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Since the early 1990s there has been global concern about the ‘crisis’ in the water sector, a 
crisis marked by increasing conflicts over access to water for both domestic and productive 
purposes and growing deprivation or water insecurity for those who are unable to claim their 
just entitlements. Despite the recognition in 2002 of the right to water as a fundamental 
human right by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it is 
estimated that 1.1 billion people worldwide lack access to safe water (Black and Talbot 
2005). Although the Committee called upon states to meet their legal obligations in ensuring 
the right to water for all, fragmentation in water resource planning and competing perceptions 
on water management continue to mar the ‘waterscape’ of policies and programs. Not 
surprisingly, in this context it is the poor and marginalized – women, children, the elderly, 
landless and so on – who are the most affected, lacking both voice and the ability to articulate 
their water rights.   
From the first central initiative to establish local governments in 1957 to the 73rd and 74th 
Constitutional Amendment in 1992 and 1993, the country has moved towards an effort at 
decentralization. The two constitutional amendments established mandatory provisions for 
decentralization to local governments in India in rural and urban areas respectively. One of 
the key features of these amendments is a proportional representation of the dalits and tribals 
and 1/3rd representation of women on local bodies. This has undoubtedly opened up spaces 
for local participation in matters of their governance. However, to what extent have these 
been successful in empowering people in governing their own matters has been a matter of 
concern to practioners and academics alike. 
This project looks at the gendered terrain of water governance in India where decentralization 
policies in the early 1990s coupled with water sector reforms from the latter half of the 
decade have sought to change the role of the state from a supply driven provider of water 
services to one, which is facilitating demand and enabling community management. At the 
core of this process of institutional restructuring is the realization that water is no longer a 
free good and that decentralized management is the only way to ensure sustainable, equitable 
and efficient water delivery. Based on principles of cost recovery from users, the new 
institutions – pani samitis for domestic water consumption and water user associations 
(WUAs) in the case of irrigation management transfer – are meant to address management 
inefficiencies through participatory planning and inclusive decision-making. 
Women’s participation is seen as integral to these new institutions, not least because of the 
plethora of policy statements at global and national forums calling for gender mainstreaming 
in water management, but more importantly because rural women as water collectors, farmers 
and caretakers of family health and hygiene, are being systematically denied their water, and 
often basic human, rights (van Wijk-Sjibesma 1998). Where water scarcity affects agrarian 
livelihoods, migration is not uncommon either of men only or entire families compelling 
women to manage the land in the absence of any clear ownership rights or entitlements to 
community water resources which are invariably linked to land ownership. Gender relations 
also intersect with other categories of social exclusion, notably caste and class – dalit 
(Scheduled Caste) and adivasi (Scheduled Tribe) women face the double burden of walking 
further to collect water as they are denied access to the village well (fear of ritual pollution) 
and in the process may encounter sexual harassment from upper caste men (Ahmed 2005a). 
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Policies that promote women’s representation in the new community institutions of 
decentralized water governance are based on the premise that such participation is necessary 
to ensure effectiveness and to give women a voice in decision-making given their central role 
in water collection, use and management at the household level. In participatory irrigation 
institutions, few, if any, women are direct members since they do not own land, but their one-
third representation is typically called for on the executive committee as they are seen as 
more efficient managers, better able to collect user fees and resolve conflicts between 
irrigators (Vasavada 2005, Kulkarni 2005). However, this instrumentalist view to 
participation sees it largely as an apolitical process where women are to be harnessed as 
assets, as naturally privileged water managers, rather than recognizing the dynamics of power 
and negotiation in the articulation of participation as the exercise of citizen rights (Kabeer 
2005).  
Research questions and objectives 
Drawing on empirical insights from demand responsive water supply projects in Gujarat and 
Maharashtra and participatory irrigation projects in Maharashtra, this research project 
proposes to look at the substantive context of women’s participation in decentralized water 
management institutions, namely pani samitis in the domestic water sector and WUAs in the 
irrigation sector.  The main goal of the project was to understand the factors in the context of 
decentralized water management, which have either facilitated or constrained rural women in 
the exercise of their rights and priorities as empowered water decision-makers and the 
implications of such articulation for the sustainable, gender-just and equitable management of 
community water resources. The research questions that we asked were: 
1. What are the financial, political and administrative aspects of decentralized reforms in 
water management that have created space for women to participate or be excluded? 
2. How are women representatives on community water management institutions 
selected, i.e. which women participate, how and why?  
3. What are the opportunity costs of participation for women, particularly the poor and 
marginalized? 
4. Are women representatives able to articulate their priorities in local planning for 
water resource development and management that are both gender just and inclusive 
taking into account other vulnerable communities?  
5. What role do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society 
organizations (CSOs) play in enabling women’s active and effective participation?  
6. To what extent has participation in community water governance been empowering 
for women representatives, i.e. challenged gender relations at the 
household/community/state/market level enabling women to develop self-efficacy as 
citizens?  
Some of the specific objectives that guided our enquiry were as follows 
• To critically outline the historical development of state policies in Maharashtra and 
Gujarat in the context of irrigation and the domestic water supply sectors respectively, 
from a gender, equity and governance perspective 
• To map the institutional environment in the project area both in terms of the 
relationship between the state and civil society and the gender and organizational 
policies/structure/culture of selected partner NGOs and local water bureaucracies 
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(social and gender audit) so as to assess the potential for mobilizing and empowering 
local women water leaders 
The research looked at the more visible forms of participation in water governance projects, 
but it also tried to understand the gendered norms, which structure or constrain articulation in 
both formal and informal institutions (Cleaver 1998, 2003) 
The project was conceived with the broader development goal to evolve a more critical and 
nuanced understanding of women’s participation in community water institutions as a process 
of negotiation, as an end in itself rather than merely as a means to achieve project efficiency.  
Research context  
Gender, water and decentralization in India  
The gender and development scenario for the country as a whole can be broadly divided into 
four phases - the early phase of planning i.e. the 1950's which was completely gender blind 
and did not see women’s presence as critical for development. The second phase onwards 
women were viewed as important for development, but largely as welfare subjects. Women 
along with dalits and tribals were conceptualized as vulnerable groups, needy of welfare 
particularly in the areas of health and education. This phase was followed by the poverty and 
population boom debates where women were specially targeted for population control 
programmes or the family planning programmes, which eventually led to the era of 
emergency in the country (Vasavi and Kingfisher 2003).  
The later 70’s and the 80’s were in fact the golden years as far as the women’s movement is 
concerned. After the launch of the UN decade for women in 1975, we see a plethora of 
women’s voices asserting their contribution to development and demanding pro-women 
legislative change in the areas of wages, rape laws, violence, sex determination etc.  
The early nineties brought in a changed political scenario with a mood for structural 
adjustment and opening up of the economies. Women were conceptualized as central to the 
model of economic growth. The agency of women to actively contribute to economic growth 
therefore had to be tapped actively. This conceptualization filtered down to almost every 
sector of development in as much as it contributed to growth without challenging current 
roles of women. The water sector is no exception. 
In linking governance to economic performance, two key perspectives have directed the 
state’s orientation to women’s role. One has been to include women as key actors in the new 
decentralized administration process, and the second has been based on the efficiency 
approach with a focus on the economic efficiency of institutions, development projects and 
programmes. 
It is important to remember that decentralization at the tertiary level comes in around the 
same time that neo-liberal policies and arguments of efficiency and economic growth 
dominate the development debate. Our research questions also try to look at some of these 
contradictions from the point of view of women’s participation. 
In the water sector we see a transition in the thrust of reform globally. Over the past decade, 
there has been an increasing consensus that the water crisis is at its core, a crisis of 
governance. A plethora of global policies and principles have been enunciated to broadly 
outline how we can apply the concept of good governance to the water sector.  These include: 
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Recognition of the need to ‘value’ that is, ‘price’ water – water can no longer be seen as a 
free or even public good, particularly in view of climate variability, predicted scarcity, and 
increasing leakages (corruption) in the water sector. 
Recognition that we need to move from state-centric, supply driven approaches to water 
services to one where the state is a facilitator of demand-responsive water provision through 
the organisation of user committees.   
Restructuring of water management institutions to ensure decision-making at the lowest 
appropriate level – participatory, inclusive and accountable water governance.  
Water is a state subject in India, that is, while the Union government at the Centre provides 
guidelines on how water resources should be developed and managed, individual state 
governments determine their own priorities for water allocation between competing sectors. 
Although agriculture continues to be the largest consumer of water in India, the National 
Water Policy (2002) reiterates that the first charge on any available water is to meet the 
drinking water needs of people and livestock.  In December 2000, the Supreme Court ruled 
that access to clean water is a fundamental human right of all citizens under Article 21 of the 
Constitution, and the state is duty bound to provide it (Ramachandraiah, 2001). However, the 
augmentation, harvesting, recharging or transportation of water (pipelines, tankers) with the 
primary intention of meeting local domestic water needs is fraught with conflict in the 
absence of efficient and effective decentralized management structures. 
Decentralisation was introduced in the early 90’s with the 73rd and 74th constitutional 
amendments. According to a World Bank (WB) review of rural decentralization in India 
“while political decentralization has progressed satisfactorily, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization is happening at a much more hesitant pace,” (WB, 2000: 8 Volume 1). 
Interestingly in their seven state study, the WB also looked at participation of rural 
population and their findings shows that women, landless, dalits and tribals participated the 
least, since they had little to gain from these processes (WB, 2000: 10 Vol 1) 
The water reform process  
The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1993), under which Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs) were restructured, gave these local governing bodies the added 
responsibility of managing drinking water and sanitation. It was felt that the Public Health 
Engineering Departments and/or state water boards which till then were responsible for 
meeting domestic water needs were centralized, monopolistic and overstaffed, lacking 
accountability to users, especially the poor and the marginalized. Instead, PRIs are now 
expected to be responsible for the choice of technology, recovery of operating costs (through 
water taxes or user fees), and the maintenance of rural water supply and sanitation schemes 
through elected pani samitis (water committees).  However, because state governments in 
many cases still control grants to the PRIs and have access to funding from bilateral and 
multilateral agencies as well as the central government, they continue to be the main 
providers of a minimum supply of free water to rural areas (UNICEF 1997: 9). 
The Ninth Five Year Plan (FYP, 1997-2002) re-articulates the global shift from perceiving 
water as a social good to be provided free by the government to acknowledging that it is a 
scarce economic resource, which should be provided according to the standard of service that 
users are willing to maintain, operate and finance. Not only are rural users expected to 
provide 10 per cent of capital costs, but they are also meant to be fully responsible for O&M 
through panchayats and pani samitis.  For the first time in the domestic water sector people’s 
participation is called for at all stages of project implementation right from the selection of 
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technological options (not surprising as they are then expected to pay for these) to 
implementation and maintenance (to overcome problems of poor workmanship and the use of 
sub-standard material). In the irrigation sector however we do not see a similar strategy 
unfolding. Here people’s participation is expected only at the implementation level. 
Recent policy documents indicate that the central government has a fairly large programme 
and financial layout for the drinking water programme in the country. Rural water supply is 
one of the six core components of the ambitious Bharat Nirman1 project of the central 
government. 
In irrigation development, equity is narrowly defined in terms of minimum access to 
beneficiaries within the command area of a particular project. Here too of course the tail 
enders of canal system often remain deprived. Linking of land ownership and water rights 
excludes women farmers from membership in water users associations and by extension 
decision-making on the timing of water delivery and pricing. Moreover, PRIs have no role to 
play in irrigation management and have no organic links with the WUAs which are 
independent users groups. Whether this link with the PRIs is desirable or not is a highly 
contested issue, but despite its separation it is evident that WUAs cannot remain political 
organizations. This division of administrative responsibility for water without coordinated 
planning is one of the major limitations of decentralized water governance, which needs to be 
explored in the context of gender equity and sustainability. 
As far as irrigation is concerned despite its many benefits for the overall productivity of 
agriculture, it is significant to understand that a large number of poor men and even fewer 
women have not been able to get access to irrigation. Expansion of irrigation for meeting 
livelihoods of the poor has rarely been on the irrigation agenda, which has largely been 
dominated by production goals, which, it is argued, would finally filter down to the poorest. 
In this context then it is not difficult to understand how different social categories of users 
have never featured on the irrigation agenda at all leave alone women from within the 
household (Kulkarni, Joy and Paranjape 2004). 
Neither the Ninth FYP nor the National Water Policy (2002) make any specific mention of 
gender differentiated water needs or women’s role in water management – they are simply 
subsumed under the general category of ‘stakeholder participation’. That is, women, and 
communities, are looked at as homogenous categories. Special attention is to be given to the 
needs of marginal groups while developing water projects, particularly those involving 
displacement. But the ‘disadvantaged’ are only identified as the scheduled tribes and castes, 
and gender is not considered a category of social stratification or exclusion within these 
marginalized communities.  
This research looks at the unfolding of women’s participation in community water 
institutions around access to safe drinking water in Gujarat and Maharashtra and access to 
water for irrigation in Maharashtra in this policy context. A brief outline of the research 
context in each state follows. 
Why Maharashtra and Gujarat  
There were several reasons that prompted us to choose these two states for our study. 
                                                 
1 Bharat Nirman is an ambitious project of the central government to build  rural infrastructure from 2005-2009. 
drinking water is one of its six components and it hopes to cover 55607 uncovered and 3.31 lakh slipped back 
habitations and 2.17 lakhs quality affected habitations during this period (NSA policy brief)  
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Maharashtra and Gujarat the two neighbouring states share a common history as they were 
one until 1960 after which they were formed as separate states. These neighbouring states 
lying in the western region of the country are characterized by both poverty and prosperity.  
Location of researchers  
At the outset, we would like to state that as researchers from both these states we share 
personal histories linked to both the water sector and women’s movement. Having worked in 
these two states for over a decade now on issues of water sector reform and gender, we as 
researchers not only have an informed understanding of the processes but also hold a stake in 
seeing a process of change in both these substantive areas. Both of these have a bearing on 
the process of research and analysis. This personal and collective history is an important 
reason for us to locate the research here. 
Socio-economic poverty amidst prosperity  
Both are highly urbanized and industrialized and considered as among the top four states as 
far as the economy is concerned. According to the Human Development Report of 
Maharashtra 2002, the per capita State Domestic Product (Rs. 20,644) was 40 per cent higher 
than the all India average (Rs. 14,712) in 1998-99.  It has until recently been ranked as the 
state with the highest per capita income in the country (HDR)2. The per capita income of 
Gujarat is 27% higher than the national average. It ranked fourth in terms of per capita 
income in India for the past two decades (GHDR 2004). In both these states, the non-
agricultural sectors play a major role thereby covering up for the poor performance of the 
primary sector3.  
Despite the distinction that both these states carry as far as per capita incomes are concerned, 
their rural poverty is on the rise and so are the inequities in wealth distribution in general. 
Economic growth has come largely from non-agricultural sectors, essentially in areas like 
Mumbai and Thane for Maharashtra and around private ports and Special Economic Zones in 
Gujarat (Golden and Silver Corridors), resulting in both sectoral and regional imbalances as 
well as environmental degradation. Moreover, if we compare the Human Development Index 
(HDI) for both the states then Maharashtra ranks 4th and Gujarat ranks 6th in the country as 
per the 2001 Human Development Report indicating that despite the high per capita income 
we do not see corresponding levels of human development attainment. Pockets of prosperity 
have been created in both the states. For example in Maharashtra, the Marathwada region is 
the most backward and scores very low on the HDI. Almost fifty per cent of the population of 
Maharashtra consume less than the required calorie intake of 2700 cals a day. 
As far as the gender indicators are concerned both the states fair very poorly. The sex ratios 
of Maharashtra and Gujarat as per the 2001 census are 922 and 920 respectively and gender 
gaps in literacy and access to basic services persist, while gender violence is increasing.   
Non-state initiatives  
Both the states have also had long histories of civil society initiatives of a differing nature. 
Maharashtra has had a long history of social reform and movements around inequities of 
                                                 
2 The more recent report of 2003-2004 shows that it ranks third after Harayana and Punjab. 
3 Socio-economic survey of Maharashtra The share of agriculture in Maharashtra declined from 42.14 per cent 
in 1960-61 to 27.69 per cent in 1980-81 and fell to 15.8 per cent by 2002-03.  
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caste, class and patriarchy. Mahatma Phule, Savitribai Phule, Babasaheb Ambedkar are a few 
names that have contributed to the history of social change in Maharashtra.  
In Gujarat, the Gandhian ideology set the tone for social change (Iyengar 2000) and most of 
the early NGOs strongly emphasize values of self-reliance, simplicity and volunteerism, 
within the development framework largely set by the state, (e.g. SEWA, the Self Employed 
Women’s Association, has had a long history of accommodative politics, see Ahmed 2005b). 
Gujarat is also known for its enterprising spirit and not surprisingly, it was the base for the 
launch of the dairy cooperative movement and its brand-name, Amul – a development 
success story both locally and globally. A number of academic and research institutes in the 
state, notably the Institute of Rural Management in Anand, have also contributed to the more 
recent professionalisation of the voluntary sector.  
Movements and initiatives around water charecterise the waterscape of both the states. In 
Maharashtra there have been pioneering example in the 1980’s like the Pani panchayat 
experiment initiated by Vilasrao Salunkhe around equity in access to water. This was one of 
the very first experiments on delinking water rights from land rights. Mukti Sangharsh 
Chalwal in western Maharashtra further developed on this idea and spread it on a scale. 
Experiments around decentralized water management also were initiated by SOPPECOM in 
the late 80’s and early 90’s with the first water users association created on the Mula major 
irrigation project in Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra4. Experiments by Anna Hazare, 
Popatrao Pawar on watershed management too exemplify the rich civil society initiatives 
around water in Maharashtra5. 
Gujarat too has had several initiatives around water and the experience of the Swadhayay 
movement stands out in this regard. Pandurang Shashtri Athawale, who initiated the 
Swadhyaya movement in the early 80s was influenced by the Gandhian ideology. Self help 
was his main motto and that is how Swadhyaya got its name. The movement has stressed the 
importance of recharging of wells and groundwater. At the opposite end of the spectrum has 
been the Narmada Bachao Andolan which has been protesting the construction of the Sardar 
Sarovar project and the immense displacement of adivasis that this has entailed. But Gujarat 
has also seen much state-civil society collaboration over water policy and management issues 
as Chapter 3 outlines.  
It is these vibrant movements and organisational collective action, which have in fact 
managed to make the state accountable and counter the otherwise adverse effects of states 
efforts at commodification and privatization in the water sector. 
Decentralisation process 
Maharashtra was the first state to adopt the Balwantrai Mehta committee report and bring in 
amendments in its two acts by 19946. Interestingly it is also one of the lead states in 
launching the sector reform process in the water sector. The seven state World Bank study 
shows that even in a progressive state such as Maharashtra, PRIs are looked at as bodies 
which are responsible for the execution and maintenance of development works and schemes. 
They say that the government of Maharashtra is actually transferring funds, functions and 
functionaries to the local governments (WB, 2000, Volume II pg 188). 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion on this experiment refer to chapter 5 of this report. 
5 Both these efforts in Ahmednagar district in watershed management have been sort of trend setters in the 
waterscape of the country. Anna Hazare is considered as a pioneer in this effort. 
6 Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958 and the Maharashtra ZilhaPanchayats and Panchayat Samitis Act 1961 
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In Gujarat, the history of decentralization predates the formation of the state as a distinct and 
separate entity, from Maharashtra, in 1960. With the enactment of the Bombay Village 
Panchayats Act (1958) a foundation for democratic decentralization was established and in 
1961 the Gujarat Panchayat Act was passed, delegating authority and the transfer of funds to 
various departments. But it was not till the 73rd Constitutional Amendment and the renewed 
Gujarat Panchayats Act of 1993 that a more substantial commitment to decentralization was 
made. 
The experience with women in panchayats has been mixed in both the states and although the 
whole question of men as proxies for elected women representatives continues to haunt the 
success of reservations for women in PRIs, increasingly we find a large number of women 
entering the public arena and asserting themselves. The Mahila  
Swaraj Abhiyan in Gujarat, is a network of women’s groups and individuals who have been 
trying to capacitate women panchayat members and leaders as well as work on questions of 
gender right both through elected representatives and other networks.  
Decentralisation in the water sector in its present form is fairly recent in both the states of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. The once low-key sub committee of the GP, Drinking water 
committee has now acquired significance in the light of the recent reform process where a 
large fund flow to the pani samitis has been possible. The irrigation sector is under the state 
control and has no organic links with the PRI. Its process of decentralization is independent 
of the PRI amendments and are closely linked with irrigation performance and recovery of 
costs. 
Given that a significant amount of resources are being channeled to panchayats/ WUAs to 
promote decentralized and sustainable water management systems and community institution 
building, it is imperative that decision-makers at all levels are capacitated to ensure that 
principles of gender equity and social inclusion do not simply become instrumentalist design 
factors driven by project or program objectives of community/ stakeholder participation 
rather than empowered citizen action by all men and women. It is in this context that we 
locate our study for Maharashtra and Gujarat.  
In Maharashtra, our study is located in both the sub-sectors of water namely domestic water 
and irrigation. The domestic water sector has a long history in the state with various 
experiments that started from dug wells, centralized regional piped water schemes introduced 
through a DFID (Department for International Development)  support to the present demand 
driven schemes covered under the sector reform process. Our study concentrates on the 
present sector reform process where we specifically look at two schemes of Aple Pani (our 
water) and Jalswarajya (water freedom)7 based on a demand driven approach with a 10% 
capital contribution from the users and entire Operation and Management (O&M) costs to be 
borne by the women. Participation especially of women in planning and implementation is a 
special feature of these schemes. 
In Gujarat three different institutional environments were studied: (i) the Ghogha project, 
initiated in 1997 with Dutch bi-lateral aid as one of the first projects under the sector reforms 
framework, (ii) the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation project in Kutch where the 
institution building process is ongoing and lessons learned are being transferred and (iii) 
NGO facilitated and community-led decentralised water interventions, within the framework 
of sector reforms, i.e. with users contributing 10 percent of capital costs and being 
responsible for all O&M expenditure. 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion on the history of reform process in the domestic water sector in Maharashtra refer to 
chapter 4. 
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Comparing the two states, we see that the thrust of state led decentralization process varies. 
Maharashtra has launched water sector reform in both the sectors through the passage of 
several laws tied to the World Bank loans, while Gujarat is still moving gradually, 
particularly in the irrigation sector. Though the principles of the reform process in the 
domestic water sector are the same, Gujarat continues its implementation through centre and 
state support over multi or bi-lateral donor agencies, though ADB is funding urban slum 
infrastructure initiatives, including access to water and sanitation through cost recovery 
principles. NGOs are far more prominent in the Gujarat context as against the Maharashtra 
one where the state has laid its own apparatus for civil society participation. 
This varied context therefore has a bearing on the methods of investigation and on our final 
analysis as well. Therefore, although there are aspects where comparisons will be possible 
between the two states, there will also be areas where the uniqueness would have to be 
respected. 
Organisation of the report  
The report is organised in six chapters, the first, which is the Introduction to the study, lays 
out the research context, the questions, and the rationale for selection of the two states. The 
second chapter discusses our normative concerns and conceptual framework on gender, water 
and decentralization. The third chapter details out the research context and the findings in the 
Gujarat domestic water scenario while the fourth chapter discusses the same for Maharashtra. 
The fifth chapter discusses the research context and the findings in the irrigation sector in 
Maharashtra and the final chapter brings out our learning and recommendations for policy 
and practice. 
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 Chapter 2 
Unmasking Decentralization in Water Management: 
Gender and Good Governance 
Introduction  
In a recent interview, the WASMO (Water and Sanitation Management Organization) Project 
Director claimed that one of the outcomes of decentralisation in the domestic water sector in 
Gujarat is that (rural) women should have the right to ask for (safe) water at their doorstep.8 
‘Good governance’ is an integral part of his vision, but what does this mean, for water 
resources, or for the women and men who are elected or selected on community water 
management institutions, whether for domestic water or irrigation, in Gujarat and 
Maharashtra? For the WASMO project director, at the heart of the success of water sector 
reforms is self-change and the key to this is honesty and transparency. But for many poor 
women and men, good water governance, may simply translate as an assurance from their 
representatives that they will get enough water at the right time (i.e. appropriate, jointly 
decided) and at the right place (public or private connection).   
This chapter outlines three conceptual gateways on which we hinged our inquiry, namely: (i) 
decentralization as a terrain for more efficient, effective and equitable water governance, (ii) 
an understanding of whether the processes of participation underlying the facilitation of a 
‘new’ water commons translate into space for rural women and men from diverse socio-
economic backgrounds to articulate citizenship, including livelihood, rights and (iii) the 
extent to which political space and articulation have empowered women, particularly those 
represented on the new water institutions, but also in the larger community arena. This 
requires engaging in a more nuanced understanding of the neo-liberal state in India, where 
decentralisation of water management is not driven by market exigencies solely, but rests, 
and to a large extent is directed by, political benevolence. Water, for the state, is both a public 
and a political good – while it struggles to ensure access to water through new partnerships 
with bi/multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, communities of water users and to a more limited 
extent the private sector, it also seeks to maintain its hegemony over this process through 
legitimizing forms of populist ‘control’.  Underlying or masking this process of state 
‘accumulation and dispossession’ (Harvey 2003) is the language of growth with equity and 
justice9 – which presents us with a somewhat hybrid agenda of neo-liberal reform, of which 
decentralisation is a key aspect, in the water sector.  
We begin this chapter by an outline of our normative framework on democratic participation, 
equity and sustainability with respect to water, sustainability of water governance (both 
institutional and management related aspects) and empowerment. We then move on to 
outlining our conceptual framework. We begin with a brief introduction to decentralisation 
and its implications for environmental democracy as well as for gender rights, particularly in 
the context of water governance.  Governance, increasingly seen as the ‘key’ to resolving the 
water crisis, is far removed from the rights of women – despite a plethora of statements 
calling for the equal participation of women and men in decision-making, the water 
governance agenda remains largely gender-blind (Cleaver and Franks 2005).  This 
necessitates understanding not only how participation in decentralisation is structured, but 
equally, the problematic of (women’s) agency and empowerment. We end this chapter with 
                                                 
8 Personal interview, Ahmedabad, 24/6/08 
9 See approach paper to the 11th Five Year Plan. 
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our methodological framework, outlines our methods and the constraints or challenges we 
encountered in the field.  
Our normative concerns around water  
We detail our normative concerns around water by looking at its various attributes first 
followed by a discussion on concerns. 
Water is an ecosystem resource wherein we need to recognise and respect concepts of 
ecological flow, minimum ecosystem requirements and the preservation of ecosystem 
services. 
Water is a common pool resource and has competing uses which call for some form of 
collective management and regulation in order to ensure equitable and regenerative 
(sustainable) use. For example, in India most surface water is by and large seen as part of the 
public property regime, whereas groundwater, despite attempts to regulate access, operates 
under a private property regime, where land ownership has determined the right to use (and 
overexploit) water flowing below.   
Water is both a local and non-local resource and modifying water regimes in upstream 
villages has basin or watershed-wide implications affecting water availability and quality for 
downstream villages. However, most planning around water remains limited to either the 
local level, particularly in the case of decentralisation and local governance, or in contrast, 
mega water projects are planned. There are few, if any attempts, at building meso-level 
institutions, either regional or around river basins and watersheds to negotiate conflicts and 
address sustainability of the resource / aquifer10. 
Equitable access to water  
Equity is important because there are historically embedded social and economic inequalities. 
Class, caste, tribe (or community) and patriarchy are some of the stratifiers in society through 
which inequality manifests itself in India. This understanding leads us to critically examine 
the ‘local community’ the participation of which has become quite critical to water sector 
programmes. The gender dimension adds one more layer to the issue of historical 
disadvantages. 
Equity as we understand it in the water sector is a matter of minimum assurance to all of 
water required for livelihood needs irrespective of their ownership of assets, especially those 
who depend on land and water for livelihood needs including landless. By livelihood needs 
we include water required for domestic use, energy, livestock/fisheries etc, productive needs 
as well as that required for ecosystem needs. Here we introduce the idea of a per capita right 
over use of water. Per capita water allocation, first taken up by Pani Panchayat and further 
developed by Mutki Sangharsh and the South Maharashtra movement is based actually 
embedded in this principle of separation between land rights and water rights.  
While there is a spectrum of views on how far and to what degree equity in this sense can be 
realised, there needs to be a broad agreement that it forms an important component of a 
strategy for water sector reform. Minimum water assurance is here seen as a right that vests 
in people by virtue of their right to an adequate livelihood, and not by virtue of the land or 
other assets that they own. In the conventional approach, water rights are tied to and enjoyed 
through land rights. In contrast, the consensus around the concept of equitable access to water 
                                                 
10 This has been drawn on the work of SOPPECOM, Pune and for a detailed discussion refer to Joy and 
Paranjape (2004) 
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is based on a separation between the two. This means that apart from water for domestic 
purposes for all, water for production needs to be extended to the landless and women. 
Special efforts will be needed to bring such disadvantaged groups within the ambit of 
minimum water assurance as a right of equitable water access. 
Equity also has implications for water use prioritisation (or what could be called as inter-
sectoral equity) and implies making distinctions about water use and treating water for 
different uses differently. Broadly, the priority in most areas would be: drinking water; water 
for domestic use and for cattle; water required for ecosystem regeneration (for example, 
minimum environmental flows) and water required for livelihood activity; and surplus/extra 
water that could be used for cash or commercial crops. The principle here is that water should 
become available to the next category of use only after the first use is assured – and also that 
some water uses (e.g. flushing toilets or watering lawns) may not require the same quality of 
water as that for drinking purposes.  
Gender equity in the sector  
At present gender is a dimension that is routinely added on as a component to most 
programmes, partly because women’s movements and struggles have made a mark and 
equally because many funders have come to insist on its inclusion. It is these reasons that 
compel the state to address some of the inequities and disadvantages that women face. 
However, there is little attention given to the theoretical treatment of this issue in the water 
sector and hence most of the efforts at making the water sector inclusive become mere lip 
service.   
The questions that we often face in this regard are whether women’s hard work around water 
qualifies them for participation in the sector planning and a right to entitlements. Right to 
water often becomes a tricky issue in the context of water for women especially because at 
one level women are divided across social groups such as that of caste, class, religion etc and 
across households and at another level water itself is divided into sectors of domestic and 
production. What then is the notion of individual access, independent entitlements for 
women? How do we understand equity in this regard? Do we consider women as equal 
stakeholders in the water sector or are they seen only as part of these larger social groups. 
Gender and equity in drinking water and sanitation is about basic human rights – the right to 
water and sanitation has been well stated and women, like men, are adequately covered in 
principle at least. Where they lose out though is not being able to participate in decision-
making that ensures this right and that ensure that water for drinking purposes is the first 
priority.  
On the other hand, you have water rights linked to land ownership which again is largely 
unfavourable to women. So the equity question in irrigation and water for livelihoods begins 
not with participation, though that this is important, but with the de-linking of access to water 
from land ownership – for women, poor and the landless. In India, this entire process is rather 
messy and we really don’t have any rights or regulation of access for either groundwater or 
surface water systems, except where communities, with some external facilitation, have made 
these norms themselves through multi-stakeholder dialogue processes, negotiation, etc. 
There is however a need to bridge this divide and look at water as a livelihood resource and 
therefore rights around water as right to water for livelihood. This calls for clear rights over 
use of water for meeting livelihood needs and decision making around it. 
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Sustainability and regenerative use of water  
Terms like sustainability and sustainable development are being used very widely for very 
different things: from a purely economic sense equivalent to the withdrawal of all state 
subsidies and support, to a strictly environmental sense. Sustainability to us then is a) use of 
water within renewability limits where we restrict our uses to water that can be recharged b) 
minimising importing of water after a clear assessment of the local water resource is done 
along with the livelihood needs of the community.  
Water: social or economic good  
This is a highly contested terrain and there are polarised views on the question of pricing and 
cost recovery. Since the 90s there has been an increasing demand to remove subsidies in the 
water sector and that, the water tariff should reflect the real cost of providing water. This is 
also reflected in the World Bank prescription for water sector reforms in India as it advocates 
‘meeting costs from user charges. The other position has been advocating right to water as a 
state responsibility, which is free of cost. This position has largely been in the context of the 
domestic water sector. There seems very little expounding of positions on the water sector as 
a whole and this has only compounded the problems on the question of pricing and recovery. 
We find neither of these extreme positions advancing the goals of water sector restructuring 
as outlined earlier. We understand water as both a social and an economic good and argue for 
a critical role of the state and not its withdrawal as is perceived in the current paradigm. For 
example, the state will have to pursue the agenda of minimum assurance of water for all for 
meeting livelihood needs. 
We do believe that we should take a rational, but socially just stand on the issue of water 
pricing and would argue that the basic service required for livelihood needs should be 
provided at an affordable cost, say to meet operation and maintenance costs. Any water used 
beyond the meeting of livelihood needs should be treated as an economic service should be 
provided at an economic cost which could mean that some share of the capital costs is taken 
over and above the O & M costs.  
Understanding governance and decentralisation  
The need to govern has been an intrinsic part of the evolution of human society from feudal 
kingdoms to nation states with the legitimatization of social order by the ruler over the ruled 
as one of the main objectives. From neo-liberal, democratic states to dictatorships, from adult 
franchise to the exclusion of citizens on the basis of gender, the nature of government 
machineries and governance around the world vary tremendously.11  It was not till the early 
1990s that the concept of governance gained attention when international institutions began 
to see the ‘crisis of governance’ at the heart of the failure of development and economic 
growth.  The World Bank defined governance in narrow economist and administrative terms 
as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and 
social resources for development,” (World Bank 1992:1). Four key dimensions lay at the 
heart of this neo-liberal framework: public sector management (capacity and efficiency); 
accountability; providing the legal framework for development and ensuring access to 
information and transparency (Jayal 2003). Missing from this top-down, state-centric 
framework was the idea of politics and processes of power.   
                                                 
11 It is important to distinguish between government and governance – the former refers to the institutional 
arrangements for the exercise of sovereign power while the latter defines the process as well as the results of 
making decisions on behalf of society(Mander and Asif 2004: 11) 
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In 1997, UNDP (and other donor agencies, social actors) extended the definition of 
governance beyond the mere exercise of power by the state to include “the exercise of power 
or authority – political, economic, administrative or otherwise – to manage a country’s 
resources and affairs. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations 
and mediate their differences,” (UNDP 1997: 9).  The growing visibility of civil society and 
social movements in the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly with the end of the Cold War, the 
breakdown of the USSR, the emergence of transitional economies in Europe, the end of 
apartheid in South Africa and the liberalisation of trade made it essential that the concept of 
governance is inclusive and recognizes the notion of citizenship and the articulation of rights. 
A rights-based approach mandates the state to provide ‘enabling conditions’ and recognizes 
the importance of treating voice as a significant criterion of legitimacy in processes of policy 
formulation (Jayal 2003).  
The new definition of governance was seen to converge with the human capabilities approach 
(Sen 1990, UNDP 2000) and the poverty reduction agenda: enhancing human capabilities, 
particularly for the poor, through education, good health and participation in decision-making 
has an indirect influence on economic production and plays a role in influencing social 
change (Mukhopadhyay and Meer 2004: 20). 
It is in this overriding context that the policy terrain of decentralisation emerged as the corner 
stone or edifice of the proposed good governance and rights based agendas. Under the 
umbrella of decentralisation, the transfer of management responsibilities and powers from 
central government to a variety of local institution rests on the belief that such reforms not 
only increase popular participation, but also promote more equitable and efficient forms of 
local management, which would ultimately lead to sustainable development (Ribot 2003, 
Manor 2004, Beall 2006).    
In India, decentralisation in the post independence era dates back to the early constitutional 
debates between Gandhi and Ambedkar in 1948 where the question of village versus 
individual as the primary unit was discussed. Gandhi had argued for village republics and had 
in fact in an issue of 'Harijan' detailed out what a panchayat should be (Harijan 1942 as cited 
in World Bank, 2000 pg 18). and Ambedkar had spoken of individual rights and tended 
towards a doing away of the village as an administrative unit." What is the village but a sink 
of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad that the 
Draft Constitution has discarded the village and adopted the individual as its 
unit.1”(Ambedkar in the constitutional debates 1948, as cited in the World Bank 2000 pg 18) 
Several committees were launched by the post independent Indian governments to look into 
the possibilities of decentralisation. The first among these was the Balwantrai committee in 
1958, followed by several others to look into different aspects of rural decentralisation. 
Almost all the committees spoke about a lack of political will, interfering bureaucracy and 
elite capture at the local level as the key obstacles in decentralisation. However, none of the 
subsequent processes seem to have effectively tackled some of these constraints until 1993 
when the 73rd amendment was introduced with the political idea of democratic 
decentralisation (WB, 2000). 
While there is no standard model or definition of decentralisation, many authors have tried to 
distinguish between types and forms of government functions which are decentralised. 
Litvack et al. (2001) delineates three types: (i) fiscal decentralisation refers to lower tiers of 
government setting and collecting taxes, making particular expenditures and rectifying 
‘vertical imbalances’ between revenue and public spending, (ii) political decentralisation is 
related to democratic participation in decision-making, through for example, quotas for 
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marginalised groups or women and (iii) administrative decentralisation refers to how 
responsible political or governing institutions turn policy decisions into more just and 
inclusive outcomes (cited in Beall 2003, adapted).   
In terms of administrative decentralisation, Rondinelli’s three-way categorisation between 
deconcentration, delegation and devolution is useful; wherein deconcentration refers to the 
transfer of certain planning, financing and management tasks to local units of central 
agencies, without any inherent transfer of authority. “Delegation by contrast, relates to the 
transferring of responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to 
other organisations that have semi-independent authority and ‘are not wholly controlled by 
the central government but are ultimately accountable to it’ (Rondinelli et al, 1989:75-76). 
Devolution is a more extensive form of decentralisation that refers to the actual transfer of 
authority to lower tiers of government, with local governments being given autonomy with 
respect to decision-making, finance and management,” (Beall 2003). While deconcentration 
and delegation imply a reorganisation of central government, devolution means relinquishing 
political, i.e. decision-making, power (DFID 2002).   
However, decentralisation is not a panacea for either the facilitation of democratic 
participation or more efficient and effective governance. The discourse on decentralization 
assumes to a large extent that once the institutions of governance have been engineered to 
bring these closer to localities, participation and voice will follow. Non-elite groups in 
society will automatically raise their voices and demand accountability, transparency and a 
fair (just, equitable) share in public goods (such as water). On the one hand, decentralisation 
entails complex changes to administrative, financial and decision making systems that require 
a high level of technical expertise and coordination. On the other hand, the basic premise of 
decentralization that government is brought closer to people and therefore is more responsive 
to the real needs and interests of people (citizens) is undermined without strategies to 
mobilize ‘voice’ of subordinate groups in society, and the forging of institutionalized spaces 
for participation and accountability (Standing 2004 and Mukhopadhyay 2004).   
Most work on gender dimensions of decentralization focuses on the connection between the 
subordinate power of women in the private domain and possibilities and limits to the exercise 
of power in the public sphere, in the world of politics, decision- making and governance.  It is 
assumed by some studies (Evertzen 2001) that local politics is easier for women because 
eligibility criteria for the local level are less stringent and local government is the closest 
(physically) to women’s spheres of life, and easier to combine with the rearing of children. 
Moreover, since women’s interests tend to be linked to their gendered responsibilities, it has 
been argued that their priorities would often relate to the provision of local amenities, 
services and infrastructure – for example, improved water and sanitation (Beall 2006). 
On the other hand, Goetz (1997) argues that local government is always hierarchical and 
more embedded in local social and power structures compared to national government and so 
it is difficult for women to penetrate as independent political actors, or for them to raise 
controversial gender issues. Whether or not women would be effective in the exercise of 
participation and power depends upon to a greater extent on the terms of their inclusion. 
Often, the role and influence of traditional authorities gets mapped on to the new form of 
formal local government structures introduced by decentralisation. Customary panchayats act 
as gate keepers controlling nominations to elections in general, but their influence is 
particularly strong in the selection of women that may take advantage of reservations 
(Sharma 1998). 
It is clear to most gender and development researchers and practitioners that institutional 
innovations are required such that there are rules to secure institutionalized spaces for 
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women’s participation in planning and monitoring and most importantly auditing and review 
of expenditures, allocating a percentage of budgets for women-only deliberations, gender 
sensitive local revenue and spending analysis. However, creating institutional spaces is also 
not enough, but what is required is that the ‘construction of interest as also the construction of 
voice’ is seen as a political project involving building citizen capacity to collectively engage 
local powers as well as the state. This capacity is created through the simultaneous process of 
engagement from below and above. Heller (2001) maintains that whereas the active agency 
of civil and political society builds participation and mobilization from below (read NGOs 
and party activists), state created channels, opportunities and incentives (or disincentives) for 
collective action construct citizen capacity from above. Here many writers warrant caution: 
while decentralization is supposed to be increasing accountability and participation of 
women, it has to be remembered that politics at the local level is far more embedded in 
unequal social structures where traditional authorities and elites hold power and institution 
building and planning capacity is weaker. 
Decentralising and democratising water  
Crafting democratic and decentralised institutions for community water management where 
concerns of equity, gender and sustainability are integral requires an understanding of the 
peculiar nature of water as a common pool, flow resource where conflict and competition at 
multiple levels between upstream/downstream villages, and between sectors is not 
uncommon.  
Equally, water plays an important role in local democratisation, not only because it is at the 
heart of daily livelihoods and decision-making can facilitate democratic change, but water 
also has the potential to generate revenue for local government (Ribot 2003).  Thus the water 
sector reform process in India has been parallel, at least in the drinking/domestic water sector 
with the restructuring of the institutions of local governance, namely the panchayats (PRIs), 
the creation of sub-committees and the empowerment of gram sabhas (village assemblies) as 
collective decision-making forums.    
Re-thinking participation  
“…Control over water signals social organisation. A community that cannot hold on to its 
water resources probably cannot do much else,” (Ingram 1997:2). 
Central to the goals of decentralisation and institutional restructuring is participation, a 
concept which has been much debated in development practice, as both a valorising discourse 
providing space for the acquisition of new knowledge, building project ownership and 
facilitating empowerment on the one hand, and on the other with the underlying, but largely 
unrecognised potential for creating new forms of uncontested power – the ‘tyranny of 
participation’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Cited in O’Reilly, 2008). Typically, participatory 
approaches have been dichotomized into ‘means’ and ‘ends’ (Oakley et al. 1991) with the 
former seeing participation as an efficient tool or means for achieving better project outcomes 
and the latter arguing that the process of participation is important in itself as it enhances the 
capacity of individuals, particularly those from disadvantaged or marginalised groups, to 
improve their own lives and build self-autonomy (Cleaver 1999).    
In the water sector, participation is used as a term to validate numerous activities including 
legitimizing expenditure, reducing operational costs (through the collection of community 
contributions for capital costs and O&M charges) and improving the public image of 
bureaucratic mis-management and languishing infrastructure (Mosse 2001). At the core of 
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most project or programmatic understandings of participation is the notion of the unitary, 
undifferentiated community, imbued with holistic, albeit lost, values of environmental 
stewardship which can be revived through collective mobilisation and participation in the 
emerging new commons. Such a conceptualisation of communities overlooks social 
difference and relations of power and exclusion underlying access and entitlements to 
resources, conflicts and processes of negotiation or the complexity of cooperative action. It 
also eulogises communities as having specific/appropriate knowledge and skills for 
environmental governance. So although communities do have an understanding of their local 
resources, firstly it is likely to be diverse across different social groups and moreover various 
structural and resource (financial) constraints might prevent people from making informed 
choices around planning of their own resources. The role of ‘outsiders’ (social change agents, 
technical experts, civil society) becomes important both because of the likelihood of them 
bringing in new skills and information and creating a space for alternate subaltern politics. It 
becomes important though to state at the outset that outsiders need to have a broad consensus 
on the normative concerns detailed out earlier. 
Drawing on various conceptualisations of participation, Agarwal (2001) outlines six different 
forms or levels typifying varying degrees of participation in a hierarchical ‘ladder’ moving 
upwards towards more effective and empowering participation. Levels are defined here, “not 
by how a group is initiated, but by the extent of people’s activeness,” (Agarwal 2001: 1625). 
Participatory exclusions for women as women, (gendered hierarchies of power), and for 
women from diverse social and economic backgrounds (differentiated by caste, class, faith, 
ethnicity), take many forms. These can be overt (membership rules of water user 
associations) or subtle, located in local cultural and social practices which implicitly prevent 
women from speaking out at public meetings or in front of male elders. Discourses of 
participation are rooted in power – “….different meanings may serve similar purposes, while 
similar meanings may serve different purposes,” (O’Reilly 2008: 197).  
Table 2.1 Typology of participation 
Form/level of participation Characteristic features 
Nominal participation  Membership in the group 
Passive participation  Being informed of decisions ex post facto; 
attending meetings and listening   without 
speaking up  
Consultative participation  Being asked an opinion in specific matters 
without influencing decisions                         
Activity-specific participation   Being asked to (or volunteering to) 
undertake specific tasks 
Active participation  Expressing opinions, whether or not 
solicited, or taking initiative 
Interactive (empowering) participation Having voice and influence in the group’s 
decision 
(Source: Agarwal 2001: 1624) 
A review of programme and project level experience of involving women in government and 
donor-assisted drinking water schemes in India during the U.N. Decade reveals that, for the 
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most part, women have been seen as beneficiaries rather than partners (Venkateswaran 1995).  
Participation is often reduced to ‘labour utilisation’ (particularly in drought relief work), 
while ‘consultation with communities’ generally signifies consultation with men as heads of 
households and community leaders. Viewing women’s participation as both incremental and 
instrumental has meant that women’s practical needs have not always been addressed, nor 
has their knowledge about water sources and preferences been taken into account.12  In a 
number of cases participation has placed an extra burden on women’s time or reinforced 
gender inequalities without commensurate economic or social benefits in terms of income or 
status gains (Baden 1993: 5).  Neither has such participation addressed the larger question of 
women’s water rights – both in terms of access to water (physical, affordable, potable) or 
their role in decision-making on how (scarce) water sources should be used and managed, i.e. 
water distribution and entitlements for individuals / households in socially differentiated 
communities.  Not surprisingly, a review of the Report of the First National Commission on 
Water (1999) by one of its members, stated that women have “little voice in water-resource 
planning in this country, yet they are always depicted as the providers and managers of water 
at the household level,” (Iyer 2001: 1117). 
In her study of a drinking water project in northern Rajasthan, jointly funded by the state 
government and a large German development bank, under the aegis of public-private 
partnerships, O’Reilly (2008) argues that there is an unquestioned relationship between 
women and water underlying women’s participation in the project: 
“Women’s groups must first and foremost serve the purpose of making the water supply 
system sustainable in the long run, i.e. women must be mobilised to take responsibility for the 
water management of their village. The health and hygiene education objective and the 
empowerment and self-help objective are important but should be subordinate to this 
overriding goal,”  
(Project Social Side report cited in O’Reilly 2008: 199). 
Not only does women’s participation explicitly impinge on their (unpaid) labour as mothers 
and housewives to facilitate the long-term viability of a community / decentralised system, 
but there is also an underlying assumption that women would be willing to comply, because 
of their altruistic relationship with water and the environment. Such assumptions give 
primacy to women’s roles as domestic water collectors as well as privilege her positioning as 
a natural caretaker for nature and her family, without looking at the structures of power 
underlying agency.13 Ultimately, participation is about the exercise of power – in relation to 
the ‘other’, for power is not possessed by an individual (Foucault 1980, Cited in O’Reilly, 
2008), but is shaped through a recursive relationship between agency and structure.  
                                                 
12 The distinction between practical and strategic gender needs and interests was first made by Moser  where the 
former refers to meeting the basic needs that would reduce the drudgery of women’s everyday lives, for 
example, access to potable water or improved stoves, that would reduce the time and energy spent in water / 
fuelwood collection or cooking. However, practical needs, while an important entry point into complex socio-
cultural environments, do not question who continues to collect water or even how much water an individual or 
a household is entitled to. Strategic interests raised larger questions of women’s rights, control over resources 
and participation in decision-making. 
13 There is a wide range of ecofeminist literature which sees women not only as victims of the environmental 
crisis but also ascribes to them the virtue of being natural carers because of their role in the reproduction, 
nurturing and sustenance of life (see Braidotti et al. 1994). Such biologically deterministic typologies of women 
as unitary categories have been widely criticised by feminist political ecology (Rocheleau et al. 1996) and 
feminist environmentalism (Agarwal 1992) for being ahistorical and overlooking the larger structures of power 
within which women’s relationship with the environment is embedded.     
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Problematising women’s agency  
“A prototype rural woman water user is traditionally responsible for fetching domestic water 
for her family and should also become involved in planning and decision-making about the 
management of integrated water resources, raising funds and contributing other resources 
for the construction of new supplies. Through membership in water user associations and 
groups, she should play a part in the maintenance of water supply infrastructure and in 
regulating the distribution of water. As a consumer, she [should be] is empowered to exert 
sufficient pressure to demand a good service from water suppliers,” (Cleaver 2003: 3, 
brackets added). 
The assumptions underlying women’s agency need to be critically examined because of the 
high value that is placed on the active participation of marginalised people and women in 
community institutions around collective resources. Agency is the ability to define one’s goal 
and act upon it, but agency is more than ‘observable action’ as it also encompasses the 
meaning, motivation and purpose that individuals bring to their activity, or in other words, 
‘the power within’. Agency tends to be operationalised as decision-making – the power to act 
– but it can take a variety of forms including bargaining and negotiation, resistance and 
intangible cognitive processes of reflection and analysis by individuals and groups (Kabeer 
1999: 3). Agency can also be exercised in the more negative sense of ‘power over’ – but 
power can also operate in the absence of agency, through consent and complicity, an 
acceptance of the legitimacy of a given social order.  There is a longstanding debate in 
contemporary social science theory, which is beyond the confine of our framework, on the 
extent to which agency is in fact ‘conscious’ or whether what is assumed to be conscious is in 
fact the deliberate exercise of ‘false consciousness’ by the powerless  
One way of understanding this deeper reality lies in Bourdieu’s idea of ‘doxa’ – the traditions 
and beliefs that exist beyond discourse or argumentation and are taken for granted to such an 
extent that they are ‘naturalised’, i.e. they form an objective, acceptable social world 
(Bourdieu 1977). Bourdieu argues “that as long as the subjective assessments of social actors 
are largely congruent with the objectively organised possibilities available to them, the world 
of doxa remains intact, a self-evident ‘common sense’ about the world that is validated in the 
objective consensus of the way that world is,” (Kabeer 1999:9).   In Bourdieu’s view doxa is 
determined by habitus – a set of dispositions, embedded in culture and shaped by elites that 
makes people act or react in different ways. Thus, while agency is largely prescribed by what 
is culturally appropriate or not, many would argue that compliance is not complicity and that 
women do challenge hegemonies, even in the organisation of water, in ways that do not 
necessarily constitute overt resistance (Agarwal 1997).  
“The availability of alternatives at the discursive level, of being able to have chosen 
differently or at least being able to imagine such a possibility, is thus crucial to the 
emergence of a critical consciousness, to the process by which people move from a position 
of unquestioning acceptance of the social order to a critical, and perhaps transformatory, 
perspective on it. But the process is always uneven in any given context because people come 
to specific points in their lives through very different histories and hence bring very different 
material standpoints and discursive potentials to their present situation,” (Kabeer 1999: 9).  
For Kabeer, the issue is not simply about being able to choose between different alternatives, 
but from a feminist standpoint, the kind of choices or decisions women are able to make. She 
distinguishes between first and second order choices – the former are strategic decisions 
which are fundamental to the shaping of a woman’s life (e.g. the right to go to school, to 
belong to a women’s group or to marry a person of one’s choice or have a child/daughter). 
Second order choices, located around the assertion of practical gender needs, affect a 
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woman’s quality of life – for example, the right to choose where a water standpost should be 
located – but do not constitute its defining parameters or transformatory potential. In other 
words, the exercise of agency for Kabeer, is not just about potential ability to exercise choice, 
but more importantly about the impacts of such choices on well-being outcomes.     
However, empowering citizens to choose, with dignity, the kind of life they value requires 
not only an enabling institutional and material environment but also pre-supposes a normative 
and moral good which empowered and capable citizens are expected to value and ‘choose’.  
In practice, this is far more complex than we realise – women, for example, do not always (or 
necessarily) want the option of autonomy, nor do they necessarily conceptualise power 
differently from men (Deshmukh-Ranadive 2005).  This inner dialectic has been well brought 
out in studies on women fieldworkers who tread a delicate line between expectations of their 
ability to share gender concerns with village women and on the other hand, their 
organisational compulsions as ‘outsiders’ to a larger authority where their positioning and 
exercise of power is structured by gender and other social stratifiers, not uncommon to what 
the women they work with face (see Goetz).      
Cleaver (2007) argues, that people do not exercise (property) rights over natural resources 
simply as ‘resource appropriators’ but as women and men with complex and multi-faceted 
identities that are not only embedded in social contexts or structured by social space, but 
equally located in embodied notions of the ‘self’. While there has been little attention to how 
embodiment – the presentation of the self – enables or constrains women’s participation, it is 
clear that the human body is a signifier of social status and power as well as communicative 
intent (see Jackson 1998). 
From agency to structure  
Women’s incentive for water management – underlying their agency – is not just related to 
their resource dependence, but also to social and institutional structures, which do not allow 
them the same access to resource rights, economic opportunities or decision-making as it 
does for men. Engendering governance is not merely a technical exercise – increasing the 
number of women in organisations or political spaces, such as water committees, but about 
redefining the nature of public space and acknowledging that the private domain – where 
much gendered socialization takes place – cannot be seen as distinct or separate. However, 
there is little recognition of the implications of the public-private divide or the terrain of 
households and to a lesser extent, communities, and the intra and inter-dynamics of power 
that characterize institutional sites and that set the boundaries for participation by women and 
men (Ashworth 1996). “Although governance is about ‘getting institutions right for 
development’ governance policies rarely concentrate on ‘getting institutions right for women 
in development’ (Goetz 1997 in Baden 2000, emphasis added). Not only are institutions 
assumed to be neutral, the public-private divide that determines women’s exclusion from the 
public domain is used to reinforce gendered power relations in ‘organisations’ at all levels 
(public, private and civil society).14   
Men who see women’s roles as confined to the home find it difficult to accept their 
participation in the public sphere (‘women lack mental and educational skills to make 
decisions’) while organisational cultures tend to assign typically ‘female tasks’ to women 
staff or keeping them in desk-top rather than field-oriented positions. While these roles are 
being challenged, the shaping of women’s lives cannot be understood without understanding 
                                                 
14 It is important to clarify the distinction between institutions as ‘rules of the game’ and organizations as the 
‘players’ – see Kabeer’s work on the institutional framework (Kabeer and Subramanian 1999) and Goetz (1995) 
who builds on the above in the context of gender and organizations.   
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the expectations and opportunities that shape men’s lives (Nussbaum 2003). Although 
emerging research on gender and governance in the water sector (Cleaver, Zwarteveen) is 
beginning to address the question of masculinity and the construction and implications of 
gendered identities in water bureaucracies or NGOs, a large part of our inquiry has focussed 
on women, as they continue to remain an under-researched and un-recognized constituency in 
water policy and water management. However, women’s relationship with men, the 
structures of patriarchy that determine participation in water governance at various levels and 
how men perceive women’s changing roles have been important questions for us and the 
community water institutions we have looked at in the context of decentralisation processes 
in Gujarat and Maharashtra.  
We would argue that decentralization provides (or at least, appears to do so) legitimate space 
and a framework for women’s participation in water governance at the community level. 
Decentralization has the potential for re-shaping the institutional infrastructure of water 
management and of facilitating equitable community representation and inclusion (Ribot 
2003). However, the decentralization of roles and responsibilities without the concomitant 
devolution of real power and resources means that decentralization as a political objective has 
little meaning for women’s representation or participation given the inherent gender biases 
which prevent women from exercising voice, accessing resources or institutions 
(Mukhopadhayay 2005). Decentralization is a process, which needs to be negotiated, and the 
hard reality is that for poor and marginalized women negotiation is being contested in an 
economic environment where policies of privatization, pricing and centralized, technocentric 
delivery systems (large dams, pipelines and the Indian state’s river linking project) dominate 
the political discourse on water management.  
Issues of methodology 
A methodology as we understand it is how research should proceed. It essentially looks at 
whether existing theories can explain the question under investigation. At the outset, we 
would like to make it clear that we are feminist researchers. At the heart of feminist 
methodology is the critique of who produces what kind of knowledge and how it is 
systematically used to construct and sustain women’s oppression in different ways across 
caste, class, race, tribe etc. A new kind of thinking and research practice is therefore required 
which holds potential to counter knowledge that has consistently perpetuated women’s 
oppression. 
Feminist research is any research that involves an empirical study, which draws on feminist 
insights. A feminist methodology therefore is one, which involves a distinctive body of 
research practice and epistemology. It becomes distinctive in three key ways a) it uses new 
resources, in this case it is the women’s experiences and perceptions; b) there is a well 
outlined purpose of enquiry directed at addressing gender inequities; c) understanding that the 
location of the researcher her/himself plays a critical role in shaping the research design as 
well as the final analysis of the research (Harding, 1987).  
Analysis in feminist research  
A frequent question that comes up in discussions on feminist methodology is whether 
perceptions and subjectivities can be treated as knowledge. To that extent, would research 
that investigates women’s voice or silence produce knowledge? Can the voice of only women 
or some women really be treated as knowledge to generalize? These questions gain relevance 
particularly in the light of post-modern theories which talk of multiple truths, providing at 
one level space for diverse narratives of subaltern, but also narrowing the idea of a universal 
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truth of women’s oppression that raises possibilities of collective action to counter ways in 
which domination is enacted and institutionalized (Harding 1987).  
What makes feminist research relevant is the potential its analysis holds for changing theory, 
or bringing in new topics into the discipline, consciousness raising or producing data that will 
support or stimulate policy decisions or political action. In this case water is seen as having a 
central role in women’s lives from a livelihoods perspective. Our present study hopes to 
support research of value to women, leading to social change or action beneficial to women 
though a nuanced understanding of the decentralization process in the water sector and its 
relationship with women’s empowerment. 
Methods  
Often discussions on methodology are reduced to discussions on methods and tools. We 
believe that the difference lies not in the tools but in which questions are asked and to whom, 
how the questions are framed, how men and women’s lives are conceptualized and to what 
purpose finally the research is used. Feminist methods therefore are often different 
interpretations using similar set of tools used by social scientists in general. 
Having made the distinction between methodology and methods, we now come to our 
methods. Methods can be broadly categorised into three main categories- a) hearing / 
listening through interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) etc., b) observations and c) 
tracing of historical records/policies, secondary data, etc. (Harding, 1992) 
In our study we have used all the three kind of methods in varying combinations. Almost all 
feminist researchers would use a combination of these methods to investigate the problem. 
One of the themes emerging from feminist methodology has been a shifting focus from 
individual knowers to the perspectives of collectives. Feminism has always valued 
knowledge as a process of cumulative ideas and collective perceptions. In our choice of 
methods therefore we have gone for individual as well as collective/group interviews as well 
as the FGDs. 
Sample, research tools and data collection  
The whole question of scale versus detail was a matter of concern while deciding on the 
sampling process. As we have seen earlier, the process of decentralization has been different 
in both the states and across the sectors as well. In Maharashtra it has been launched at a 
fairly large scale in both the sectors, whereas Gujarat experiences it as a slower process 
which has kept itself away from multilateral funding. At one level there was need to capture 
the scale of the event in both the states and at another to understand the depth of the process 
and its impact on women’s empowerment. Given our perspective around decentralized water 
governance, participation and gender we needed to have a sample that would capture 
differences across social groups and bio-physical regions. 
Sampling process: domestic water  
In the drinking water sector in Maharashtra as we shall see in the concerned chapter, we 
looked specifically at two drinking water schemes which were Jalswarjya and Aple pani, the 
details of which have been elaborated in Chapter 1. We had a sample that covered the 
different bio-physical regions of the state as well as different class, caste, tribal groups. 
Among our primary criteria in the domestic water sector in Maharashtra we had the region, 
followed by the size of population, size of the dalit and tribal population and finally the 
opinion of the support organization with reference to completion or non completion of the 
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scheme. We had a database of 3000 villages where the scheme had been launched in 
Maharashtra, but due to its inaccuracy, we were not able to follow a very systematic sampling 
procedure. We covered a total sample of 17 villages across the six districts spread in five bio-
physical regions of Maharashtra.  
In Gujarat the sampling process was a bit different as the nature of decentralization too was 
different from that of Maharashtra. The sample was a purposive one based on the information 
provided by our NGO partners, some of whom were quite prominent players in this state, 
unlike Maharashtra. In Gujarat three different institutional environments were studied and 
these were (i) the Ghogha project, initiated in 1997 with Dutch bi-lateral aid as one of the 
first projects under the sector reforms framework, (ii) the Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation project in Kutch where the institution building process is ongoing and lessons 
learned are being transferred and (iii) NGO facilitated and community-led decentralised 
water interventions, within the framework of sector reforms. A total of 13 villages were 
covered across the different hydro-geological regions of Gujarat with partner NGOs. 
The key criteria for selection were as follows: 
• Diversity of population (dalits, adivasis, minorities…)  
• Diversity of water infrastructure, mechanisms and innovations 
• Participation of women strong (perceived) 
• Positive outcomes: access, equity, sustainability 
• Not extensively researched (particularly important in the Gujarat context where there 
is a longer history of civil society-state water partnerships and a number of well 
documented community water management initiatives) 
Pani Samitis in Gujarat (village water committees) were selected with partners from different 
social and hydro-geological contexts (see map 3.1) under the three institutional environments 
identified. NGOs facilitating pani samitis in these project villages were invited to support the 
limited research team based at Utthan with the fieldwork, for a small honorarium, making 
them partners in the research. The NGOs selected are not only different in size (small, 
medium and large organizations) but also have different approaches and capacities for 
addressing gender and water concerns, at the level of policy advocacy, in their organizational 
environment and in practice. 
Research tools and methods- domestic water  
For both the states, we have used a similar set of research tools15. These can be broadly, 
categorized as follows 
• Semi-structured, in-depth interviews with women members on the pani samitis (both 
states), women’s empowerment committees and social audit committees (Maharashtra 
only) 
• FGDs with men and women committee members 
• FGDs with men and women from different caste/tribal hamlets within the village 
• Focus group discussions with the women members of different self help groups 
(SHGs) in the village for Maharashtra 
                                                 
15 Refer to annexure .. for the research tools for domestic water sector. 
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• Detailed interviews with the Support Organizations in Maharashtra and NGOs in 
Gujarat  
• Interviews with government officials at different levels 
• Transect walks and PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) exercises to understand the 
physical location of the scheme and its implications on equity and sustainability 
• Scrutinising records of the pani samitis in terms of financial transactions, maintenance 
of proceedings, etc which form a central part of good governance, what we referred to 
as the physical verification of records especially in Maharashtra 
Primary data have been supplemented with secondary information about the villages 
collected from partner organizations such as demographic and socio-economic village 
profiles and the physical/ financial details of the schemes.  
Sampling: irrigation  
Our study in the irrigation sector was more of an exploratory nature as the launch of the 
reform process in Maharashtra has been comparatively new and Gujarat did not have the 
legislation in place until very recently.  
Our sampling process in Maharashtra covered different types of irrigation projects ranging 
from major, medium and minor. Water Users Associations (WUAs) from across four 
different irrigation projects were selected for the study. Almost all of them fall in western 
Maharashtra and four out of the five are included in the sector improvement programme of 
irrigation. 
Research tools and data collection  
A similar set of tools were used for the irrigation sector as well. Our experience in the 
domestic water sector also helped us in designing and improving our research tools for the 
irrigation sector. In our earlier phase of data collection, our two key tools were individual 
interviews and focus group discussions. Our experience was that individual interviews can be 
very cumbersome for women as there is little stimulus for them to think and talk. On the 
other hand FGDs can sometimes silence some of the voices. We thought that the best way to 
address these shortcomings would be to conduct smaller group interviews with women. We 
did not see this as a substitute for individual interviews and FGDs, but more to complement 
the data from there. Group interview tool was therefore designed for the irrigation sector 
study. 
Transect walks through the entire service area16 of the concerned canal to see the canal 
system and talk to the farmers located in different reaches of the canal system. This was to 
get an overall understanding of the decentralisation process and also of how it had impacted 
different sections of the community, importantly the women members in terms of the access 
to water.  
• In-depth individual and group interviews with women on the committees and women 
members of the WUAs 
• In-depth group interviews with men members of the WUAs and some of the 
committee members to get men’s view to the decentralisation process as well as about 
women’s participation. 
                                                 
16 Service area or command area is the area served by a particular irrigation project or its different canals. 
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• FGDs with the committee members, women members and also with the members of 
the WUAs. Here a conscious effort has been made to discuss the issues in different 
bastis17 where different sections of the population reside. For e.g., FGDs were 
conducted in dalit bastis or with farmers in the tail reaches of the WUA. 
• FGDs with landless and other non members of the WUA to assess their perceptions 
on use of water. 
• Discussions with Irrigation officials wherever it has been possible. 
• Physical verification of records such as minutes of the meeting,  
Challenges  
At the outset, we need to highlight some of the challenges that we faced. Much of these 
issues were unfolding as we went deeper into the process of collecting data. One of the 
important contexts that need to be understood is that although introduced as early as 2002, 
many of the outcomes of the state led decentralization process are yet not visible. Both the 
design and the delays associated with it have contributed to this effect. Thus understanding 
women’s participation and their effective empowerment in such a context has been difficult. 
Many of the unanticipated issues related to pricing, cost recovery become difficult for women 
to respond to as their impacts have not necessarily unfolded as yet. Women are yet to 
internalize these new phenomena and are seen to be grappling with many of the issues 
especially so in Maharashtra. In Gujarat, where we have villages from the older Ghogha 
project  and from NGO-led interventions we do see more responses of women in this regard.  
In the irrigation sector, it is evident that women are not at all in picture as far as governance 
issues are concerned. Therefore, although they are active in the agricultural sector, we do not 
see them participating in the planning processes, an area that needs deeper theoretical and 
empirical investigation. 
The second limitation stems from the first one, as the tools designed and the methods used 
then seemed inadequate to deal with this early stage of state led decentralization. 
As far as our data collection process goes one of the things we were not been able to do is 
participant observation of water committee/users meetings or the gram sabhas/mahila gram 
sabhas around the question of water. The initial phase of planning in gram sabhas was more 
or less over by the time we started our data collection. In fact much of the initial enthusiasm 
had waned and the frequency of meetings of pani samitis had reduced considerably. In the 
irrigation sector, there has been an overall lethargy and unlike the domestic water sector, 
there is no apparent incentive for people to participate. Attending these meetings would have 
provided us rich insights into questions such as who takes the lead in articulating problems, 
whose voices are heard etc. Much of the data we have is from interviews and FGDs, which 
were largely organised around our visits. 
 Delays in implementation of the scheme in Maharashtra domestic water sector, meant that 
we could assess only the process of empowerment which came by way of the Information, 
Education and Communication component of the programme and not really the impacts. 
Similarly in the irrigation sector quotas for women on managing committees are very recent 
and there is no history of women’s participation in governance issues in this sector either.  
As a result of these realities in both the states and across the sectors, some of the questions 
that remained unanswered were related to performance of decentralization and women’s 
                                                 
17 Bastis are localities in a village. These are usually organized around caste in rural areas. 
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empowerment and the relationship between the two; costs on women in the absence of 
decentralization in terms of time saved, financial costs etc. Taking into account these 
limitations, we had realized that we would not be able to present counterfactual reality about 
women’s concerns and interventions. By counterfactual reality we mean what it would mean 
for women in the absence of decentralized water governance. This reality also meant that 
many of the questions that were directly related to investigating on counterfactuals, or their 
role in contributing to the overall process of decentralization or its impact on their 
empowerment did not receive any responses from women, as they were not able to imagine 
such situations. Here we realized the limitations of doing the study at a scale and therefore 
not spending enough time on recreating scenarios to get women to respond to different 
possibilities of absence and presence of decentralized efforts in water management. We 
realized that probing with women cannot go beyond a point when the scenarios themselves 
have not fully unfolded. These processes would need a very different kind of an enquiry. 
The other challenges we faced were in terms of constituting our field teams which were both 
male and female. Some of them were new to the water sector and some not so familiar with 
gender issues. So the multi-disciplinarity was important but combining it was very crucial 
and this was done through a series of trainings and on field discussions. The other issues were 
related to the availability of people during field work, both in the villages as well as with 
government officials. Planning time with NGOs in both the states was another challenge we 
faced. Many a times this meant delays in field work and missing out on some important 
interviews. In some cases it was difficult to obtain the data from government sources. This 
also gave us a view on the issue of transparency and right to information. In the chapters that 
follow we discuss our detailed findings on decentralised governance in the water sector for 







Water, Decentralisation and the State in Gujarat: Policy 
and Practice 
 
Part I: Introduction: the development landscape  
Since its formation in 1960, Gujarat has shown steady progress in economic growth and has 
been ranked fourth in terms of per capita income in India for the past two decades.18 
Although the state’s population of 50 million (Census 2001) accounts for less than 5 per cent 
of the country’s population, Gujarat contributes about 7 per cent of national production and 
about 13 per cent of national industrial output (GHDR 2004: 21).  However, agricultural 
growth has shown a steady decline in the state forcing small farmers and farm labor into 
spiraling poverty and increasing migration to urban areas. Part of the reason for this has been 
the overriding focus on the unsustainable Green Revolution approach to agricultural 
development with high exploitation of groundwater for irrigation, and introduction of 
genetically modified crop varieties depending on intensive use of fertilizers and pesticides. In 
contrast, dry-farming technologies have, till recently, been consistently overlooked in rain-
fed areas which account for 70 per cent of the cultivated area of the state forcing them to 
remain at the vagaries of monsoon variability and periodic drought.  
Animal husbandry and dairy development are important sub-sectors contributing from 22 to 
33 per cent (in drought years) to agricultural output and providing livelihood security for the 
poor (GHDR 2004: 27). But provision and access to fodder, particularly during drought years 
remains critical and less water intensive fodder crops need to be developed as the ‘virtual 
costs’ of livestock production increase (see Kumar et al.).  
Growing industrialization in the post reforms period (1991 onwards) has seen massive capital 
and infrastructure investments in coastal regions, notably Saurashtra and Kachchh, often at 
the cost of land and water resources acquired and/or degraded (polluted) by industries 
through liberal government policies. Not surprisingly, the state does not have an 
environmental policy and the water policy first drafted in 2002, based on the national water 
policy and then re-drafted and shared with civil society in 2004, has yet to be implemented.    
Poverty, gender and human development  
While poverty is a multi-dimensional concept, income poverty, is the most commonly used 
official indicator of the percentage of the population living below the poverty line.19 
According to government estimates, there has been a considerable decline in income poverty 
during the last few decades. Currently, the rural poor account for about 12.2 per cent of the 
population and the urban poor, 13.76 per cent (GHDR 2004: 51).20 Although high economic 
growth and relatively good employment opportunities have contributed to the decline, the 
                                                 
18 According to the Gujarat Human Development Report (GHDR 2004) the state’s per capita income in 2001 
was Rs. 12,975 (at 1993-94 prices) which was about 27 per cent higher than the national average of Rs. 10,254 
in the same year (p. 21).  
19 Poverty line… 
20 These figures vary depending on data sources, but roughly 17-19 percent of the population can be classified as 
(income) poor. 
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majority of the poor continue to depend on agriculture and include rural labourers particularly 
those coming from SC and ST communities, and small and marginal farmers.  
However, Gujarat ranks sixth among major states in terms of the incidence of human poverty 
(1991 estimates), which is defined as “absence of certain basic capabilities needed for human 
functioning” (GHDR 2004: 53). About 28 to 29 per cent of the population lived in human 
poverty in 1991 and the incidence of human poverty is much higher in rural areas where 
access to basic infrastructure including health and education services is limited.  Apart from 
the skewed pattern of growth in Gujarat with an undue emphasis on the secondary and 
tertiary sectors, there was also a corresponding decline in spending in the social sectors, 
notably health and education through the 1990s, which is only now being addressed (post-
2000). In contrast states such as Kerala, have achieved a high level of human development at 
relatively low levels of per capita income.  
Not surprisingly, in this overall context of low human development in Gujarat, the gender gap 
has increased. The most notable indicator of gender inequality is the declining sex ratio in the 
state which fell from 934 in 1991 to 921 in 2001 (Census 2001), largely due to the drop by 
almost 50 points in the juvenile sex ratio (0-6 years) during this period.21 Female infanticide, 
particularly in the better-off districts such as Mehsana in northern Gujarat and embedded 
cultural biases (discrimination) against the girl child and women, in terms of access to 
education, health and nutrition and basic resource entitlements, persist despite the presence of 
a considerable number of NGOs working on women’s empowerment and gender rights in the 
state. Infant and child mortality rates for females is higher in most parts of the state while 
data on the maternal mortality rate is conflicting, though as a whole there have been 
improvements in the delivery of health care to women.  
The gap between the female and male literacy rate, although narrowing, still persists 
particularly in rural areas and amongst marginalized communities – minorities, dalits and 
adivasis. Currently the overall female literacy rate is 50.2 per cent (adult age 7+) while the 
male literacy rate is 68.6 per cent. However, in rural areas the female literacy rate is as low as 
41.2 per cent (male: 63.2 per cent). Apart from low enrolment and retention rates for girls in 
schools, environmental degradation in several districts forces girls into domestic unpaid 
labour, collecting water or fuel or looking after younger siblings while her brothers would be 
studying and her mother working. The lack of separate sanitation facilities for girls, 
particularly in secondary schools, is another constraining factor as is the low value put on 
educating daughters amongst minorities and other social groups living in poverty.   
Gender budget analysis of women-specific and pro-women schemes in 2000-01 and 2001-02 
shows that actual expenditure is far less than budgeted estimates which in real terms have 
been declining as state funds have been diverted to disaster reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.22  
Despite women’s increased participation in local governance, self-help groups, co-operatives 
and community natural resource management institutions, gender violence persists, especially 
during times of riots and communal strife as was witnessed in the 2002 riots where women’s 
bodies became sites of struggle. Social reconciliation strategies while important have failed to 
address issues of justice or reconciliation and the livelihood divide between majority and 
minority communities in both urban and rural areas is significant.23   In 2006, the state 
launched its policy on gender equity and empowerment (Nari Gaurav Niti), the culmination 
                                                 
21 The juvenile sex ratio declined from 928 in 1991 to 878 in 2001 (GHDR 2004: 182). 
22 For a more detailed discussion on gender budgeting see GHDR 2004: 205-207.  
23 This is not the place to discuss communal politics in Gujarat but exclusion on the basis of faith is an 
increasingly important part of the social landscape.  
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of almost 3-4 years of collaboration between government departments and civil society 
institutions, supported by UNFPA and led by the department of women and child 
development. The main goal of the policy is to create an enabling environment for the 
realization of equal rights by women in all spheres of life, for the eradication of all forms of 
violence and gender discrimination and to mainstream gender including gender audits and 
gender budgeting, in all development policies, programmes and projects. Although the policy 
has been very ambitious in its’ chalking out of gender details for each department as well as 
specific goals to be met by 2010, in reality apart from a massive media campaign to save and 
educate the girl child (endorsed by the CM), very little seems to have transpired and certainly 
all the collective energy that was mobilized during the policy formulation process seems to 
have dissipated.   
Water in this context, becomes a symbolic medium for understanding both the political 
economy of development and the cultural politics underlying agency and social action. For 
water in Gujarat can be seen as a political marker of competing development paradigms on 
resource management, a cultural marker of social stratification and exclusion and a social 
marker of changing gender roles in the context of competing claims and growing attempts to 
involve women in community initiatives.   In fact, the gender policy calls for the equal (50%) 
participation of women at all stages of water resources planning and management, for the 
design of water infrastructure which is sensitive to gender needs, for capacity building on 
technical skills for women (e.g. water quality monitoring, repairing handpumps) and for 
changes in property laws so that women can own, self or jointly, land – on the basis of which 
access to water, at least for irrigation, is still determined.      
Water resources and water management issues: the GWSSB24  
Despite huge investments in the water sector in Gujarat, notably on ambitious projects such 
as the Sardar Sarovar or Narmada project to meet drinking water and irrigation needs, 
growing conflicts in an essentially drought prone state continue to dominate the waterscape, 
highlighting asymmetries in development (Hirway and Mahadevia 1999). Not only are water 
resources distributed unevenly across space and time, the extent to which they have been 
utilised varies according to political and economic interests (Wood 1999). Rainfall in the 
state ranges from over 2,000 mm in the Dangs in South Gujarat to about 200 mm in Kutch. 
But it is not the amount of rainfall per se which is important – rather it is the frequency and 
intensity of rainy days and the extent to which infrastructure is able to capture or harvest rain. 
For example, the alluvial areas of north Gujarat receive low rainfall, but because of the good 
recharging potential of the aquifers, the region is rich in groundwater resources.  However, 
over the last 40 years these have been increasingly exploited for irrigation resulting in the 
drying up of many open wells and mining of deep aquifers.25 In contrast, the high rainfall 
regions of south Gujarat have poor groundwater conditions but provide scope for the 
development of surface water reservoirs (Hirway and Patel 1994:12-16). Saurashtra 
meanwhile receives low to medium rainfall, a small percentage of which is captured by 
surface reservoirs, but because of heavy soils and hard rock geology, groundwater recharging 
potential is very poor.  
Overlying this diverse spatial hydro-geomorphology is a pattern of development 
characterised by urbanisation, industrialisation and water-intensive agriculture as well as the 
growing demand for domestic water as a result of natural population increase and changes in 
                                                 
24 This section has been abstracted from Ahmed 2003 and 2005.  
25 This is largely due to subsidized loans with free or cheap energy to pump groundwater.  
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lifestyle.26  Currently, 23 per cent of the state’s water needs are met from surface water 
sources and about 77 per cent from groundwater sources with agriculture accounting for the 
major share of water consumption. About 77.4 per cent of the total drinking water 
requirement in the state is met from groundwater sources (Kumar and Talati 2000: 44). 
However, the level of depletion of groundwater is alarming and today the state falls into the 
‘grey’ category of groundwater exploitation where 65-80 per cent of recharged water is 
extracted (GHDR 2004: 80).27 This has also led to a rapid deterioration in the quality of 
available groundwater with about 15 per cent of the villages in Gujarat affected by excessive 
fluoride content in groundwater, 6 per cent of villages suffering from excessive salinity and 
another 5 per cent from high levels of nitrates (GHDR 2004: 81).  
Although Gujarat has the largest extent of coastline in the country, coastal livelihoods are 
increasingly vulnerable to cyclones, storms and to saline intrusion as a result of over-
pumping of aquifers for both agriculture and industrial growth and, more recently, sea level 
rise or storm surges due to global warming and thermal expansion of the oceans.   
While markets for groundwater have developed in recent years (Shah 1993), they remain 
highly inequitable and attempts to develop legal mechanisms for groundwater withdrawal 
have been limited because of the difficulty in determining water rights (Dubash 2000).  
Moreover, after the introduction of structural reforms in the early 1990s, “a new social class 
has emerged to dominate the state’s political economy, that of the mega-industries, which has 
much larger political clout than the earlier dominant rich farmers’ lobby,” (Mahadevia 
1997:179). In fact water pollution, particularly in the ‘Golden Corridor’ and now the rapidly 
developing, ‘Silver Corridor’ is recognised as a critical environmental problem with severe 
livelihood implications for the poor.28  
The principle responsibility for providing drinking water rests with the Gujarat Water Supply 
and Sewerage Board (GWSSB), an autonomous body established in 1979 with a 
decentralized organizational structure at the district and taluka (block level).29  Since 1981 all 
the activities of the Public Health Engineering Department have been transferred to it. The 
main objectives of the Board are to provide safe and adequate drinking water on a sustainable 
basis to all, to maintain sanitary conditions and to prevent waterborne diseases so as to 
promote the health and well-being of the people.  
For administrative purposes the Board has divided the state into three zones: Vadodara, 
Ahmedabad and Rajkot (Sharma 1998: 2) covering between 6-7 districts each. The technical 
                                                 
26 It is important to stress that ‘lifestyle’ is socio-culturally and ecologically specific - where water is scarce 
people have adapted livelihood strategies in terms of cropping patterns, water use intensity and so on. However, 
variations within villages or towns as a result of differential economic and political power are notable – for 
example, slum dwellers in the city of Bhuj in the water scarce region of Kachchh use only 14 litres per capita 
per day (lpcd) of water while middle and upper class housing societies record a daily use of 79 and 109 lpcd 
(IRMA / UNICEF 2000: 26).  
27 Water scarcity as defined by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development refers to a situation where the 
annual withdrawal of water is greater than 40 percent of the annual renewable freshwater (IRMA / UNICEF 
2000: 29).  
28 The Golden Corridor refers to the industrial belt stretching for 400 kms along the western coast of Gujarat, 
from Vapi in the south to Vatva in the north, which is literally a ‘hot-bed’ of pollution. See the report by the 
Indian People’s Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights (1999) Who Bears the Cost? Industrial and Toxic 
Pollution in the Golden Corridor of Gujarat. The Silver Corridor refers to the coastal, water scarce regions of 
Saurashtra and Kachchh which have been attracting considerable investments recently in the area of mineral 
exploitation (Hirway and Mahadevia 1999). 
29 Administratively, the GWSSB falls under the Department of Narmada and Water Supply under the Ministry 
of Water Supply. The Department is headed by a secretary to the government and is responsible for formulating 
drinking water policy, allocating funds, preparing plans etc.  
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aspects of rural drinking water supply schemes at each zonal level are looked after by three 
types of circles: Public Health Works Circle, Public Health Projects Circle and Public Health 
Mechanical Circle. In each circle, there are divisional and sub-divisional offices which 
provide technical support to the GWSSB’s rural drinking water programmes.  As of 2000, 
there were 18 circle offices, 56 divisional offices and 220 sub-divisional offices (TERI 2000: 
8).  
The main functions of the GWSSB include, identifying no source villages and developing 
water resources therein, undertaking rural sanitation works, responding to water supply needs 
during periods of drought as well as overseeing urban water supply and sanitation 
requirements. In addition to the development of local water sources, usually for villages with 
a population of 500 or less, the GWSSB is responsible for the implementation of regional 
water supply schemes (RWSS) which are funded both by the state government and, till 
recently, bi-lateral aid from the Netherlands. The Board is empowered to negotiate loans, 
plan and design water works and supervise their construction. The state government funds 
most of the rural schemes, with support from external agencies, and also oversees cost 
recovery and personnel management issues, while urban schemes are generally financed by 
the respective local authorities, though recurrent costs are often borne by the state (GoG 
2000).   
Recognising the need for human resources development and training in the drinking water 
sector, the government established the Gujarat Jalseva Training Institute in 1990 with the 
help of a loan from the World Bank.  It supports capacity building efforts in the water supply 
sector as well as undertaking monitoring and evaluation on water quality, and strengthening 
local institutions involved in water management through its numerous training programmes. 
A detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the GWSSB was done twice, first in 
October 1994 and then in August 1999 as part of the Netherlands Missions looking at 
institutional reform and change in the water sector. The main strengths of the Board are 
derived from its extensive infrastructure, experienced engineering staff (all male), access to 
state funds and an Act which empowers it to assume a nodal role in the water sector (e.g. 
review tariffs) and gives it considerable scope to initiate partnerships with other actors. 
However, with over 4000 people on its staff, the GWSSB is a massive bureaucracy, literally a 
juggernaut (IRMA / UNICEF 2000: 38). But, “… the Board is unable to derive any effective 
autonomy because it has no powers of enforcement or policing, and is too closely interlinked 
with the government,” (Ibid: 39). 
In fact the GWSSB’s weaknesses are embedded in its structure, its poor financial viability 
and its heavy reliance on government subsidy and hence, political patronage. There has been 
no systematic assessment of its human resource potential or requirements and due to the rigid 
separation of tasks there is little communication between those who design projects and those 
who implement them (Haskoning 1994). The overlying emphasis on technocentric rationality 
– engineering expertise – coupled with little devolution of ‘empowered’ responsibility has led 
to unsustainable water management investments.  
For example, there are major problems in the operations and maintenance (O&M) of the 343 
regional pipeline schemes in the state. It is impossible for the GWSSB to monitor or ‘police’ 
these pipelines simply because of the tremendous distance they cover.  Therefore, not 
surprisingly, villages along the route, particularly those who are not directly beneficiaries, 
tamper with the pipelines (breach them) to withdraw water for irrigation or for their cattle. 
This affects the availability of water for downstream users in the scheme (Mehta 1997: 17). 
On many occasions pipelines do not function effectively – unreliable electricity supply 
particularly in the summer months when the need for piped water is most critical, affects the 
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frequency, timing and quantity of water available.  In addition, the distribution of water in 
villages is governed by social and power relations which determine where water should be 
stored and distributed and how much water which people should receive and when (Barot 
1997: 473).   
Part of the reason for this scenario was the lack of coordination or organisational linkages 
between the GWSSB and other departments which have an impact on water use and 
development in the state.  Problems arise when water sources are identified and developed for 
the provision of drinking water without taking into consideration other water uses or users 
(e.g., livestock, agriculture and industry) which leads to conflict and eventually, 
unsustainable water planning and management.30  The GWSSB’s response is simply to find 
more and more new sources, usually requiring the transfer of water from water rich to scarce 
areas, through pipelines or increasingly, tankers, greater fund allocation and the creation of 
even further technical bodies by the state, for e.g., the Gujarat State Drinking Water 
Infrastructure Co. Ltd. (GSDWICL). 
By the mid-1990s, recognizing the limitations of large bureaucracies to implement 
participatory and sustainable water management, the Gujarat government, in line with sector 
reforms initiated by the Centre moved towards decentralized water governance.  
Decentralisation and water management: the beginning of a paradigm 
shift  
In Gujarat, the history of decentralization predates the formation of the state as a distinct and 
separate entity, from Maharashtra, in 1960. With the enactment of the Bombay Village 
Panchayats Act (1958) a foundation for democratic decentralization was established and in 
1961 the Gujarat Panchayat Act was passed, delegating authority and the transfer of funds to 
various departments. But it was not till the 73rd Constitutional Amendment and the renewed 
Gujarat Panchayats Act of 1993 that a more substantial commitment to decentralization was 
made. However, problems in decentralizing governance remain – the state governments were 
expected to devolve functional autonomy, administrative support and financial resources to 
the PRIs, but the results of this process, and Gujarat is no exception, are mixed. Although 
Gujarat claims to have transferred the 3Fs – functions, funds and functionaries – to the PRIs 
in respect to 15 items (departments and subjects, see Sama and Khurana 2006: 49), effective 
devolution also requires effective capacity to manage all the new responsibilities as well as 
transparent mechanisms for involving people (elections), particularly women and 
marginalized groups in democratic decision-making.    
Under the panchayat system, community participation and contribution for in-village water 
supply was called for in the 1961 Gujarat Panchayat Act. These schemes were usually based 
on locally available sources, particularly wells, and costs were not too high. However, 
community contributions at 25 percent of the capital costs were higher compared to the 
present model; O&M was the responsibility of the village (panchayat) or beneficiary 
community (Sama and Khurana 2006: 50).  In 1971, hand-pumps for drinking water supply 
were installed, mainly in tribal hamlets, by the state government with support from UNICEF 
and later, tribal development schemes.  O&M was the responsibility of the panchayat and 
training and repair kits were provided, but in the absence of funds, O&M soon became the 
responsibility of the GWSSB.  Although in some villages, NGOs and women’s groups were 
                                                 
30 One of the most fundamental areas of conflict are the debatable water supply norms used by the Centre and 
states – 40 litres per capita per day (lpcd) for rural areas and 140 lpcd for sewered urban areas (100 lpcd for 
unsewered urban areas) which do not take into account livestock needs for rural communities. 
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involved it was not till 1987 that NGOs were more officially involved. Organisations like 
SEWA (the Self-Employed Women’s Association) were invited to raise awareness, motivate 
and mobilize communities during the implementation of the Santalpur Regional Water 
Supply Scheme to provide drinking water to 72 villages in three blocks of the drought prone 
Banaskantha district, including Santalpur taluka. Funded by the Netherlands government, this 
rural pipeline scheme was known as a second-generation water project because of the attempt 
to involve water users in water management (Ahmed 2005).  
SEWA conducted an action-research study, with the Foundation for Public Interest 
Research31, to understand the impact of the pipeline on local water availability as well as 
suggest ways for improving its management. The study found that not only were people 
rarely getting water from the pipeline scheme, they had become dependent on it to such an 
extent that there were numerous conflicts over scarce water and little concern for maintaining 
traditional water sources. Women, the primary water collectors, were hardly consulted about 
the location of standposts or the timing of water delivery and pani panchayats were largely 
non-functional.32 These were informal bodies, formed under guidelines issued by the 
GWSSB in consultation with the gram panchayat, usually as a post-project exercise. They 
were responsible for ensuring the smooth functioning of the water supply system in the 
village, to oversee that no water is wasted, major repairs reported and minor repairs taken 
care of, cattle drink from the trough only and the surrounding area, including drains, is kept 
clean. SEWA found that in many cases so-called members of pani panchayats were not even 
aware that they were on these bodies or what their roles were. They hardly met on a regular 
basis, often expected monetary compensation and were not interested in maintaining 
infrastructure which they felt was the Board’s responsibility. Women members found it 
difficult to attend meetings because of the prevailing socio-cultural context, and little effort 
had gone into capacity building by either the GWSSB or other organisations.33  
In April 1995, a government resolution was passed (and revised in 2002) calling for the 
formation of a pani samiti (a village water and sanitation committee) in every panchayat 
where a drinking water scheme had been implemented. Although this is essentially to 
facilitate local participation, the order stipulates the structure, duties and function of the 
samiti in a “typically top-down manner. The tone seems more like orders issued to a 
subordinate rather than one inviting the sharing of powers,” (IRMA / UNICEF 2000: 40). 
Moreover, the resolution only increases the responsibilities of communities without giving 
them any corresponding authority. Not only do the responsibilities assigned require 
considerable managerial skills, the samitis have been given a less than 50 percent share in the 
taxes collected and no power to set tariffs or generate resources through other sources. The 
responsibility for overseeing the formation of pani samitis lay with the Taluka Development 
Officer. We return to the role and efficacy of pani samitis later in this chapter.  
Parallel to the process of decentralization, the national and state level water policies also 
reiterated the need for institutional restructuring for more efficient water management and 
called for the participation of local communities. However, the perception of ‘communities’ 
as homogenous categories waiting to participate suggested that participation was seen as an 
instrumentalist project rather than one with the potential to transform unequal social relations. 
Although drinking water needs of ‘human beings’ and animals were re-asserted as the first 
                                                 
31 Now known as the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI). 
32 Technically, each panchayat is supposed to consist of two female members, two men, the linesman and the 
sarpanch or deputy sarpanch of the village. 
33 SEWA used this experience to launch its campaign on women, water and work in 1995 and to link approaches 
to women’s empowerment through water management to the larger livelihoods and gender rights development 
agenda (Ahmed 2005).  
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charge for any available water, the question of equity (i.e. who has access to how much 
water, when, for what?) was not addressed. Special attention was to be focused on the needs 
of marginal groups when developing water projects, particularly those which may involve 
displacement. But the ‘disadvantaged’ were only identified as scheduled tribes and castes, 
and gender was not considered as a category of social stratification or exclusion within these 
marginalised communities. The draft Gujarat Water Policy (August 2000 and revised 2004) 
maintained that outreach to women should not be overlooked because they are “the most 
interested and involved users in rural water supply, domestic urban water consumption, 
health and sanitation issues and are at least equally concerned as men in agricultural 
production,” (GoG 2000: 24). Written in the framework of demand management, the policy 
regards the household as a unitary category, overlooking questions of who pays for water, not 
simply in financial terms, but also as women’s unpaid time and her access to productive 
opportunities. It was not till the initiation of the second phase of decentralization and the 
formation of WASMO that the question of women’s participation in water management and 
her empowerment, received attention.  
Decentralisation: the second phase  
From the mid 1990s onwards, the project of decentralized water management began to 
significantly move ahead with the launch of the Ghogha project in the coastal, drought prone 
southern district of Bhavnagar, building on the Santalpur experience of state-civil society and 
CBO partnerships. Initially implemented by the GWSSB, this faced all the technical re-
engineering problems we discussed earlier till WASMO (the Water and Sanitation 
Management Organisation) was formed in 2002 to facilitate community water distribution. 
Subsequently, the lessons from Ghogha were transposed to the Earthquake Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation project (ERR) and WASMO also came to be seen as the main agency for 
the implementation of sector reforms, including the Swajaldhara programme, in the state.  
The next two sections trace the objectives and strategies of these two projects before looking 
more closely at the mission and challenges of WASMO.    
The Ghogha project: objectives, history and strategies  
“The overall purpose of the project is to develop, integrating with water resources 
management, the improved, safe, reliable and sustainable drinking water and environmental 
sanitation provisions in 81 villages and 1 town of Bhavnagar district in Gujarat, which 
facilities will be community owned and managed through the local Pani-Samitis,”  (from 
Amendment to Grant Agreement, dated 2 December 2002). 
The Ghogha Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (GRWSSP) under the Indo-Dutch 
bilateral aid programme was originally designed as a conventional external supply piped 
water scheme, drawing on water from the Shetrunji Reservoir, and to be implemented under 
GWSSB management (1994). Considerations of lessons of past projects and the emerging 
demand-responsive approaches (sector reforms) led to a new approach: the building of local 
institutional capacities to set up and manage local piped water supply systems, based on 
improved local water resources. Under the new project design external piped water would 
only be provided to no-source villages. A project agreement between the GoI and the 
Netherlands government represented by the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE), New Delhi, 
was signed in August 1997.  
Three NGOs, called Implementation Support Agencies (ISAs) were invited to facilitate the 
capacity building of the communities, enabling them to run and manage the new water and 
sanitation installations that would be developed under this project and to provide training on 
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village and home hygiene. Two of the NGOs had already been operative in the area (Utthan 
and Medhavi), and the third NGO, the Centre for Environment Education (CEE), had worked 
on rural water supply projects elsewhere in Gujarat. With the support of a Dutch external 
technical assistance organisation contracted for this project, IWACO, the NGOs undertook 
participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), mainly focusing on water related issues and the socio-
economic context (demand assessment, willingness and capacity to pay).  They also started to 
facilitate the formation and capacity building of pani samitis to manage local drinking water 
assets and ensure equitable water distribution.   
Pilot water resource management projects were designed based on local needs and scope 
assessments. Considerable work on roof water harvesting tank (RWHTs) and sanitation was 
undertaken with the help of the NGOs but with funding from outside the Ghogha project (e.g. 
directly from the GWSSB under a 70:30 scheme for RWHTs). Self Help Groups (SHGs) 
were promoted to enhance the socio-economic position of women and facilitate their 
participation in mixed pani samitis. Under the Ghogha project itself little progress was made 
in implementation of hardware activities till 2003. This was the result of insufficient interest 
of GWSSB in the new approach, in which no traditional major external engineering works 
would be undertaken. The project would mainly provide small scale village level resource 
and distribution systems. GWSSB surveys of ground water potential as water source in the 
project area were undertaken in a way to prove the impossibility of the proposed local source-
based project. GWSSB was promoting the large scale Mahi pipeline as a source already 
coming to the larger area and they put pressure on the Dutch government to accept the need 
to support the Mahi project as villages would otherwise ‘suffer’ under the Dutch aided 
project. GoG indicated that two consecutive drought years in the project area had shown that 
‘the local sources do not hold promise’ (Reynders et al. 2004).  
The Dutch government gave in to the pressures and accepted the incorporation and partial 
financing of the Mahi pipeline system, making the Ghogha project a dual source project. In 
the new project phase pani samitis with adequate capacity could take responsibility for the 
construction of the village level distribution system and sanitation installation, rather than 
only external contractors as was the case in the earlier phase. Pani samitis would also be 
responsible for water resources management as well as the O&M of the new installations. 
However, in its final evaluation of the Ghogha project, the RNE appointed international 
Mission found no difference in the quality or speed of work between the pani samitis and the 
earlier contractors (Reynders et al. 2004).34 
In 2002, strongly supported and partially financed from Dutch bilateral funding, WASMO 
was set up. It was designed as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to operate independently 
from GWSSB and involve civil society institutions and individuals in its steering committee, 
to facilitate community based water management activities. The main objective of WASMO 
was to “promote new mind-sets capable of a genuine paradigm shift in the sector. 
Communication skills and human resource development opportunities within WASMO will 
therefore be a critical factor. It is these that must ultimately encourage all stakeholders – 
community leaders and organizations, government functionaries, women’s groups, 
technicians and panchayat members – to accept new roles and responsibilities upon which 
change now depends,” (GSDWICL 2000: 81).  We return to the discussion of WASMO, its 
mission and challenges later. 
                                                 
34 Sara Ahmed was the only woman on this 4-member Mission appointed to evaluate the technical, social, 
financial sustainability and institutional aspects of the Ghogha project. The Mission undertook this evaluation in 
November 2004 and as one of the principal co-authors of this report, Ahmed has drawn upon the Mission’s 
collective findings, with due acknowledgement.  
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In 2003, with the change in policy at the Centre on the acceptance of funds from donors, the 
Dutch government decided to withdraw its support to the water sector in Gujarat.35 This came 
as a major blow to the newly formed WASMO and its stated commitment to extend the 
learning from the Ghogha project to the ERR project. However, it was mutually decided that 
the Dutch withdrawal would be gradual (by June 2005) and the state government stepped in 
to support the community water and sanitation programme under the ERR in four districts 
where water drinking water infrastructure was severely affected by the Kutch earthquake of 
2001. Before we look at the ERR project it is important to take stock of the key challenges 
and constraints emerging from the Ghogha – were these transferred to the ERR, or with more 
institutional experience, were things done differently? The answers to the latter questions will 
be discussed later in the context of our field insights and analysis, but for the moment we 
outline some of the key findings emerging from the Ghogha evaluation (Reynders et al. 
2004) that have implications for the sustainability of decentralized water governance.   
Key challenges emerging from the Ghogha project  
Initially intended to be a rural pipeline water supply project, then realizing that village water 
supplies also need to draw on local sources to ensure sustainability and finally accepting the 
need for dual water supplies (the Mahi pipeline plus local sources, where available), the 
Ghogha project design almost came a full circle since its inception.  One of the biggest 
challenges was ensuring adequate recharging and local source sustainability through water 
resource conservation, small scale harvesting (check dams, ponds) and management (tidal 
barriers to prevent salinity intrusion). However, water resources management (WRM) was 
not seen as an important or integral component of the project till Phase 2, when WASMO 
was initiated; consequently in at least 25 percent of the villages, WRM work had not been 
initiated, even as the project was drawing to a close (June 2005).  A concern was also raised 
about the abstraction of water for irrigation use: in the absence of any clear entitlements this 
remains a major policy concern.  
Another key constraint was the envisaged dependency on the Mahi pipeline – only 35 percent 
of the Ghogha project villages were dependent on the Mahi system as their sole water source. 
Although all the villages were eventually connect to the Mahi system, most saw this supply 
as a back-up, particularly in the context of water scarcity or long summer months when 
recharging potential is low. Most were reluctant to use Mahi water because of the anticipated 
high costs, irregular water supplies dependent on power (electricity or diesel) and the lack of 
any organizational arrangement where local users could interact with the Mahi administration 
(the GWSSB). The only official link was the pump operator who would open the valves for 
water distribution and advise the villagers when to expect water. Pani samitis are expected to 
pay the operators and monitor their work while they receive basic technical training 
(operation of valves, chlorination of water supply) from the GWSSB and WASMO.  
A third challenge faced in the Ghogha villages was the design and maintenance of village 
water works (the distribution system). To quote from the evaluation Mission’s report: “User 
facilities are generally in poor condition with many requiring rehabilitation. Standposts have 
taps missing or broken and some drainage platforms / systems are also in disrepair. Most 
completed community washing facilities (e.g., communal bathing and washing spaces for 
                                                 
35 The BJP-led, National Democratic Alliance (NDA), decided to only accept financial resources (bilateral aid) 
from five large donors, including DfID, USAID, the World Bank, the EU and the Japanese as it was felt that 
India did not need medium-sized grants in which the transaction costs were high. However, many civil society 
organizations were deeply affected by the immediate withdrawal or cutting back of medium donors such as the 
RNE, which were also perceived as having a commitment to rights-based development.  
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women and girls) are not being used, with some in disrepair also. Cattle troughs are mostly 
used and in better condition,” (Reynders et al. 2004: iv).36  
In addition, sanitation and hygiene status in most villages was very poor, both within the 
household and in the larger community environment. The Mission concluded that the project 
had not met its envisaged environmental sanitation objectives which are essential to the 
realization of the health benefits from improved water supplies. Soak pits were the most 
commonly funded activity, with 312 demonstration and 7223 subsidised soak pits installed by 
the end of October 2004, resulting in dry lanes.37 However, demonstration toilets were few 
and their uptake even more limited because of the costs involved (hard, rocky terrain) and the 
lack of information on appropriate alternatives (the one size fits all approach with respect to 
subsidies does not fit ALL!). Dustbins provided on various street corners were too small to be 
effective and the slogans on walls were ‘preaching’ rather than facilitating awareness on the 
links between water/sanitation, hygiene and health. School sanitation blocks, though 
important in facilitating access for adolescent girls, were often locked, lacked water supply 
and designs were not child-friendly (e.g. high urinals for little boys).   
As far as the institutional aspects were concerned, many working within WASMO as 
consultants felt that a demand responsive water supply project should give priority to villages 
that are eager to participate, whereas in the GRWSSP the number of villages was fixed and 
there was no addition or subtraction.38 Participation was seen to be largely instrumentalist, 
“….only to sell the project, not to adjust it to the needs of the target villages,” (Grijpstra 
2006: 201) making it very different to not only redirect the project, but also for villagers to 
take ownership. Not surprisingly, many villagers prefer to use traditional water sources, 
augmented by the WRM measures, as village water supplies are not available regularly or at 
convenient times during the day.  
In sum, “bureaucrats and engineers dominated the formulation of the Ghogha project. To 
them the needs of the people were clear as well as how these could be met…participation 
only meant getting the people’s cooperation and agreement to the plans of the project 
initiators,” (Ibid, p. 195). While the ISAs (the NGOs) played a critical role in facilitating pani 
samitis and women’s participation, they largely accepted the project framework: ideas for 
change were rarely entertained and coordination, clear communication channels, roles and 
responsibilities as well as knowledge sharing were poor – till the last year, at least, when 
there was a rush to document lessons.  Much handholding on capacity building, O&M 
aspects, just water pricing and collection of tariffs needed to be done with the pani samitis, 
but once the Ghogha project finished (June 2005), it seemed so had the larger institutional 
responsibility of both the state and civil society – a point we return to in our findings.   
Given water allocation issues (particularly between upstream/downstream villages) and 
possible conflicts at times of scarcity, the Mission had also recommended watershed based 
user federations of pani samitis, one for each watershed covered by the scheme (Reynders et 
al. 2004: ix). But the issue of conjunctive planning – between ground /surface water as well 
as between domestic / productive water remains the biggest challenge to sustainable WRM. 
                                                 
36 According to one of the WASMO consultants, women would often fill their pots from the cattle trough as it 
was quicker than waiting for water from a tap or handpump – another reason (low pressure) for why the separate 
bathing places for women were not used (Grijpstra 2006: 197). 
37 Dry lanes were only found in those parts of the villages where households had invested in soak pits and not 
necessarily in the whole village.  
38 Project staff did not know what to do with villages that showed little interest as progress was always measured 
in terms of ‘so many out of the 82 villages’ which put field staff under pressure to show results.  
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With these constraints from the Ghogha project, we now move on to look at the ERR 
framework and whether any of these challenges were addressed in the initial project design.         
The ERR project  
Following careful stocktaking of the damages caused to the water sources as well as supply 
systems by the 2001 Kutch earthquake and detailed planning, WASMO launched the five 
year ERR project in April 2003 proposing to cover 1,255 earthquake affected villages to 
restore and develop water supply and sanitation facilities in the districts of Kutch, 
Surendranagar, Jamnagar and Santalpur block in Patan, leaving villages of Rajkot district 
which was covered under the sector reform pilot project of the Government of India.    
While the ERR project follows the same basic approach as the Ghogha, that is, demand 
responsive, community based water development through the support of NGOs as ISAs (in 
this case 31) it has some flexibility in its approach on community contribution and more 
accountability through the use of gram sabhas for approval of all village-level plans, rather 
than just the legally constituted pani samitis. In addition, there was a greater focus on 
sanitation and water resources management as integral to the development of sustainable 
water supply systems.  
The major objectives of this five-year project (still continuing) may be listed as follows: 
• To establish decentralized, demand-driven, community owned rural water supply and 
sanitation systems which would be planned, approved implemented, operated and 
managed by rural populace; 
• To ensure drinking water safety through an integrated grouping of pipelines, local 
traditional sources and multiple sources for alternative use; 
• To build effective community institutions at the local level by supporting capacity 
building and empowerment; 
• To ensure that all community groups, including women, are able to play a part in the 
decision making process and benefit from the programme; 
• To improve the living environment of households and community through setting up 
of sanitation facilities and promoting hygiene awareness in the local population; and 
• To provide implementation support to communities through independent civil society 
organizations who would function as ISAs. 
The overall implementation of the programme at the village level follows a two-stage 
approach, the total time period being 18 months.  The first six months or the first phase of the 
programme cycle is spent on community mobilization to build shared learning on the 
principles of decentralized water governance and community ownership, through the use of 
information, education and communication (IEC) materials and the formation of pani samitis 
to directly involve villagers in responsive decision-making process. During the second cycle, 
which extends for a year, the hardware aspect of the project receives priority.  The activities 
include preparing and finalizing detailed proposals with approximate costs for Village Action 
Plans (VAPs) and household contributions and also execution of structural work for required 
water and sanitation facilities along with WRM work wherever applicable.  The whole 
process can broadly be divided into the following activities (these are not necessarily in linear 
order): 
• Introduction of the project through different cultural media to generate demand 
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• Formation of the pani samiti with 30-50 percent representation of women, depending 
on local context 
• Preparation of the VAP based on participatory assessment of local water requirements  
• Finalization and approval of the VAP in gram sabha 
• Fixing of community contribution and its deposit in separate bank account 
• Training on issues related to construction and financial management 
• Disbursement of funds and maintenance of accounts 
• Start of construction / structural work with supervision by pani samitis supported by 
ISA and Community Management Support Units (CMSU) 
• Setting of water tariff and O&M contribution by community  
• Physical work completed and hand-over of scheme to pani samiti or panchayat for 
management 
As in the Ghogha project, the ERR is also coordinated by Community Management Support 
Units (CMSU’s) which are based in each implementation district and are the closest public 
interface between WASMO and water users. In other districts, the District Water and 
Sanitation Committee (DWSC) serves as the major implementing partner for approving 
village level plans, guiding pani samitis and facilitating partnerships between the range of 
stakeholders involved (government, NGOs and CBOs). WASMO has formed Core Teams of 
engineering and social sector professionals to support the DWSC. But as table 1 below 
indicates there is still a long way to go in meeting even the quantitative water coverage 
targets for the state. 
The implementation of the project is facilitated by a Steering Committee which meets bi-
annually to review progress and comprises representatives from partner organizations, 
academics and officers/engineers from the water bureaucracy.  
Table 3.1 Progress under various water reforms programme in Gujarat 
 
Project Name Total Pani 
Samiti formed






Ghogha Project      82       82       82       0
Sector Reform Pilot 
Project 
 
   833
 
    833
 
    833
 
      0
ERR Project  1251   1260   1172      88
Swajaldhara  8199   3677   1050  2627
ITDP    100       50         0      50
 Total 10465   5902   3137  2765
Source: WASMO 2008: 9 
ITDP = Integrated Tribal Development Programme 
Building partnerships: key actors  
The process of decentralized water management in Gujarat envisages partnerships between 
three categories of stakeholders: the state as represented earlier by GWSSB and now largely 
by WASMO, the NGOs or ISAs as intermediary facilitating agencies and water users, women 
and men, through village pani samitis. This section outlines the key roles and objectives of 
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each set of actors and the challenges they confront in building partnerships around 
decentralized water management and governance. 
WASMO: mission and challenges  
WASMO is a registered society and a public trust formed in 2002 as a SPV to facilitate the 
process of sector reforms. Its mission includes: 
• Empowering communities to plan, own, construct, manage and maintain their water 
supply and sanitation facilities 
• Ensuring participation of communities, particularly women, in managing their water 
supply and sanitation  
• Attaining drinking water security through a combination of local (sources) and bulk 
water supply systems (pipelines) along with (appropriate) village level infrastructure 
• Encouraging communities to adopt best practices in local water resources 
management, including rainwater harvesting, artificial recharging and water quality 
testing 
• Bridging information and knowledge gaps through the creation of a strong knowledge 
base and communication and dissemination through a variety of media 
• Developing community leaders through capacity building and partnerships  
Funds have never been a problem for WASMO despite the early withdrawal of Dutch support 
– the communities and pani samitis were never aware of this and the state adopted the sector 
reforms programme.  WASMO has a multi-disciplinary team of professionals both in-house 
and external consultants who are hired from time-to-time on a need basis. Because it has 
adequate funds for institutional support, WASMO has been able to attract some of the best 
young talent in the water sector – though retaining professionals has been a challenge. 
Although it has a relatively hierarchal organizational structure WASMO tries to maintain a 
flexible organizational culture, providing space for innovation and voice.    
“Good governance”, according to the WASMO Project Director, “suits everyone. Our 
mission is honesty as purpose.  Gujarat has been a state characterized by scarcity so 
decentralisation was important – and also a focus on water quality issues – we have created a 
demand for safe water. Political need and commitment at all levels is visible,” (personal 
interview, Gandhinagar, June 2008).  
The hallmark of WASMO’s strategy rests on three principles: 
• Get communities empowered 
• Create alternative approaches and reach people 
• Provide an enabling framework for demand responsive water management. 
The key to the success of their approach lies in the recognition of the following: 
• The importance of dual water supply: since village drinking water systems only have 
the capacity to meet standard norms of 40 lpcd and people need more water for 
livelihood purposes, WASMO believes that it is important to facilitate access to water 
from other sources too – and to look at water for drinking and livelihood purposes as 
integrated.  
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• Multiple sources for ensuring water security are important: WASMO realizes that 
communities cannot depend on only one source for water and there is a need to 
innovate and look at alternatives such as – roof water harvesting, reverse osmosis, as 
well as pipelines.  
• Quality surveillance:  WASMO believes that people have to appreciate and know 
what is good quality water and that there has to be a demand for safe water from local 
communities. This is important in terms of ‘valuing’ water. WASMO marks sources 
which are not fit for human consumption with a red cross and basic water quality 
testing kits have been distributed to all villages. 
• Women have the right to ask for (safe) water at their doorstep: WASMO hopes that 
by 2010, 75% of the villages in Gujarat and women in these villages will have access 
to safe water at their doorstep. 
What is important to note here, from the point of view and gender and water governance, is 
that although WASMO’s Project Director made it clear that women’s empowerment per se 
(as distinct from participation which is part of the mission statement) is not one of the 
objectives of sector reforms (IDRC Project Inception workshop, 2006), the fact is that two 
years down the line WASMO has realized that not only has women’s participation been 
integral to the effectiveness of pani samitis, but that as responsibility for household water use 
and management rests with women, they have the right to demand this. And it is presumably 
the responsibility of the state to meet this obligation.  
One of the other challenges for WASMO is the contradiction between its vision of 
decentralized water management and the state’s continuing focus on bulk water transfers 
through such ambitious schemes as the Narmada-Mahi link canal. Although WASMO claims 
to be quasi-government (even calling itself ‘non-government’ at times) the truth of the matter 
is that both its governing and executive boards are headed by the Secretary Water Supply 
Department, GoG. However, WASMO has been fortunate over the last five years it has had 
some very dynamic men heading the organization, all committed to gender mainstreaming in 
pani samitis, if not entirely at the organizational level.   
Another challenge that WASMO faces, and which is also one of the weaknesses of the 
approach to decentralization, is that WASMO claims it is only responsible for facilitating and 
ensuring the distribution and management of water at the village level by pani samitis. 
Building infrastructure and providing water to the village is not its responsibility but that of 
the GWSSB though WASMO has played a critical role in facilitating a focus on alternative 
water sources (not merely pipelines) and helping communities develop local sources. But 
many of WASMO’s partners feel that such a narrow understanding of decentralization is 
flawed since the ultimate ‘control’ – of the water source – will often remain outside the 
village, i.e. with the GWSSB or water policy decision-makers. What are needed are clear and 
enforceable water rights (or entitlements) – in the absence of these, the issue of who has 
control or ownership remains ambiguous.  We address the question of water rights later. 
NGOs as partners  
Until the communal violence of 2002, Gujarat, for the most part, provided a favourable 
terrain for state-civil society partnerships and the water sector has been no exception. Not 
only have representatives from leading NGOs including some of the ones in our study 
(namely, AKRSP(I), Utthan and KMVS) been invited to sit on the State-level Groundwater 
Recharging Committee and the Task Force on PIM, initiatives such as the Gujarat Jal-Disha 
or Water Vision 2010 (GSDWICL 2000) and the White Paper on Water (IRMA-UNICEF 
 45
2000) mark important collaborations between the state and civil society, including NGOs, 
CBO representatives, development professionals and academics (Ahmed 2002, 2005). 
According to the collective of civil society organisations and individuals who were 
responsible for the Gujarat Jal-Disha:  
“Decentralisation does not necessarily mean the complete dismantling of existing 
bureaucracies. It means devolution of power to stakeholder communities, active partnership 
with the community at all levels (from policy making to project design and evaluation) and 
abandoning the comfortable top-down approach for a more complex, organic, bottom-up 
approach,” (Gujarat Jal-Disha 2010.) 
While the experience of sector reforms and the formation of WASMO have generally been 
received favourably by civil society in Gujarat,  the terms of NGO engagement have often 
been questioned and the fact that they are still defined as implementation support agencies 
raises fundamental questions on how they are perceived by the state – largely as catalysts to 
meet project objectives by being responsible for the ‘software’ (attitudinal change) without 
which, needless to say, the ‘hardware’ (water and sanitation infrastructure) would not be 
sustainable. Questions have also been raised about which NGOs participate and the kind of 
roles ascribed to them.  
The selection criterion for NGOs as ISAs is based on an assessment of the following:  
• Experience in the field of drinking water, sanitation, health and hygiene 
• Experience of working with participatory approaches 
• Experience in organising women and working with gender concerns 
• Experience of working with government programmes 
• Numbers of village level organisations initiated / strengthened  
• Number of training programmes on water and sanitation for capacity building of rural 
communities 
• Number of years of experience of working with PRIs 
• Number of villages covered by the organisation (till 2004) and extent of community 
contribution to development efforts 
• Organisational profile – ratio of technical to social experts, education and experience 
of staff, number of women in the organisation  
According to WASMO, the selection of NGOs was done in a systematic and transparent 
manner beginning with an advertisement in leading state newspapers and the rigorous 
screening of all applications by an independent committee, including civil society 
representatives with no stakes in the projects. Marks were awarded to the different criteria 
listed above and a weightage of 60 percent for organisational experience and 40 percent for 
personnel applied. It was decided that a score of 60 percent should be kept as a cut-off point 
for the NGOs to avoid a compromise on their quality of work and NGOs that were blacklisted 
by other government departments were immediately disqualified. 
It is interesting to note that experience of working with gender concerns and the numbers of 
women in the NGO were listed as criteria – the first accounting for 12.5 percent of the total 
marks accorded in the experience category and the latter accounting for 15 percent of the 
marks awarded for diversity in organisational personnel. However, while this is an important 
starting point for screening potential NGO partners, a focus on numbers (personnel) misses 
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out the positioning of women within an organisation (e.g. do they have the power to decide 
programmatic direction or are they merely community mobilisers and animators?). While a 
focus on the organisational gender experience may get translated into the ability to organise 
women’s SHGs, facilitate micro-credit, develop livelihood alternatives and so on, rather than 
the substantive questions of gender rights and women’s empowerment. In practice, it seems 
that the ISAs were selected for their experience in the drinking water sector rather than their 
commitment to gender rights per se, though some, score highly on both counts as we discuss 
later.  
NGOs were expected to mobilize communities, guide the institution building process and 
ensure transparency in account keeping by pani samitis and facilitate the development of 
participatory VAPs as well as women’s participation at all levels. While WASMO saw NGOs 
as key, if not equal, partners and maintained that their relationship was based on mutual 
respect, many NGOs felt otherwise. In the end-tern evaluation of the Ghogha project for the 
RNE, NGOs maintained that they felt treated as sub-contractors of WASMO, as part of the 
government providers in a (still) highly technically oriented project. It was also felt that at 
least two of the three NGOs in the Ghogha project did not have enough women staff and in 
the case of all partners, including WASMO and the new ERR partners, there has not been 
enough time spent on capacity building on participatory and gender-sensitive approaches in 
the context of decentralised water governance. For some NGOs involved in the ERR, the 
process of collaboration is unfolding in much the same way with WASMO seemingly 
interested in meeting targets rather than long-term sustainability and equity in water 
management.  
Building community water management institutions: pani samitis  
Traditionally, wells, ponds and tanks have been the principal means of water harvesting in 
Gujarat, providing water for both domestic and agricultural purposes. Wells are largely of 
two types – shallow wells called virdhas (or virdhis) where rainwater is captured in low 
depressions and the more elaborate step-well which is fed by an underground spring.  
The construction of both types of wells required collective action, albeit of different 
degrees.39 Step-wells date to the 7th century and resemble a subterranean temple with a long-
stepped corridor leading five or six flights down to the actual water source. The construction 
of a step-well was an important community event supported by the patronage of the dominant 
caste/class in the village, usually the moneylenders (patidars) or merchant usurers. Funding 
the construction of a well was considered to be one of the seven great meritorious acts Hindus 
were expected to perform during their lifetime. Sites were chosen with care and great skill by 
‘water diviners’ called panikalas, who were paid for their services by the state. 
Not only did wells provide a reliable source of water in adverse climatic conditions, they 
were also an important meeting place for the local community and frequently a cool resting 
place for travellers. In addition, apart from their intricate sculptures, step-wells had ritual and 
cultural significance embedded in the worship of the mother goddess of water or watering 
places. Many step-wells (known as ‘vav’ in Gujarati) carry the title ‘mata’ as part of their 
name, e.g., Mata Bhavani vav, as it is commonly believed in Hindu philosophy, that the 
sacred places of female power (shakti) are always combined with sacred ponds (kunds). 
Typically, women make offerings of coconuts, grains and milk to the goddess at the step-well 
seeking blessings for a good husband, children, especially sons, and prosperity. But there is 
                                                 
39 This varies with the rock and soil type in the area and hence the depth of the well to be dug. 
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also pain associated with water: for many young women in Saurashtra driven by domestic 
violence and poverty, wells are sites for committing suicide (Ahmed 2005).   
Although villagers were responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of community water 
structures, there is little historical documentation about the social organization of domestic 
water as compared to irrigation (see Hardiman 1998). In Trapaj village, Bhavnagar district, 
the first panchayat bore well was dug in 1982 and piped water was provided to households 
who could afford house connections at an annual cost of Rs 60 (for water). A small group of 
five men, effectively a sub-committee under the panchayat managed the scheme.  
However, there were no clear principles governing the roles and responsibilities of these 
committees or the representation of different interests (most likely they were dominated by 
those who could afford to pay for water and connections). Thus, in many cases these schemes 
only worked for a few years – for example in Chaniyala village, in the same district, 
standposts were constructed by the panchayat in 1991-92 with the support of the GWSSB to 
provide water from a borewell. But the quality of construction was poor and the contractor 
ran-off with the money, leaving the job half-finished. Consequently the scheme only worked 
for less than two years.  
Women did not participate in these early pani samitis nor were they consulted about the 
citing of water infrastructure. For example, about 15 years ago in Kobadi village (Bhavngar 
district) the panchayat, with the support of the GWSSB, built a dug well and an overhead 
tank with a capacity of 30,000 litres to supply water through six standposts. A small informal 
pani samiti was formed to manage the scheme. However, there were no women on the samiti 
and neither were they consulted about the location of the standposts or the timing of water 
distribution. Women maintained that there were frequent conflicts in the lines, sometimes 
violent. Since there were no charges for the water and therefore no funds for O&M the water 
source soon dried up and the scheme became defunct after only four years. 
With the government resolution of 1995, pani samitis were constituted as sub-committees of 
the gram panchayat with the task of managing and maintaining water and sanitation 
infrastructure in the village, both at the community and household level, including 
responsibility for collection of household contributions, supervising construction work and 
maintaining regular and transparent accounts. In October 2002 the Gujarat government issued 
another GR ordering all panchayats in villages where a water scheme is to be started or is 
already in place to pass a resolution to form a pani samiti. According to the GR each PS 
should have about 10-12 members, one third of whom must be women and SC/ST should be 
proportionately represented, including ward wise if necessary. In case a GP represents more 
than one village, each village with a scheme either has its own PS or the unitary PS must 
represent both villages proportionately. Each PS must have at least 4-5 members from the 
panchayat including the deputy sarpanch. The rest of the members can include 
representatives from different community and/or local organisations and people, who are 
willing to work voluntarily. In addition, according to the GR, the PS can also co-opt 
interested community members such as the local health worker, teacher, anganwadi worker, 
talati, water department representatives, etc. as permanent guest members without voting 
rights.  
The chairperson of the PS is to be elected by the members and the term of the PS is only two 
years – though this can be extended to coincide with the term of the GP if necessary. While 
the sarpanch is not constitutionally mandated to be the president of the PS (unlike in the 
earlier GR), in a number of villages the sarpanch is also (or has been) the president of the PS. 
Norms for the length of membership are rather ambiguous – “members can be re-elected but 
the membership can also change”. Furthermore, the GR stipulates that if a member dies or 
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resigns before the two year period their post should be kept vacant but it is not so clear why 
this rule was framed.  Each PS works under the administrative control of the Block 
Development Officer and the technical guidance of the GWSSB (until the official 
‘handover’) and has to maintain minutes and other records.   
In 2002, the re-elected BJP-led Gujarat government introduced the policy of ‘Samras’: a 
village panchayat does not need to hold elections, but can select eligible members through a 
process of dialogue based on consensus. The rationale behind this policy, according to the 
administration, is to prevent the violence, which occurs during elections and which in some 
allegedly notorious districts, such as Bhavnagar and Amreli, can be fatal. The government 
provides a one-time grant of Rs 65,000 to villages, which have successfully ‘selected’ their 
panchayat members and sometimes these grants go towards the pani samiti funds. While the 
merit or otherwise of this policy, (which the Gujarat government has borrowed from the 
populist measures of the last chief minister of Andhra Pradesh), are beyond the scope of this 
study, it does appear to raise critical questions of transparency and accountability in the 
development of local governance. 
Apart from assessing the impact of decentralisation on women’s participation in water 
governance in state-led programmes, through WASMO, five of the 13 villages surveyed in 
Gujarat had pani samitis facilitated under NGO led community based water management 
initiatives. Three of these villages were part of the PRAVAH demonstration pilots seeking to 
demonstrate what gender-just, equitable and sustainable community water management 
would mean in practice, while two villages had facilitated demand-responsive drinking water 
schemes under various tribal and watershed development programmes. The next section 
provides a brief outline on PRAVAH, a civil society water and sanitation network, 
facilitating partnerships with the state government at different levels, but important to note, 
within the framework of sector reforms.   
PRAVAH: making water flow for all  
In 1994, the Centre for Drinking Water Resources Management at Utthan40 conducted an in-
depth study on the drinking water situation in the state and shared its alarming findings at a 
public seminar (Hirway and Patel 1994). All the 65 NGO representatives and individuals 
present decided that there was an urgent need to evolve a collective body to influence 
government policy and promote effective decentralized water and sanitation alternatives. And 
so PRAVAH, which means flow in Hindi, was born and registered as a Trust in 1996. 
Today PRAVAH has over 105 individual and organisational members (NGOs, CBOs, 
students, development professionals, academics and activists) which together reach out to 
thousands of predominantly, rural communities all over Gujarat. With the launch of its new 
urban initiative, PRAVAH has begun to work in urban slums, primarily in Ahmedabad city, 
now declared a mega-city by the Indian government (under the JNNURM). As a membership 
based network PRAVAH has evolved the following objectives through consensus: 
 
• To help partners develop a perspective on drinking water and sanitation issues at the 
regional, national and global level through mutual learning, information sharing and 
appropriate dissemination of research and documentation. 
                                                 
40 Utthan is one of the leading NGOs promoting decentralized, equitable water alternatives in Gujarat and has 
more than 20 years of experience on gender equity, human rights and livelihood issues.  
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• To promote on a pilot basis decentralized, sustainable and equitable water harvesting 
or supply systems which take into account water quality and conservation parameters 
as ‘demonstration models’ for policy advocacy. 
• To support NGO and CBO members in facilitating the participation of women and 
marginalized communities in the planning, implementation and management of water 
systems and services through awareness creation and capacity building.  
• To network with other civil society organizations in Gujarat and at the national and 
global level to address larger questions of gender rights and access to information, etc. 
that impact on fundamental rights to water and sanitation. 
Pravah’s larger goal is to initiate a broader people’s movement with effective participation of 
all stakeholders to access rights to water and sanitation. In its initial years PRAVAH was 
driven by its founder members: experienced development organizations, research institutions 
and individuals, largely based in Ahmedabad, the unofficial state capital. While they were in 
a better position to guide PRAVAH in its formative phase many regional members felt that 
they were ‘defining’ PRAVAH’s agenda (Sood 2000). In addition, it was felt that a centrally 
based core group/secretariat could not on its own address policy concerns effectively. Hence, 
over the last decade through a process of critical internal reflection, PRAVAH has evolved a 
decentralized governance structure enabling greater participation of all members in decision-
making, agenda-setting and building ownership for the network.   
At the core is the Central Secretariat, located in Ahmedabad, with paid staff reporting to the 
Executive Secretary, a member of the Board of Trustees, which guides PRAVAH in terms of 
its vision, mission and strategy.41 There are five regional centres, based on the major geo-
climatic zones in Gujarat, and staff, (regional coordinator plus administrative support) are 
housed within a local member organisation’s office. Each region is governed by a ‘Sankalan 
Samiti’ (steering committee) comprising 1-2 member(s) from each of the districts (6-9) which 
fall in that region. They are responsible for regional planning and resource allocation and 
every effort is taken to ensure that at least 50 percent of the members are women. One 
member from each Sankalan Samiti (SS) is selected at the Annual General Body meeting to 
represent that region on the Executive Committee (EC). In addition, the EC has 4 members 
from the Board and 2-3 co-opted development professionals bringing different skills to 
PRAVAH, e.g. technical support, social and gender analysis. The EC plans and implements 
core activities through a range of member-driven sub-committees such as, the scrutiny 
committee for demonstration projects, the research and documentation committee, media, 
advocacy and campaign committee and so on.  
Increasingly, PRAVAH is driven by the Lok Manchs – emerging district level people’s 
platforms comprising representatives from NGOs, CBOs and the district administration who 
work collectively on a regionally specific water governance agenda as well as support 
advocacy efforts at the state level.  Each Lok Manch has a representative executive 
committee, headed by the District Collector who is also the chairperson for the District Water 
and Sanitation Mission in each district (formed under sector reforms, see earlier discussion on 
decentralisation). Having a senior bureaucrat at the helm provides legitimacy for the Lok 
Manch as well as access to public information on water and sanitation programmes and 
resource allocation.  Emerging insights suggest that Lok Manchs are active where local 
leadership is strong and believes in self-reliance as opposed to those areas where there is a 
high dependence on NGOs. There is also a need to look at other potential water ‘champions’ 
                                                 
41 The Executive Secretary is the main interface between the PRAVAH Coordinator/central secretariat and the 
Board and plays a crucial role in steering the value-based growth of the network.  
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(e.g. interested school teachers) rather than work through NGOs only as they are often 
embedded in their own power dynamics (Ahmed and Mittal 2005).   
While the Lok Manches and Sankalan Samitis have been critical learning platforms for 
decentralized water governance, PRAVAH’s members have also been implementing pilots 
which seek to demonstrate alternative participatory, equitable, gender-just and sustainable 
approaches to community-led water management. Demonstration pilots were meant to build 
community self reliance on water and sanitation, change attitudes and create institutional 
mechanisms that were secular and addressed questions of poverty, rights and good 
governance (accountability, transparency, etc.) within the framework of sector reforms.42 
Successful pilots were to be used towards policy advocacy on what a model of decentralized 
water governance should comprise.  However, external, independent monitoring of these 
pilots revealed that implementing members needed a lot more hand-holding vis-à-vis gender 
equity, financial and technical sustainability dimensions and that in the absence of strong 
facilitating NGOs this was difficult.43 In addition, financial contributions in some cases were 
not forthcoming because of the past history of NGO involvement – benevolent and welfare 
oriented rather than facilitating self-reliance. Apart from O&M costs, communities were 
meant to contribute 10% of the capital costs for community water assets and 30% for 
individual or household assets – which some considered high or higher in view of the state-
led decentralization programmes.   
The next part of this chapter draws on our field research to critically examine the functioning 
of pani samitis (PS), questions of equity, accountability and transparency in the governance 
of water, and the constraints and opportunities for women’s participation in the process of 
decentralisation. Our insights are drawn from extensive interviews with women PS members 
and focus group discussions  (FGDs) with both members, women and men, as well as non-
members in 13 villages drawn from a cross-section of decentralised contexts including, the 
WASMO Ghogha and ERR projects described above as well as community-led water 
management supported by PRAVAH and its members.  
Part II: An analysis of our findings on decentralised water 
management in Gujarat  
Introduction: a brief note on methodology  
Chapter 1 outlined the project methodology across both states and sectors. Table 3.2 shows 
the villages selected across 6 districts in Gujarat with 8 villages being selected from the state-
led decentralisation context and the other 5 villages fall under PRAVAH demonstration pilots 
and community-led natural resource management interventions. To reiterate: all villages are 
within the sector reforms framework and were purposively selected in consultation with NGO 
partners to represent: 
• Diversity of socio-economic and water contexts (e.g. drought/flood prone, poor water 
quality) 
• Heterogeneity of communities – mix of castes, tribal communities and issues (e.g. 
conflicts) 
• Strong women’s participation in pani samitis (as perceived by the facilitating NGO) 
                                                 
42 Concept note for demonstration pilots and application forms, PRAVAH (2005).  
43 PRAVAH – notes from monitoring of demonstration pilots (Ahmed 2006).  
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The questionnaire and FGD checklists were developed in consultation with our main NGO 
partner, Utthan, and differs slightly from the one used in the Maharashtra context – for 
example, information on women PS members landholding status was not collected. For each 
NGO partner and subsequently in each village surveyed, the following steps were followed: 
• One day workshop with each NGO, and women PS members where possible, to share 
project framework and identify key informants to support IDRC project team 
• Village transect (PRA) to look at distributions and accessibility of village water 
supply works as well as general environmental sanitation 
• In-depth interviews with women members of pani samitis (individual and group) 
• FGDs with ALL members of pani samitis, women and men 
• FGDs, sometimes combined with transect walks, with non-members on their 
perceptions of governance vis-à-vis role of PS, responsibilities of PS members   
In addition, interviews were also undertaken with some district level functionaries (water 
engineers in the CMSU or DWSM), key actors in WASMO, NGO team members and civil 
society leaders. All primary insights were supplemented by secondary data from the Census, 
government reports, WASMO documentation, case studies and previous work in the state.  
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Transportation 
Community hall / 
Telephones 
 
The table above shows that though all the sample villages have primary schools, female 
literacy is very low, ranging from 3.4 % in the largely tribal village of Pav in Dahod district 
to 9.6% in Mokarshivangh, Kutch where water availability is still constrained, probably 
affecting girls access to school. This village also has the lowest sex ratio which is lower than 
the state average. Anther village with a surprisingly low sex ratio is the tribal village of 
Gangapur – gender relations are generally assumed to be more egalitarian in tribal societies, 
but research has time and again shown that this is not necessarily the case.  All the villages 
have a gram panchayat and basic infrastructure like electricity, public transport, 
communication (telephones, mobiles, post office) – only two villages have primary health 
centres (PHC), one of which is not functional; one village has a shop under the public 
distribution system PDS and Ghogha, a small town (or large village by Gujarat standards) has 
a bank. Most villages, particularly in Kutch where water scarcity prevails, have only open 
defecation.     
Table 3.3 provides a brief profile of the five NGO partners involved and the map 3.1 shows 
the location of these villages covering a cross-section of hydro-geomorphological regions in 
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Gujarat, from semi-arid / arid Kutch to relatively less water stressed districts such as Surat. 
However, despite some good rainfall years since 2002, most of these villages fall in drought-
prone districts. 



































Gender empowerment, livelihood security 
and conflict transformation with focus on women, 
poor and vulnerable.   
Bhavnagar district - 
coastal, high salinity,  water 
scarcity. Also tribal districts of 





Natural resource management and policy advocacy 
(eg. PIM, JFM). Women’s participation in 
separate/mixed groups. 
Sayla, Chotila blocks 
in Surendranagar 





Gender empowerment through credit 
cooperatives, natural resource management 
especially, water conservation and land salinity 
control.  
Ahmedabad and 
Bhavnagar districts - 




 1989 Grassroots rural development organization 
comprising some 12,000 women organized through 
(women’s groups) covering 160 villages to address 
issues of health, violence, livelihoods, disasters and 
education. 
  Kutch  
Before the introduction of community developed water interventions, whether led by NGOs 
directly or in partnership with WASMO all these villages were facing extensive water 
problems, particularly in the summer months – and women /girls were sharing the brunt of 
the drudgery of water collection.  Table 3.4 outlines the broad drinking water situation in 
each village before and after the various water interventions; in some cases schemes are still 
in progress. 
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Table 3.4 Village water profile, before / after interventions and current status of PS 
Village Situation Before Situation After Water Supply Works  
Mithivirdi People were fetching water from well 
in Vadis (farms) area and also making 
Virdas in the river (shallow hand dug 
wells).   
Mahi water supply scheme has been discontinued as 
village was not water charges; back to traditional 
sources. The PS installed a motor to pump water 
from one of the wells near a check-dam to an 
overhead tank, but at time of visit, pump was found 
stolen and water in well was muddy with frogs. 
Some people have private connections, e.g. roof 
rainwater tanks, but largely buy water.     
Ghogha They were facing so much water crisis 
earlier. They used to bring water from 
well, pond and well in Vadi. In 
summer they had to suffer a lot.  
Connected to Mahi water supply system – two 
overhead tanks (500,000 and 300,000 litres 
capacity), two distribution lines, 3 cattle troughs, 47 
standposts, bathing ghat – distribution problems 
persist due to low pressure for houses further away 
from pump. No local water resources – quality poor 
because of salinity and industrial effluents.  
Jasapara Before scheme they were fetching 
water from village well and hand 
pump. 
Now they get water from well to stand post – in each 
hamlet. 95% of houses have sanitation facilities 
under TSC (mostly BPL families), 30% houses have 
private connections. Water also supplied to farms, 
each hamlet gets water for an hour, daily and hh have 
water storage capacity for 2 days.  
Janada Water in borewell had gone saline, 
GWSSB supply very irregular, women 
used to travel upto 2 kms to fetch 
water, panchayat not able to pay water 
bills, illegal pumping 
One borewell connected to overhead tank, well built 
under demo-pilot also connected to tank, but no 
power supply to pump water. Not all hamlets in 
village get water because they are at higher 
elevation: each gets water for 1-2 hours every 3-4 
days, SC hamlet has little water and poor sanitary 
conditions, also cattle trough not maintained.  
Navagam They used to go to fetch water from 
village well. If they don’t get water 
from it they were going to Vadi to 
fetch water.  
They get enough water from bore-well to cluster 
storage tanks – 9 tanks, but not all get water, all the 
time.  
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Mokasar Getting water from village well and 
Vadi well 
Watershed development programme which later 
addressed drinking water needs, 9 community / 
cluster storage tanks built, old bore well deepened, 
recharging through check dam, etc.  
Refda They had to go to farm (Vadi) for 
fetching water. Literally whole day 
was spent on fetching water 
Under the demo-pilot, two old wells were deepened 
and a bore well to supply water to an overhead tank 
was also built. In addition, 150 soak pits and 100 hh 
toilets were made, with at least 25 % of the hh doing 
so on their own.  
Pav Women used to bring water from the 
well, but it used to get dry in the 
summer. Then they brought water from 
river or check dam, but that was also 
not enough. 
Now in each faliya / hamlet they have a well from 
where women fetch water. Each well is shared by 15-
20 houses, each well has net covering. Also four 
overhead/roof water collection tanks built for houses 
at an elevation.  
Gangapur There was only 1 hand pump in the 
village and people used to go to well 
and river to fetch water and wash 
clothes. 
There are 10 hand pumps in the village and people 
claim they get enough. Scheme is not functioning 
now as pipes are broken and PS doesn’t have money 
for repairs as people are not paying water charges – 
get enough ‘free’ water from handpumps.  
Dador Earlier they were making Virda in 
pond and river and fetching water. 
Water supply board’s water was not 
coming regularly. Panchayat was 
ordering for tankers in summer. 
Now they get enough water from village well and 
also water from water supply board. They fetch 
water from stand posts. Solar system is fixed at well 
to supply water.  
Hajipir Water supply by GWSSB is not regular 
– maybe once a week. During the 
summer they depend on tankers. 
Sometimes they get water from Luna 
village, but conflicts.  
Scheme still under construction – involves 
development of local sources, well recharging and 
construction of 2 overhead tank, cattle troughs and 
standposts as well as 6 underground storage tanks.   
Still depend on local water resources – pond – or 
have to buy water (expensive). Pilgrims come for 
annual fair, pond gets dirty, water drained and 
refilled from dam close by – costly.  
Chadura Earlier women were getting water from 
well but in summer and during drought 
years it was getting dry; also very far. 
Panchayat was ordering for tankers but 
Water from village pond, well near check dam and 
also from Water Supply Board. 
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that was also not enough or regular.  
Mokarshivangh Women used to fetch water from 
private Vadi wells. During the summer 
they would wake-up by 4 am to fetch 
water. Those who were late did not get 
water. Water tankers came once in 8 
days. Wo/men also went to Chadura 
village pond with bullock carts to fetch 
water. 
Women fetch water from village well developed 
under Drought Prone Programme (DPP). WASMO 
scheme still under construction (started in April 
2007) – two underground tanks (capacity of 5,000 
litres each) and one overhead tank (capacity of 
30,000 litres) being built 
 
Table 3.5 presents a quick gender scan of the pani samitis studied – most have been 
functioning between the past three to five years. The number of women members ranges from 
a low of 25 percent (Mithivirdi village, part of the Ghogha project) to all women samitis (100 
percent) in the two tribal villages covered. In total, of the 160 members on these 13 pani 
samitis, just over half (53%) are women and we interviewed 80 percent of them. 
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Table 3.5 Gender scan of Pani Samitis 








Members       
(%) 





Refda 2005  16 6 (37.5) SC: 5 4 
Pav 2005  12 ALL  All tribal 10 
Janada 2006 Once a month  9 6 (66.6)  4 




11 ALL  All tribal 9 
Mokasar 2004 Every month or 
fortnight  
18 9 (50)  6 
Nayagam 2004 Every month 15 8 (53.3) 
Female VP 
No SC on 
samiti 
6 
Mokarshivangh 2005 Every month 11 6 (54.5) All 
Muslim 
5 





Chadura 2006  11 3 (27.2)  3 
Dador 2006 Meet once or twice 
a year 
11 7 (63.6), 
Female 
President  
8 Muslims 6  
Mithivirdi 2003 Meet as necessary 12 3 (25)  3 
Jasapara 2003, first PS: 
1997-98 
Now no regular 
meetings 
12 4 (33)  4 
Ghogha 2003  11 4 (36.4)  3 
Total   160 85 (53%)  68 (80%) 
 VP = Vice President 
There are two parts to this analysis – the first considers the women members of the pani 
samiti – who are they, how were they selected, what are their roles and what is their 
knowledge/perception on various aspects concerning the objectives and functioning of the 
PS. The second part of our analysis draws on the FGDs with members (wo/men) and non-
members to look at larger questions of governance – how effective has the PS been in 
facilitating gender just and equitable water management?  
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Table 3.6 Profile of women pani samiti members 
 
 Number of  
Respondents  
(N = 68) 
Percentage 
Age (reproductive age categories)  
15-29 4 6 
30-45 49 72 
46-64 13 19 
64+ 2   3 
Income Classes (approximate annual 
income of the household) 
 
0-4,000 -- -- 
4,001-11,000 6   9 
11,001-20,000 19 28 
20,001-30,000 10 15 
30,001-40,000 6   9 
40,001-50,000 7 10 
50,001-60,000 3   4 
60,001-70,000 3   4 
70,001-80,000 -- -- 
80,001-90,000 -- -- 
90,001-1,00,000 7 10 
1,00,000+ 7 10 
Education  
Uneducated 45 66 
Uneducated, can sign 5 7 
1st-5th std 8 12 
6th-10th std 9 13 
11th-12th std -- -- 
Graduate -- -- 
Post graduate/ professionally qualified 1 1 
Religion  
Hindu 43 63.23 
Muslim 17 25.0 
Catholic 6 8.83 
Protestant 2 2.94 
Caste  
General   5   7.3 
SC 11 16.2 
ST 18 26.5 
OBC 34 50 
Marital Status  
Married 56 82 
Widow 10 15 
Unmarried 1 1.5 
Divorced 1 1.5 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.6, the majority of women in our sample our married (82%), fall 
in the age group of 30-45 years (75%) and are largely uneducated (66%). Married and older 
women have a higher degree of mobility in the social domain and are more ‘acceptable’ 
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within the given cultural context. They also have more time as they are past their child-
bearing and nurturing years; many would also be grandmothers by the time they are 40 or 45 
years old. Interestingly, the lack of education does not act as a deterrent in terms of women’s 
selection to the PS – rather other factors, which we look at later, are more important. And the 
presence of 1-2 ‘educated’ women on the PS is often enough for women to ensure that the PS 
is functioning according to its basic objectives.  
With respect to poverty and the participation of the poor in governance, data on annual 
income levels was used as an estimate – however, this data is an under-estimate and a more 
detailed analysis would require looking at consumption expenditure and accounting for 
inflation, which we did not have the time or resources for. Looking at this ‘crude’ data we 
can see that 37 percent of the women on our pani samitis come from households that have 
reported income levels of less than $0.40/day to just over a S1/day.44 In contrast, 20 percent 
of the sample includes women who come from upper social classes in the community, while 
the majority of the sample is women who are in a median income category. This suggests that 
although the pani samitis are dominated by women from relatively better off socio-economic 
categories, there are still considerable spaces for the poor to participate.  
In terms of religion, given national averages, it is not surprising that the pani samitis are 
dominated by Hindu women – most of the Muslim women in our sample come from the pani 
samitis in Kutch where the Muslim population has traditionally enjoyed better social mobility 
and participation in the public domain compared to the rest of the state – though this is likely 
to change given the progress of fundamentalist politics. With respect to the representation of 
marginalized communities – at least 42 percent of the women on the PS come from scheduled 
castes (16%) and scheduled tribe (26%) categories – though the tribal figures are only 
representative of a couple of villages/districts in our sample, namely the eastern district of 
Dahod (Utthan – Pav village) and the southern district of Surat (AKRSP(I) – Gangapur 
village).  
In terms of their livelihoods strategies, most of the women are engaged in agriculture as 
primary/self-cultivators (i.e. working on fields owned by their husbands/families), as well as 
seeking additional employment as agricultural labourers. Some of the women are engaged in 
animal husbandry, a few are involved in the delivery of village social and welfare services as 
primary health workers, anganwadi (child-care), mid-day meal service providers and 
teachers. Some of the women run petty businesses like tailoring or grocery shops and a few 
work as daily labourers, including in the flourishing, but poorly paid, diamond polishing 
business. The important point to note here is that at least 90 percent of the women in our 
sample do some paid work outside the house – those who are not able to work in the public 
domain, are typically women who come from upper caste households where there are 
restrictions on their mobility (Patel, Koli Patel and Brahmin households).  
                                                 
44 The government specified poverty threshold is $0.40/day with various estimates suggesting that 25% of the 
Indian population live on less than Rs 20/day with most working in the informal labour sector with no job or 
social security.  Given the fluctuations in the $=Rs exchange rate we are using an average of $=Rs 40 in this 
assessment – S1/day is the global figure of poverty based on GDP and purchasing power parity.   
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Chart 3.1 Occupational diversification of women on pani samitis 
 
Most of the women members have some prior political or social mobilization experience 
(institutional affiliation), either as members of the village or block or district) panchayat, 
SHGs, or other village institutions such as the dairy cooperative, disaster mitigation 
committee, watershed, forest management or education committee. Some of the women have 
held leadership positions in the panchayat or in their SHGs, but only 3 of the women in our 
sample currently hold office bearing positions in their pani samiti, as president, vice-
president and secretary – all of them from the villages in Kutch.  
Chart 3.2 Institutional affiliation of women on pani samitis 
 
In the next section we look at the patterns of selection –how did these women get selected for 
the pani samiti, what were there driving characteristics, was there an election and who took 
the final decision? 
Process of selection to pani samiti- characteristics of women, who decides?  
A number of co-related factors determine which women are selected for the pani samiti, who 
selects them and how this process unfolds – is it transparent and democratic or is the question 
of which women participate decided by a few men, their husbands or village seniors, and 
largely determined by class and/or caste. The graph below (chart 3.3) shows the frequency of 
the most important characteristics women highlighted as the reasons for their selection. 
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Chart 3.3 Characteristics of women pani samiti members 
 
As can be seen from the graph, the two criteria that women articulate as being most important 
in their selection are prior experience (membership of other community based institutions) 
and whether or not they have (or are perceived to have) time for attending meetings and 
fulfilling their PS responsibilities.  Other criteria, such as being articulate, willingness and 
capacity to work effectively, demonstration of leadership skills and ability to move out 
(within the hamlet, village) are also important determinants. Factors such as the presence of 
their husbands or other family members on the PS, the quota (reservation) or their level of 
education are not so significant, comparatively.  One of the interesting criteria that a few 
women have cited is the perception of them as being individuals who have the skills to ensure 
the involvement of people from diverse caste or faith backgrounds – and in the context of 
conflict, or even the perception that conflict is /can be a reality, this is an important 
characteristic.  
Most of the women had their names proposed by members of the SHGs or other village 
institutions, or even other PS members as the graph in Figure 3 illustrates. They were also 
selected because they were already on the panchayat, and by law, there has to be some 
representation from the panchayat on the pani samiti.  In the case of a number of villages, 
particularly those in Kutch, representation on the PS is also by faliya or vaas (hamlet) with 
each hamlet nominating three people for the PS.  
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Chart 3.4 Who proposed names of women pani samiti members? 
 
Sometimes names were proposed by more than one category of individuals and women have 
even suggested themselves, or been suggested by NGO representatives. The role of relatives 
and influential village members in suggesting names of women candidates is comparatively 
less (about 22 percent of the total of options).   In nearly 72 percent of the cases women were 
asked if they wanted to be on the PS which suggests that women’s names were not just 
proposed to fill a quota but their acquiescence was deemed important in a democratic 
process. In addition, in the case of 44 percent of the women, their names were discussed and 
then decided upon in a gram sabha. While in the case of 35 percent of the women, a separate 
meeting was called for usually by the facilitating NGO to select the names of women 
candidates – this is mandatory in the WASMO-ERR project and other sector reform 
initiatives. Surprisingly, 22 percent of our sample could not recall where (in which forum) 
they had been selected or even how they had been selected (18%) – whether there was a 
discussion (under the samras process) or an election. However, the majority of our sample 
(82%) confirmed that they had been selected after an open process of discussion. 









Chart 3.5 Role and responsibilities as pani samiti members  
 
As PS members, women listed a number of responsibilities – the first amongst these being 
attending meetings – 68 percent of the women felt that attending meetings regularly was an 
important responsibility.  Another significant responsibility was seen as the monitoring of 
construction work – 50 percent of the women said that monitoring the construction of village 
water and sanitation infrastructure and ensuring quality of material used was a key 
responsibility. This also includes maintaining the attendance register and paying labourers. 
Three women claimed they had also been responsible for purchasing materials.  
However, the most important responsibility women felt that they had was in the collection of 
capital contribution and O&M charges, including water tariffs – nearly 74 percent of the 
sample listed this as an important responsibility.45 Some of the reasons women felt they 
assumed or were sometimes assigned this task was that in some cases households are 
reluctant to pay water charges – either they cannot afford these, being very poor, or they 
don’t see any direct benefits for themselves (e.g. they live most of the time in houses located 
in their fields and are not so depended on village water sources or they are well off and have 
private connections). Women PS members claimed that it was easier for them as women to 
counsel or negotiate with the women in these households on the need to contribute and 
encouraging them to either pay themselves (if they were SHG members) or ensure that their 
husbands pay.  
Women also claimed that they had an important role in discussing key committee decisions 
with non-PS members, either at the hamlet or neighbourhood level or in other village 
institution meetings and in resolving conflicts (53 percent of the women said this was an 
important responsibility for them). Some of the women who held leadership positions on 
other village institutions explained that they had been instrumental in ironing out differences 
in the location of community water infrastructure (e.g. standposts). Having standposts which 
are accessible (within 200 meters) would be important for most women, however, if the area 
around standposts and other community water points is not properly maintained there is 
waterlogging which leads to breeding of mosquitoes, etc. – so who makes what decisions on 
the appropriate location of community water assets is critical. Other conflicts that women 
cited were between those who paid O&M costs regularly and those who did not: for example, 
in Navagam village (Surendranagar district, WASMO-ERR project with AKRSP) where 
                                                 
45 Women listed multiple responsibilities and the percentages are calculated as a % of women who listed that as 
a responsibility, not as a percentage of responses  
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there are cluster storage tanks in hamlets for water distribution, there were conflicts when 
those who paid and felt responsible asked others to stop wasting water 
Other responsibilities that women cited that they were responsible for included supervising or 
monitoring that people did not waste water, followed rules on disposal of waste material and 
kept the area around community infrastructure clean. A few women, those who had basic 
literacy skills, were responsible for maintaining PS records (5 women) and some also 
recorded PS  meeting minutes (6 women) while a couple of women claimed they had 
mobilized other village women for meetings and training programmes. Only four women 
claimed that they had any direct responsibility for operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure itself.  
In sum, most of the responsibilities discussed above were cited by the women who regularly 
attended meetings – at least 26.5 percent of our sample, that is, just over one-fourth of the 
women, maintained that they did not attend meetings, regularly or otherwise, and did not 
participate in much committee-related responsibilities. Of the women who did attend 
meetings regularly and were actively aware of their responsibilities (73.5 % of the sample), 
78 percent claimed that they took up tasks themselves while the balance 22 percent claimed 
that they were assigned tasks, but that they were largely willing to take them on. However, 
most women felt that there was some gender stereotyping in the tasks assigned to women – 
particularly the responsibility for financial contribution, which is the key for the sustainability 
of the community water system: “so if money does not come in, i.e. if people do not pay the 
water charges on time it is seen as women’s fault”. Another gender stereotyped task that 
women pointed out was the responsibility assigned to them for maintaining cleanliness 
around the water and sanitation infrastructure. This was seen as an extension of their unpaid 
work in keeping their homes clean, the same caring role was being extended to the public 
domain on the assumption that ‘women did not mind’ or that they had an innate sense of 
altruism, to do good for the community.  
Gender and knowledge: access to information, awareness, perceptions  
Access to information and the ability to process information – produce knowledge – which is 
then internalized, shared and disseminated to other women and men, particularly non-
members is a key factor in facilitating women’s participation and building gender just and 
equitable village water and sanitation committees. We began by asking women PS members, 
the basic questions like when was their village PS formed and did they know why it was 
formed, are they aware of its rules and regulations. An overwhelming 81 percent of the 
sample reported that they knew when their PS was formed (year only) – and this date was 
later confirmed in PS records. The reasons behind the establishment of the PS were many and 
quite diverse, depending on the institutional context under which the PS was initiated. For 
example, for some women the PS was there to facilitate the construction of village ponds 
under drought proofing programmes (Kutch), while in some of the tribal villages, the PS was 
seen as a means of asserting rights to water for horticulture.  
However, most women asserted that the PS was a [governance] mechanism to facilitate water 
problems and negotiate conflicts in the village through better management, as well as monitor 
construction work, collect water charges on a regular basis and ensure sufficient availability 
and quality of water. A number of women also felt that an efficient PS would help them save 
time as they would have access to a regular, well-maintained water supply.  Interestingly, 
while women stressed factors such as efficiency and effectiveness in terms of the delivery of 
water and maintenance of water infrastructure as important reasons for the formation of the 
PS, they did not look at ensuring equity in the distribution of water as a rationale for the PS. 
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This is not to say that women are not aware of equity and inclusiveness issues, but that their 
overriding or primary concern, like men, is with first ensuring a regular and adequate water 
supply and building a reasonably robust community institution.  
Chart 3.6 Reasons for formation of village pani samiti 
 
At least 69 percent of the women were aware of the rules (or lack of rules) made by the 
committee – and the rest, 31 percent, were not aware of the actual mechanisms or principles 
under which the PS was mandated to work.  
Knowledge on decisions related to water source, storage and distribution  
Most of the women PS members – 72.06 percent of the sample were aware of how the water 
source, storage and distribution mechanisms were decided, by whom or in which institutional 
forum. In terms of the options that women who were aware of how and where these decisions 
were taken listed, about 61 percent of the respondents agreed that the gram sabha was the 
most important forum for democratic and inclusive decision-making on the location of water 
infrastructure.  However, decisions were also made in other forums such as meetings of the 
women’s group or the pani samiti or the panchayat. In addition, there were a number of 
influencing factors, including active community leaders, the partner NGO, or the 
implementing agency and in some cases, residents of the hamlets where the infrastructure 
was to be located.  
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Chart 3.7 Decision-making on water according to women who claimed they knew 
 
 
Nearly 51 percent of the sample claimed that they had a role to play in the decision-making 
regarding the location of the village water infrastructure. And 82 percent of the sample 
claimed they were relatively content with the location of the various water systems.  In terms 
of the location of public facilities such as standposts and community storage tanks, most 
women felt that these should be on ‘common’ land and accessible to everyone equally. That 
is, the land should not be held by an individual who may later deny access to other 
community members either on grounds of caste or faith or if there is prolonged water 
scarcity, s/he may claim the water asset as theirs.    
Perception on water pricing system  
There are two sets of costs that water users have to bear – the first concerns the community 
contribution which is a minimum 10 percent of the capital costs and is usually a one-off fee 
collected per household (cash or labour), once the amount is collectively decided in the gram 
sabha. In some villages, better off families contribute more – often just to get the work 
started.  The other set of costs – the water tariffs – are recurring costs and vary from village to 
village, in terms of the actual fee, whether it is per household or per person (varies with 
public or private connections) and whether it is collected monthly, quarterly, biannually or 
annually. The table below illustrates the wide difference in water tariffs in our sample 
villages.   Essentially, the water tariff is meant to cover the operation of the system, costs of 
repair and maintenance as needed, salaries of operators and the costs of water supply where 
applicable (e.g. paid to GWSSB for external water transfer).  
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Table 3.7 Water tariffs in sample villages 
District Village Water Tariff 
Mithivirdi Rs. 15 per person per year (well) 
Ghogha Rs. 20 per household per month for stand post usage.  
Rs.50 per household per month for private connection usage. 
Jasapara Rs. 20 per month per hh for private connections and  
Rs. 10 per month per hh for stand post usage. 
Bhavnagar 
Janada Rs. 200 per household, annually 
Navagam Rs. 20 monthly per household. Surendranagar 
Mokasar Rs. 10 per household per month 
(additional funds on need basis) 
Ahmedabad Refda Not started collecting water tariff.  
Dahod Pav Not started collecting water tariff.  
Surat Gangapur Rs. 20 per household per month 
Dador Rs.3 per person per month 
Hajipir Scheme under construction 
Chadura Rs. 50 per month per household 
Kutch 
Mokarshivangh Scheme under construction 
An overwhelming number of women, 82 percent of the sample, knew how the water tariff in 
their village was applied – whether it was per person or per household and the differential 
rates applied to private and public connections. The women who did not know came from the 
villages where the scheme was not yet operational and so the tariff was not being collected. 
However, when the women were asked how the water tariff was decided, at least 27 percent 
(just under one third of the sample) did not know. Those who did know how the tariff was 
calculated pointed out the following components as being important in determining the tariff 
(in declining order of significance): 
• Maintenance and repair costs, including costs of diesel, spare parts – 48 percent of the 
sample listed this as the most important set of costs 
• The operator’s salary – this is perhaps the highest component of the tariff and one of 
the more ‘visible’ costs – 45 percent of the women who knew how the tariff was 
calculated listed this 
• The costs of electricity (where applicable)  
When asked whether they thought the water tariff was appropriate, 60 percent of the sample 
maintained that whatever was decided collectively was deemed correct in their opinion. 
However, 30 percent of the sample did not have an opinion on this and the rest thought it 
should be calculated per person instead of per household – only one woman felt that it was 
more than they could afford. Interestingly, the discourse on decentralization which demands 
that users should pay for services has been internalized quite strongly by the women 
committee members – 90 percent of them felt that users should pay for water; only one 
person thought the government should pay for water and no one felt, even the poorest, that 
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people could not afford to pay for water. However, only 49 percent of the women were ready 
to pay more for water if they could be ensured of better quality and better service delivery – 
“if water is available for 24 hours, at my doorstep” – her dream, reiterated by the WASMO 
project director. On the other hand, 38 percent of our sample said that they could not afford to 
pay more for better quality water services.   
Chart 3.8 Readiness to pay for more / better quality water 







Yes, if there is more
convenience
Yes, if forced (govt or
elders so decide)





In terms of looking at the willingness and ability to pay – for more / better quality and 
efficiency of water services, we find the data rather inconclusive when it comes to the 
question of which women.46  The data shows those who are willing to pay for better services 
include: women from economically better off households, older women as it would ease their 
work burden/drudgery as well as widows since they tend to be on their own and/or have more 
dependents.   Interesting, educated respondents, who would be somewhat aware of their water 
entitlements and the role of the state in this respect, do not agree to pay extra for more/better 
quality water.   Low income group respondents (4,000-20,000 INR per annum) seem equally 
willing and unwilling to pay. That may be because while they want better facilities, they 
cannot afford it.  Even in contexts of severe water scarcity, people are either too poor to pay 
more or have devised / adapted their livelihood strategies to live with less / poor quality water 
in the face of government apathy.  Better positioned individuals may be agreeing as a little 
more expense is immaterial. On the other hand, they might not want to pay because they are 
likely to already have facilities like private borewells or farm wells or can afford tanker 
delivery.  
In some cases, for example, in Navagam village, Surendranagar district (WASMO-ERR 
project with AKRSP), Hansaben Mehta, a PS member, recounts how a family was allowed to 
take (pump) more water from one of the cluster storage tanks for their house construction – 
and pay extra for it. The only regulation was that the pumping time should not exceed one 
hour and that this could only be done after everyone in the hamlet had got their share of 
water. The said family paid Rs 180 for taking extra water for four days – this is still cheaper 
than if they had to arrange for water from outside or fetch it themselves (saves time).  
                                                 
46 Willingness to pay studies in the water sector – not the same rigour here. 
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Women’s perceptions on equity in the water tariff are also important – should all members of 
a village, given the diversity of  different socio-economic conditions pay the same or equal 
water tariff, whether per person or per household (accounting for the difference in 
private/public connections). The majority of women – 49 percent of the sample – thought that 
all should pay the same water tariff whether in cash or kind (labour). However, 10 percent of 
the sample felt that households should pay according to their ability (economic conditions), 
while 24 percent thought the poor should be exempted and 3 percent felt that the rich should 
pay for the poor or those who cannot afford the water tariff so that the community does not 
suffer. In addition, 6 percent of the sample felt that flexible payments, particularly if it is a 
monthly payment, could be an option for the very poor. What this analysis suggests is that 
although women, collectively agree to the pani samiti decision that all users should pay for 
water and that the water tariff in their village was largely appropriate, when probed, women 
do feel that some degree of flexibility needs to be considered when the poor are asked to pay 
for water, i.e. they realize that not everyone has the same ability to pay for domestic water. 
Many poor families, for example, depend on daily wages or sometimes remittances from 
family members to pay water charges.     
Gender and participation: ability to attend meetings  
Pani samiti meetings are held regularly, at least once a month, in villages where schemes are 
still going on; but where village water works have been completed and handed over, meetings 
are less frequent. In terms of the timing and location of the PS meetings, 72 percent of the 
sample said that these were appropriate for them. For the other women members, the timing 
and location of the PS meetings did not matter, since they did not attend these meetings 
(10.3%), or only sometimes (10.3%) or sent their husbands or sons instead of them (7.4%).  
Just over half the sample, 53 percent said that they were consulted about the timings, 13 
percent felt that even if they were not consulted, the timings suited them. However, 18 
percent of the sample maintained that they were not consulted about the meeting timings and 
therefore found it difficult to attend the meetings regularly. Generally, most women find the 
afternoons a good time for meetings as that’s when their workload is less, but meetings held 
in the evenings are difficult to attend – either it clashes with preparation of dinner or it is too 
late for them to venture out. In some villages (e.g. Navagam) it is women members who 
inform other women about the next PS meeting, while men inform male members.  
In Navagam village where the PS was having regular meetings, an otherwise active woman 
member, claimed that she had not attended a PS meeting for the past two years! However, its 
not only women who do not attend PS meetings regularly: in Hajipir village, Kutch, women 
complained that only two of the five male PS members regularly attended meetings, whereas 
women dutifully attended all meetings held to date: “ Only women can’t do everything on 
their own; men have to support us. But in our monthly PS meetings only 2 men come, while 
all the women participate. Maybe if we had rules about attendance, men would also attend 
regularly?” Raimaben (Vice-President of PS in the FGD with PS members, November 2007).    
Apart from factors such as the lack of information about when or where the meeting is 
scheduled, some of the women who did not attend the meetings, regularly or otherwise, felt 
that there was little support for them on the pani samiti. Male members often dominated the 
PS discussions and that because of the socio-cultural context they had little opportunity to 
participate effectively, so they stopped attending meetings, as they found them a waste of 
time.  
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Gender and participation: ability to articulate /voice concerns in meetings  
One of the main concerns about decentralization has been whether the space created for 
women’s participation – through quotas or otherwise – has been used to articulate or voice 
gendered priorities. In the case of the pani samiti meetings, 72 percent of the women who do 
attend meetings felt that they could articulate their priority concerns in such forums. In 
Navagam village (Surendranagar district, WASMO-ERR with AKRSP), Hansaben claimed 
that she had decided the water tariff and others on the PS had agreed – albeit without any cost 
calculations. Other women who attended meetings felt constrained to speak by the social 
structure, particularly in front of men – many of them (10.5% of the sub-set of women 
attending meetings) asked others to put their point across. This is an interesting strategy that 
women seem to be employing – using the experience of older, more articulate and confident 
women to voice their concerns if they feel inadequate or shy in the given cultural context.  





As a percentage of 
women who attend 
meetings 
Yes, I can speak  41  72%
Can speak during PS meeting but not 
where larger community is involved 
  2      3.5% 
 
Can speak in a women’s meeting only   1     1.8%
No, take help   6   10.5%
No, don’t have anything to say   5     8.7%
No, social structure does not allow to 
speak if men are present 
  2     3.5% 
Sub-total of women who do attend 
meetings 
 57     100 % 
Women who don’t attend meetings 
11 16.2%  
(of total)
Total women 68
The analysis of the profile of women who do feel confident about speaking in meetings 
shows that these are generally older women and with past or present institutional affiliation – 
either as members of SHGs or panchayat. Tribal women, not surprisingly given their relative 
mobility in the public domain vis-à-vis other women, are also confident of speaking in 
meetings as are women from the OBC category. However, and again not surprisingly, women 
from the SC category (dalits) find it harder to articulate voice. And finally, education while 
an important ‘capacity’ for women does not seem to have any co-relation with the articulation 
of voice.   
 Women have considerable awareness of the issues being discussed in PS meetings and were 
able to list out a range of issues as show in figure 12. The most significant set of issues that 
the PS discusses – which is also one of the responsibilities allocated to women PS members – 
is the collection of water tariffs and the financial and works progress review. However, 23.5 
percent of the women claimed that they were not aware of the issues being discussed – most 
of these are naturally the women who claimed they were not attending meetings, but more to 
the point is that it seems there is little interest amongst them to find out what the PS is 
discussing even if they were not able to physically participate in such discussions.  
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Chart 3.9 Issues discussed in pani samiti meetings 
 
Interestingly, in some villages men on the PS acknowledge that women are doing good 
(water related) work in the village, that they have gained their respect and are able to speak in 
meetings: “Earlier, we were not asking women to help with village water works. But now we 
get water only because of their hard work (referring to village infrastructure and not water 
collection by women). Women were feeling shy to participate earlier, but now they come and 
sit in the meetings and also talk, raise important points,” (men in FGD at Mokarshivangh 
village, Kutch, WASMO-ERR with KMVS, December 2007).   
Pani Samitis: accountability and transparency  
Most women members feel that overall there are tremendous benefits in having a good, 
functioning and accountable village pani samiti. The four most important benefits they listed 
(in declining order of importance according to the number of responses): 
• All households/persons in the village get enough water  
• There is regular collection of water charges    
• Water is available regularly      





Chart 3.10 Benefits perceived as a result of well functioning pani samiti 
 
Other benefits of the PS that were listed as significant, but of less significance than the first 
set of benefits, was the fact that with the formation of the PS there was less malpractice in 
accounts or during construction work, everybody got an ‘equal’ amount of water (according 
to what they were entitled to and paid for) and that there was regular cleaning of the water 
infrastructure and more broadly, the village (environmental sanitation). Interestingly, only 
four women felt that the PS inculcated a sense of ownership for the water infrastructure 
amongst the village community.  
When asked whether their participation both as individuals in their own right and as women 
made a difference to the functioning of the PS, just over half of our respondents felt that it 
had not (this includes the women who did not actively participate in PS meetings). Amongst 
the active women who felt that their participation had made a difference, a number of 
outcomes were cited where the presence of women on the PS, had in their opinion made a 
difference. This included more transparency and fewer malpractices in PS matters, an assured 
and regular supply of water and better quality of construction work. 
Although it is difficult to find clear examples of malpractice or corruption, many women 
claim that reservations for women in the public sphere are important, as women are known to 
work honestly:  “If one-third of the members on the committee are women, it automatically 
brings the corruption down by 1/3rd so it is essential to provide reservations to ensure that 
women are able to come up in public spheres,” (interview with Hansaben, PS member, 
Navagam village, Surendranagar district, September 2007).  
Another woman argued that “Bhaiyo joye chhe ki kya paisa male chhe, beno jove ke kaam 
saru thaye – Men try to figure out where can they make money through cuts in the project 
allocations while women make sure that the work is done properly,” (Interview with 
Prabhaben, Janada village Bhavnagar district, April 2007).  
However, in the village of Mokarshivangh (Kutch, WASMO-ERR project with KMVS), men 
reported how WASMO brought their own contractors to do the village water supply works, 
when one of the learning from the Ghogha project was that PS could either undertake the 
work itself (labour from the village) or select contractors, to prevent malpractices: “We told 
WASMO that their contractor will only be able to work from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. so that we can 
monitor their work; also they could not bring any (raw) materials at night,” (Khanjibhai, 
secretary of PS, FGD, Mokarshivangh village, Kutch, December 2007).  
The pani samiti is seen as the most effective institutional mechanism for resolving conflicts 
over water distribution (22 percent of the women agreed on this), while for some women, 
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village elders and the panchayat, or more specifically, the sarpanch, were deemed to have a 
greater role in resolving community conflicts, because of their access to larger networks of 
power such as political parties or local politicians (MLAs).   
Participation: facilitating and constraining factors  
We looked earlier at the reasons why women were selected to the pani samiti – their personal 
attributes and characteristics which got them selected. But it is also important to understand 
why women wanted to be on the PS – 19 percent of our sample gave no particular reason for 
why they were on the committee. Of the ones who did have a reason – 61.8 percent of the 
respondents maintained that they stood for the PS because they were interested, they wanted 
to do good for the community and water was an important livelihood resource, while 40 
percent of the respondents maintained that they were on the PS because they had been 
selected and so were fulfilling community responsibilities – as largely determined by others.  
 
There are a number of factors which either constrain or facilitate women’s participation, 
primary amongst them, at least in the South Asia context being the role of the family. Other 
factors that determine participation are poverty and social position (caste, class, age) – we 
had argued earlier that the sample is fairly representative both in terms of income groups and 
social inclusion. With respect to their family, an overwhelming 60 percent of the sample 
claimed they had no opposition from their family when they stood for election, while 19 
percent claimed that though there was some opposition earlier, now the family has reconciled 
to them being on the pani samiti. Those who don’t participate in PS meetings (20%), 
probably continue to face some opposition from their family members.  
When it comes to support from their family when they have to attend committee meetings or 
other committee responsibilities, 72 percent of the sample maintained that they had the 
support of their families. On the other hand, 25 percent of the sample maintained that there 
was not so much work for them to depend on their families for support – these largely 
included the women who did not attend meetings and who did not take up committee 
responsibilities. 








No particular reason  13 19.2
Those who gave a reason, 
multiple responses in some 









Table 3.10 Extent of family support when women are busy with committee work 
 
 No. of responses Percentage 
Yes 49 72
None 1 1.5
Not so busy, includes those who don’t attend 
meetings or if they do, have few tasks  
17
25
No family members 1 1.5
Total 68 100
However, when probed further as to whom within the family supports the women PS 
members, we find that most of the support for their household work comes from daughters 
and daughter-in-laws (or other women members, like mothers/in-laws) although in some 
cases husbands and other male members are also supportive. Since we never asked the 
women who takes primary responsibility for housework when they are busy with committee 
meetings, there are multiple responses (i.e. joint work) which illustrates that although the 
burden of domestic work remains with women, men – husbands, sons or other male members 
– are beginning to share in this workload.  
Chart 3.11 Responsibility for household work when women are busy with PS work 
(Multiple responses, % more than 100)  
 
 
Most of the women in our sample, 59 percent, felt that being on the PS does not interfere with 
their household work, nor are they so preoccupied that they do not have time for other things, 
like rest or leisure. This is perhaps a reflection of the number of meetings that a PS has – 
while the construction work and institution building processes are going on, meetings are 
more frequent (maybe twice or thrice a month) but once the basics are in place there is only 
the maintenance, including cleanliness and sanitation, and collection of water charges which 
the committee needs to attend to and any problems, or conflicts, as they come up.       
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Table 3.11 Does participation in PS affect your time for other activities, 
including leisure or rest? 
 
 No. of responses Percentage 
Yes 16 24 
No 40 59 
Can’t say 1 1 
Not applicable 11 16 
Total 68 100 
Most women don’t see their being on the pani samiti as additional work, or if they do, they 
take it in their stride as a social responsibility (i.e. not just more work), but also an 
opportunity – to participate in the public sphere. A word of caution here –the large number of 
‘no responses’ in the table below is perhaps an indication of indifference or lack of 
understanding of the question.  






Increased work 10 15
Opportunity 6 9
Both 12 18
Indifferent / no response 40 58
Total 68 100
Most of the women realize that their participation is essential for a well-functioning pani 
samiti and for them these ‘opportunities’ are translated at first into practical gender needs 
before women can address the larger dimensions of change and empowerment (strategic 
gender needs).  The principle benefit of the PS is the availability of an assured, accessible 
water supply and the time women save in the drudgery of daily water collection – 71 percent 
of the sample agreed on this. However, in 25 percent of the cases (one fourth of the sample) 
the scheme either had no water or the water supply was temporarily disrupted so women did 
not in effect save time. The other negative responses are probably from the households who 
already have their own private connections or water source and are not dependent on the 
village water scheme. 






No water (either scheme not functional 




Yes 48 71 
No 3 4 
Total 68 100 
We did a very crude analysis of where time saved is used and most women claimed that this 
went into income generating activities, including agricultural work (multiple responses). 
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Some women also spent additional time on more household work, while very few spent time 
saved on leisure or rest and only two women found that they had time for social service.  
Chart 3.12 Utilisation of time saved from water collection (multiple responses)  
 
Apart from time saved, many women also reported that they could now send their children to 
school more regularly, particularly girls who would have otherwise been involved in water 
collection. The women also mentioned that they could give regular baths to children before 
school. Many women, at least 72 percent of the sample, reported that there were positive 
improvements in the health of family members. More women however (87 percent of the 
sample), reported that there was an improvement in the general cleanliness around their 
homes and in the village – the discrepancy is due to the fact that not all villages have received 
water under the scheme (work in progress) so it is difficult to account for changes at the 
household level, while changes at the community level may be more forthcoming.  
Empowering women?  
How far has participation in pani samitis transformed women’s lives – led them to have a 
greater say in decision-making for example, increased acceptance of their views and 
perceptions or led to greater mobility for them and sharing of household work. The other 
critical question is whether women have been able to move beyond water to articulate other 
gender concerns at the village level, or in a larger context? Analysis of change is largely 
perceptional and qualitative, i.e. we are not trying to measure levels of empowerment 
attained, but to understand how women are expressing and seeing change at all levels.  
Just over half the women in our sample (54 percent) felt that there had been some change. 
This change was manifest in many different ways – at the level of the self and in relation to 
their position in their households and the community. For example, 57 percent of the women 
reported that they had more respect from their family and community members, while 44 
percent of the women felt that they were participating more in household decision making 
and 49 percent of the women felt that their was greater acceptance of their views and 
opinions. In addition, 51 percent of the women reported that they had more mobility – access 
to the public domain now than before:  
“People have started respecting me more now. My extended family members ask me for 
suggestions for all decisions. Now I can speak up, when required. I can go out for meetings/ 
trainings. First time I went out alone to Botad for buying material for the project. Now I have 
an independent identity as “Shivuben”, rather than just a relative of a male family member,” 
(Personal interview with Shivuben, Janada village, Bhavnagar, 2007).  
Many women are elated at the fact that they can now sit on a chair while in a meeting “just 
like educated women from cities like you” (Hansaben, Navagam, Surnedranagar, 2007) 
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However, many women reported no change in terms of their mobility, or participation in 
decision-making and many (one-third of the sample) maintained that most of these 
‘empowerment indicators’ were there from before and being on the PS had not fundamentally 
changed their lives. 
Table 3.14 Changes towards women’s empowerment 
 
Changes at household level 
Increased participation in decision making process within household 
Answer No of women reporting Percentage 
Yes it has increased 30 44 
It is there from before 22 32 
There is no change 16 24 
Total 68 100 
Increased respect  
Answer No of women reporting Percentage 
Yes it has increased 39 57 
It is there from before 8 12 
No there is no change 19 28 
don’t know 2 3 
Total 68 100 
Increased acceptance of views and opinions  
Answer No of women reporting Percentage 
Yes it has increased 33 49 
It is there from before 12 18 
There is no change 23 34 
Total 68 100 
Increased mobility 
Answer No of women reporting Percentage 
Yes it has increased 35 51 
It is there from before 9 13 
There is no change 24 35 
Total 68 100 
Sharing of work by household members (m/w) 
Answer No of women reporting Percentage 
Yes it is shared now 17 25 
There is no change 10 15 
It is there from before 41 60 
Total 68 100 
In terms of sharing of household work, most women felt that this had not changed 
significantly (60%). In most cases, work continues to be shared by daughters/ daughter-in-
law or other female relatives. Sometimes it looks like further burdening of the women of this 
particular generation. The PS member (majority are between 40-45 years) now spends even 
more time outside, resulting in further involvement of the next generation women in 
household work. We have seen daughters unable to attend school, daughter-in-laws managing 
ALL household work and her small kids, while the mother-in-law is “empowered” and able 
to visit distant towns for trainings and demonstrations. The “emancipation” of the next 
generation doesn’t seem to be happening, or at least they will have to wait for their turn, as it 
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is the mother figure who has more mobility and improved status within the family and 
community.  
Part III: Summary: key emerging issues and their implications 
for decentralization and women’s empowerment in Gujarat  
Our findings in Gujarat have illustrated that decentralisation, like democracy, is a process and 
not a destination.47 Pani samitis that have been formed as a sub-committee of the gram 
panchayat, at least under the WASMO-Ghogha and ERR projects, do have independent bank 
accounts and project funds have largely been transferred directly to them, albeit with some 
delays. Accountability and transparency of the PS is assured through village gram sabhas for 
all significant decision-making throughout the project cycle (e.g. on selection of samiti 
members, particularly women and marginalized communities and on deciding location of 
water infrastructure and fixing village contribution and water tariffs).  Separate account 
books are maintained by the PS and regularly audited by the facilitating NGO as well as 
WASMO – although it was difficult to verify these as the records were often kept with the 
block development officer (the talati), and minutes of PS meetings were not maintained.  
Unlike the Ghogha project, in the WASMO-ERR project there has been clear recognition for 
the need for dual water supplies and the development of local sources, if available (quantity 
and quality of water), have been given priority. Similarly the need for water resources 
management (water and land/soil conservation, recharging) to ensure source sustainability 
were built into the programme from its inception and not added on later. Every village plan 
was based on local needs and priorities rather than a ‘one size fits all’ approach and 
innovations were encouraged. For example, Dador village has solar power plates which help 
pump water from the local source – a covered well – for distribution in the village through 
standposts. With the help of facilitating NGOs, technical capacity of pani samitis was built 
through specific training programmes on their roles, functions of a PS, monitoring 
construction of village water works and managing water tariffs and O&M. Exposure visits to 
well functioning schemes managed by efficient pani samitis were also organized and many 
women and men shared their experiences of what they had learned and how they had used 
their learning in the development of their own village water works.          
However, building communities’ technical capacity to develop, manage and maintain village 
water supply is not the same as building their capacity to constructively engage in the process 
of decentralization as citizen and subjects rather than ‘objects’ of participatory water 
planning. Political articulation – the degree to which communities of water users represented 
through pani samitis can influence water policy – is determined by the institutional 
architecture which facilitates articulation between civil society, the state (polity and 
bureaucracy) and citizens in a wider democratic context (Chhatre 2007).  The impact of water 
sector reforms and the space for rural women to participate in decentralized institutions, as 
well as their empowerment, has to be looked at within this larger framework.  
In this section we try and summarise the key outcomes both for women and men as well as 
specifically for women in terms of a number of broad parameters: efficiency, effectiveness 
and sustainability of demand-responsive water management, social inclusion, equity and 
political voice, participation and empowerment.  The discussion that follows draws on our 
FGDs with all pani samiti members, women and men, as well as FGDs with non-members, 
sometimes in the course of a village transect, around (non)-functioning water infrastructure or 
                                                 
47 Adapted from quote by Jardo Muekalia, representative for Angola’s Unita, a rebel movement turned 
opposition party, on the nation’s first election in 16 years (TIME, September 22, 2008, 172(11): 10).    
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in a specific marginalized hamlet (e.g. where dalits live). There are some points of difference 
and some points of convergence in this analysis from our preceding discussion based largely 
on the in-depth interviews with women PS members, and these are highlighted.   
Efficiency and effectiveness  
While the former refers to the benefits of decentralization outweighing the costs (financial, 
social) the latter refers to whether the process has met its goal, i.e. of developing self-reliant, 
water supply systems capable of meeting community domestic water needs. Both are inter-
linked and together would contribute towards equitable and sustainable water management. 
In terms of efficiency, the unfolding of this process of developing demand responsive water 
management has required tremendous financial and human resources and time.  In the case of 
the Ghogha project for example, little was achieved for the first 5 years (from 1997-2002) 
and it was only with the formation of WASMO as a Special Purpose Vehicle and the powers 
and resources that it had (financial, technical, human) that we see serious efforts at 
developing pani samitis and facilitating partnerships between them, civil society actors (the 
Implementation Support Agencies) and the state (GWSSB/WASMO). While we were not 
able to do a financial analysis of costs overrun, etc., it is clear that without the collaboration 
of NGOs with substantial experience of community-led water management as well as gender 
mainstreaming, this programme would not have been able to meet its intended goals, 
efficiently.  
That said however, problems in the delivery of water, in access (physical, costs), water 
availability and quality persist in many villages raising questions about the effectiveness of 
sector reforms. These concerns persist and are largely felt by the community (non-PS 
members) despite the fact that overall most women on the PS have claimed that access to 
water has largely improved, for all. We would argue that access to water is a reflection of the 
choice of technology (given demand and population), community pricing decisions (water 
tariffs) and social factors underlying inclusion.        
Choice of technology  
while WASMO claims that it encourages appropriate technological innovations that address 
the diversity of agro-ecological conditions and water availability in rural Gujarat, the reality 
is that much of the ‘innovation’ has been led by partner NGOs and not the water engineers 
who would otherwise be content with their overhead tanks, sumps and distribution pipelines. 
Even here there are glaring gaps in the assessment of water needs – for example, in Ghogha 
village on the one hand, the capacity of the overhead tank is low compared to village 
requirements and on the other hand, there is not enough pressure because of inadequate 
power supply, to pump water to hamlets further away (at the tail-end of the distribution 
system). Water supplies are irregular – once in 10-15 days; insufficient (only for 2-3 hours at 
a time) and at odd times (not fixed, sometimes late at night).  Consequently, there is illegal 
pumping of water direct from the main pipelines, and although the PS has imposed a fine of 
Rs 250, this is not enough of a deterrent.   
Conflicts over the choice of technology, between WASMO and local communities, are not 
uncommon. In Dador village, Kutch – villagers claimed that in one of the hamlets which was 
at an elevation, WASMO engineers had insisted that they build an underground storage tank 
otherwise water would not reach, whereas they had insisted on an overhead tank. But 
WASMO got its way as villagers did not have substantive resources of their own to build the 
tank they wanted. However, now the underground tank is always overflowing, the handpump 
which was put on the head of the tank is broken and consequently dogs are freely drinking 
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water which was meant for domestic use. And in a predominantly Muslim context, dogs are 
considered unclean.  
Pricing of water  
Our analysis shows that while women PS members had internalized the discourse on valuing 
water (all users should pay), there were concerns in many villages about the ability of the 
very poor to pay. In Hajipir village, Kutch (WASMO-ERR with KMVS) there are some 10-
15 households of Koli Patels (backward castes) who are very poor. The PS decided that they 
would provide them a water tank at no cost (the 10% community contribution to capital costs 
was waived) but they will be expected to pay water charges as applicable.   
In many cases, willingness to pay was linked to the efficiency of services, but this became the 
proverbial double bind. For example, in Ghogha where water delivery to the furtherest 
hamlets was irregular, households were not willing to pay the water charges levied by the PS, 
but they were willing to pay more to get the occasional water tanker to meet their needs. An 
exasperated woman panchayat member from the hamlet who had been trying to coax the 10 
households there, claimed: “Unless you pay for water, you should not complain about poor 
services!” (FGD with non-PS members, Ghogha, January 2007).  
Social exclusion  
Despite the fact that the pani samitis, as earlier discussed, are fairly representative of women 
from socially marginalized groups, discriminatory politics of caste and faith still determine 
who has access to water.  In a dalit hamlet in Navagam village, Surendranagar district 
(WASMO-ERR with AKRSP) – women and men claimed that the location of (water) Cluster 
Storage Tanks (CSTs) was decided by the middle caste Bharvad community. Caste 
discrimination in the village persists – so older women generally do not go to fetch water. 
Children are sent instead (girls), but sometimes even they are pushed aside, not allowed to 
take water from tanks so dalit women have to walk to the well nearby. Water also does not 
come to all the CSTs – at the time of our field-visit only three of the 8 CSTs were getting 
water regularly, so dalit women and children had to use the tank which was near the Bharvad 
or Koli hamlets, both from middle caste categories.  
Women claimed that they did not have time to be part of the PS because they had to go for 
daily labour (also no men from dalit community on the PS) and they felt diffident about 
speaking in meetings (FGD with non-PS members, Navagam village, January 2007). While 
they were not asked for their views on the location of the CST in their hamlet, they were 
content with the site (it’s the water that’s not coming regularly) and are involved in keeping 
the tank/surrounding area clean. Poor dalit women are also not members of any SHGs in the 
village where information on water and other development issues is often shared by women 
members of village institutions. One of the women present in the FGD (January 2007) did 
become a SHG member by giving Rs 10/ but when she went for the first meeting the other 
upper caste women complained about her presence (did not want to share the same social 
space with her), so her family told her not to go anymore.    
Surendranagar is a poor, drought prone district and factional conflicts, particularly caste 
conflicts are not uncommon as AKRSP(I) has documented in its attempts to introduce 
demand responsive water projects with support from WASMO (see Prajapati 2005). 
AKRSP(I) has tried a number of conflict resolution strategies, usually based around dialogue 
with village elders, panchayat members or women’s mahila mandal. Where these have 
failed, AKRSP has been forced to withdraw from the village. An analysis of who participates 
and who benefits in Mokasar village, also in Surendranagar district, showed that most of the 
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developmental benefits from AKRSP facilitated interventions were accruing to the wealthy 
and better off farmers. The poor, who constituted 32.5 percent of the village population, were 
unable to pay the contribution for water harvesting structures in the village and remained 
indebted to moneylenders, particularly during periods of drought (ibid).   
Apart from caste, exclusion based on faith in a state which is highly communalized is also not 
uncommon. Kutch is the only district, where there are a sizeable number of Muslim women 
and men participating in the pani samitis and in other village institutions, some holding 
office-bearer positions. In Ghogha, many non-PS members felt that since it is a Muslim 
dominated village and since the distribution of water is controlled from outside the village, by 
the GWSSB (external source), the village was suffering as the state government is BJP (FGD, 
April 2007). However, while it is difficult to probe or prove such statements they cannot be 
dismissed as perceptions also determine social action.48 
Governance  
If we look at governance as a process of decision-making which is more or less accountable 
to community needs for water and which is open for scrutiny (transparent), then we need to 
begin by looking at the framework of rules, incentives and formal/informal practice which 
constitutes the pani samitis.  
Meetings  
most PS do not have regular meetings – the only exceptions are those villages where water 
supply work is still ongoing. In some villages, like Hajipir (Kutch, WASMO-ERR) where the 
PS they had regular monthly meetings, on further probing, it was found that the last meeting 
was held five months back! Apart from infrequent meetings, meetings when they are held are 
also poorly attended – at least one third of the women in our sample did not attend meetings, 
while in other villages women pointed out that it was mostly the men who did not attend, as 
domestic water was seen as women’s work (we return to this largely unquestioned 
assumption later). However, most committees did not have rules for erring/absent members – 
in Mokarshivangh village (Kutch, WASMO-ERR) the PS had made it compulsory for every 
member to attend a meeting at least once in two months – if they did not have any justifiable 
reasons, they would be asked to step down.  
Rules  
In most villages there are (in)formal rules, for example, not to wash clothes or utensils or 
bring animals (livestock) to the same water sources which are used for drinking or cooking 
purposes. In addition, no one is allowed to pump water directly from any of the water 
infrastructure (pipelines, tanks) but to use the hand pumps, etc.  However, the extent of 
monitoring or enforcement varies – since most rules are not written or adequately 
communicated to the larger public it is difficult to assess whether they are being complied 
with, though people generally seem to be aware of what’s right/wrong water and sanitation 
practice. Fines are also not clear in most villages – particularly where work is still in progress 
or where water supplies are irregular. In Mokasar village (AKRSP, tribal development 
programme) where people who were found washing their hands or legs inside the cluster 
water storage tanks would have to give 5 kgs of grain to feed the pigeons! And in Ghogha 
                                                 
48 This is again not the place to go into the Gujarat carnage of 2002 and developments post this, but many 
villages have been publicly declared (board at entrance to village) Hindu Rashtra and free from Muslims, i.e. 
there are no Muslim residents in the said village, many did not return after the riots, others have been 
economically forced out.  
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village, as mentioned earlier, there is a fine of Rs 250 for anyone caught pumping water 
directly from the main pipeline. Where fines have been enforced, the money collected has 
gone into the village O&M account.  
Corruption  
Curruption is difficult to measure either directly or even indirectly, hence perceptions of 
corruption are taken as a proxy (Asthana 2004). Although WASMO has introduced a number 
of steps to minimize corruption, including auditing of all accounts and letting the PS decide 
who should build their village water works – contractors (monitored by them) or themselves 
(local labour also seen as employment generation), corruption even if not tangible, is 
pervasive, at least in people’s perceptions. Some PS members maintain that corruption exists 
higher up the ladder (naming bureaucrats within WASMO), despite WASMO’s claims at 
being an ‘honest organisation’. While others in the community, dismayed at still not 
receiving water, point their fingers at rent-seeking PS members who they argue will not do 
anything unless you pay them. For others, corruption is embedded in a development process 
which lacks direction or foresight: “As part of our capacity building we were attending a 
workshop on community disaster management where the officers were telling us what steps to 
take AFTER a disaster rather than how we can prevent disasters through better building 
(retrofitting our schools, homes) and planning,” Ismailbhai, PS member, Ghogha (FGD, 
February 2007).      
Certainly the Right to Information Act (2005) has provided a platform for many villages in 
Gujarat, with the help of civil society actors like PRAVAH, to raise questions of 
accountability and transparency vis-à-vis public officers and water projects.  But it is more 
difficult to look at corruption within – whether it is in local communities where the power of 
vested interests is often blatantly visible or in NGOs where field teams who have been 
facilitating partnerships between the PS and WASMO have themselves been accused of rent-
seeking behaviour to get village projects approved and sanctioned in time. Needless to say it 
is difficult to prove such allegations, but it is important to recognize the potential nexus of 
power between local level government functionaries, elected leaders (sarpanches, etc.) and 
contractors. Equally important is to understand the struggle for livelihoods, not only for the 
rural poor and marginalised, but also for the personnel within NGOs, particularly small 
organizations with low salaries or incentives, who have to work long hours in difficult 
terrains with limited access to education, health or other social services.    
Participation, gender and inclusion 
Participation, gender and inclusion is intrinsic to the process of water governance and 
certainly through their quotas, the pani samitis have provided space for the participation of 
women (1/3 reservation) and marginalized communities (representative). In Gujarat, this 
process has not been based on election, but selection through consensus – the policy of 
samraas adopted by the state government after 2002, when the pani samitis were also 
reconstituted according to the new government guidelines.49  Women who have been selected 
to the PS are largely older (40+ years), married women with considerable experience in 
community institutions such as SHGs, village panchayats and other decentralized institutions 
around natural resources management.  Unlike other examples of local governance, except 
for a few cases, women were not selected because of their relationship with male panchayat 
                                                 
49 According to the 2002 GR, panchayats in villages where there are water schemes have to form a PS of 10-12 
members, of which at least 4-5 have to be from the panchayat, including the deputy sarpanch. It is no longer 
mandatory for the sarpanch to be the head of the PS.  
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or PS members or other powerful men in the village. Though in some villages, like 
Mokarshivangh (Kutch, WASMO-ERR) the panchayat had consciously selected couples so 
that women could attend meetings, even those held late at night and there would (allegedly) 
be no opposition from their family or kin to their participation in the public domain.   
In terms of their roles and responsibilities, other than attending meetings regularly, women 
PS members were responsible for collection of water tariffs, for negotiating conflicts around 
the location of public water infrastructure and for ensuring that the area around these was 
kept clean and water was not being wasted. Many women felt that the latter was extending 
their unpaid household work to the public arena (as natural environmental caretakers), 
entrusting them with the collection of water charges amounted to vesting in them the 
responsibility for ensuring the financial sustainability of their PS. It is interesting to note how 
these roles intersect with each other – one based on privileging women as carers, as ‘assets’ 
to be ‘harnessed’ for water management (Rocheleau et al. 1996) and the other privileging her 
as an honest person (Green et al. 1998). Both roles are embedded in perceptions of rural, poor 
women as more ‘accustomed to voluntary work’ (World Bank’s Water Resource 
Management Strategy 1993, cited in Green et al. 1998: 264), yet ironically both roles are at 
the centre of the technical and financial sustainability of the PS and the village water works 
where considerable funds have been allocated and/or spent and where access to regular, 
sufficient and quality water supplies can improve lives, save expenditure on health and 
perhaps, save time for productive (income generating) work for women (and men).   
At another level is the parallel question of who or which women participate? Scheduled castes 
account for less than one-third (16.2%) of the women on pani samitis, while the 
representation of scheduled tribes is better (26.5%) because of the presence of some adivasi 
dominated villages in our sample (Pav, Navagam, Mokasar).  Looking at the distribution of 
poverty, about 50 percent of the women on the PS are from middle-income households while 
25-30 percent are very poor, with household incomes below the poverty line and the balance 
20% come from the better off or large income households. Certainly, for women from poor 
households and lower castes it is difficult to find the time to participate as their only source of 
livelihoods is arduous daily labour (agriculture, construction), they are often compelled to 
migrate with their families or they are excluded from public meeting spaces because they are 
considered ‘polluting’ (as the women from Navagam village explained).  
On the other hand, upper caste women and men also apply more subtle social sanctions, by 
questioning the very process or need for broader participation as is evident from this FGD 
(January 2007) with the largely upper caste, Darbar men and women members of the pani 
samiti in Jasapara village (Bhavnagar district, WASMO-Ghogha project with Utthan): “What 
is the need to involve other people? What however is required is regular availability of 
water,” claims Nirmalaba, an ex-sarpanch (female PS member).   Shakti Singh (male PS 
member) added: “If you try to involve more people it also brings in more chaos and conflict – 
participatory decision-making takes time.” Ghanshyma Singh (male PS member) agreed: 
“Most people here just think for themselves – they lack a larger vision for the community or 
village.” Referring no doubt, to the fact that the poor so caught up with their daily livelihood 
struggle have no time to think big, beyond their basic livelihood needs about the larger 
agenda of environmental justice and water rights. 50 And even if they were involved, opening 
the process to more inclusive participation would lead to unnecessary delays, affecting all in 
the long run.    
                                                 
50 Chambers also referred to this in some of his early work on participation (refs to be included). 
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Participation and women’s empowerment  
Understanding what empowerment means in concrete terms for the women who have come 
into these (new) public spaces is challenging. If we look at the four inter-related elements of 
empowerment: social, economic, political and physical with respect to decentralized water 
governance, what can we say from our discussions with women and men in Gujarat.  
• Social empowerment in terms of changes in self-image and status for women is 
increasingly visible in terms of their greater mobility in the public sphere (particularly 
important for upper caste, Darbar women), their ability to command respect and to 
negotiate with men and government officers. However, all these changes cannot be 
attributed to their participation in PS alone – much is due to a longer process of 
political engagement with other village institutions (particularly SHGs), political 
parties or panchayats. In other cases, it is strongly linked to the gender sensitive 
leadership of some of the NGOs (notably Utthan and KMVS) and to the attempts to 
link women’s participation in water governance to larger questions of gender rights. 
But clearly, there is a lot more work to be done on this front as many women 
members did not see these linkages, nor were they able to relate the contestation over 
water in their micro environments to the larger shifts in water policy and sector 
reforms. Support from men, particularly in terms of sharing in household chores is 
still limited and most of the ‘burden’ of women’s participation has been borne by their 
daughters and daughter-in-laws. In the Darbar dominated Jasapara village, men stated 
that women’s participation in PS meetings should not be at the cost of their primary 
household responsibilities: “We men have to wait for our meals if women go out to 
meetings!” (Mohanbhai, PS member, FGD January 2007).  
• Economic empowerment is not an aspect that we categorically explored but despite 
problems in some of the villages as pointed out, overall access to water has improved 
and women are finding more time for productive work. The gradual increase in the 
enrolment/retention of girls in schools, school sanitation and improved hygiene 
practices will also, one hopes, translate into economic gains for women and men. 
However, there is a still long way to go in terms of changing or challenging the intra-
household division of labour, resource entitlements and decision-making over 
benefits, including the right to work, and equal wages. 
• Political empowerment: has clearly improved with women’s right to participate now 
constitutionally mandated in both panchayats and pani samitis. However, the extent 
to which women, particularly from marginalized communities, are able to articulate 
voice is still contingent on socio-cultural practices of purdah (female seclusion) and 
what is considered appropriate behaviour for women. In earlier work on pani samitis 
facilitated by Utthan under the Ghogha project, Ahmed (2005), had pointed out how 
women maintained that whenever they spoke at PS meetings, other male members 
would go and complain to their husbands – “how could their wives have the audacity 
to speak in front of us, they exclaimed! When questioned by their husbands, women 
replied that drinking water is their problem, and they feel compelled to speak out 
when there is a discussion or a particular decision is being taken which is likely to 
affect them. To an extent, such male perceptions are a reflection of the cultural 
practice of mariadah – the culturally expected shyness from women in terms of 
vocalizing their opinions, which is still prevalent in many part of Saurashtra 
(Blennerhasset 1999: 129).  Patriarchal definitions of what is appropriate feminine 
behaviour, particularly in public spaces, often entails women risking intra-household 
conflict if their husbands think they have transcended their socially accepted roles 
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and so violated their masculine identity based on power, control and dominance,” 
(Ahmed 2005: --).   
• For women from the upper caste Darbar households, participation in the public 
domain is still difficult. Explains Shakti Singh, (PS member, Jasapara village): 
“Things are changing slowly, with education more girls are coming out – I let my 
wife be nominated for sarpanch,”  admitting reluctantly, that he attends meetings, but 
he adds, “I have at least made her a sarpanch in name – in my grandfather’s time 
even that would not have been possible. Our children will have women sarpanches 
who will also work. But this is not possible till everyone is educated,” (FGD, January 
2007).  However, just to remind the likes of Shakti Singh, being educated or literate 
was not one of the key deciding factors in the selection of women PS members – 
rather factors, like past experience, ability to attend meetings, commitment, etc. were 
key determinants of who/which women got selected.  
• Physical empowerment:  the right to clean water and sanitation – and the ability to 
access these – is at the core of women’s physical safety, security and dignity, 
particularly in conflict and disaster-prone environments. Although much work still 
needs to be done on developing affordable, appropriate sanitation alternatives as well 
as capacity building on the ‘software’ aspects underlying household decision-making 
on sanitation, a beginning has been made and women (and some men) are demanding 
household latrines. However, where access to water is still limited, as in many of the 
villages in Kutch, and open spaces exist (though not adequate tree cover, except from 
the abundant acacia or prosopis julifera) – creating demand, without providing 
technological, environmentally appropriate and culturally acceptable alternatives is 
still a challenge.  
Looking at empowerment in a broader framework linked to questions of sustainability, equity 
in water use and gender equality, much remains to be done. While access to potable drinking 
water has improved considerably, handing over management responsibilities to pani samitis 
without ensuring that they have the technical, financial and human resource capacity to both 
‘manage’ as well as ‘govern’ defeats the larger goal of decentralization. No doubt capacity to 
manage through access to information and new knowledge, exposure visits, etc. has increased 
and is being extended to other village developmental activities.  For example, in Janada 
village (PRAVAH demo-pilot, Bhavnagar) one of the women PS members who had 
undergone training on monitoring the construction of water supply works recounted how 
when the village anganwadi (day-care) was being built she realized the contractor was using 
more sand and less cement: “I brought all the raw materials to my house and when the 
contractor asking me what did I want, thinking he could bribe me, I just told him that we did 
not want the angawadi walls to collapse and our children to get hurt, (FGD, April 2007).  
With respect to equity – fairness in the allocation of water – none of the villages had any 
rules as to how much water a person/household can take, when water is available that is. 
Even if such norms existed, they would have been difficult to enforce. Only in one village – 
Dador in Kutch (WASMO-ERR) – did we find that the pani samiti had taken a conscious 
decision not to provide private household connections. Given the continuing problems of 
water scarcity in Kutch, it would have been difficult to monitor water use and good quality, 
drinking water would have been wasted, maintained the PS members, adding that there were 
enough community taps at tanks and standposts. Still, this does not answer the question of 
how much water is one entitled to? 
Equally, the PS do not seem to have any norms regarding water distribution – such as, 
providing water to the furtherest hamlets first, which inevitably, as in the case of Ghogha and 
 89
Navagam villages are where the poor and marginalized live. Part of the reasons for these gaps 
is not because of the limited understanding of villagers but because of the limited discussion 
in our water community (civil society and the state) on what constitutes minimum livelihood, 
including drinking water, assurances for water. And not simply needs, which get translated 
into rather skewed government norms for water allocation.51  
Linked to the question of intra-village equity is inter-village equity, particularly when 
villages are part of the same watershed or river basin and share the same underground water 
aquifers. Across nearly all the villages, partly because of the historical problem of water 
scarcity in Gujarat, villagers, women and men, felt that their water was theirs and that if they 
shared it with other villages they would not have enough for themselves.  While there are 
some examples of inter-village water sharing in Kutch, giving the resilience of the Kutcchis, 
they do not like to be dependent on others and would rather have their own water systems.     
In addition, is the question of ownership: has the process of decentralization and the creation 
of pani samitis facilitated greater responsibility for water management and good governance? 
Does the larger community feel that the pani samitis can be entrusted to manage their water 
and to develop self-reliant, sustainable systems and institutions? Unfortunately, our 
discussions with non-PS members were rather mixed – in many villages, particularly where 
schemes were not working, habitations were scattered and women did not attend gram sabha 
meetings, there was limited knowledge about the PS or who comprised its members. 
Surprisingly, many women, and even a few men, stressed that this was the first time 
(referring to the FGDs we were facilitating) that they were being asked for their views on any 
village issues, raising questions about the democratization of information beyond the capacity 
building of PS members.   
Most people felt that it was the state’s responsibility to either provide them with drinking 
water – or help them develop their own local systems – but decision-making should be vested 
with them. However, with decentralization only extending to the distribution of water within 
villages, questions persist as to who owns /manages or governs water sources?  According to 
some NGO leaders, the major flaw in WASMO’s definition of decentralization is that 
ultimate control over the water source (where there is an external water source) remains 
outside the village and decentralization should mean self sufficiency in developing, managing 
and distributing water from local (within villages) sources.  
 
                                                 
51 Water allocation norms are currently 40 litres per capita per day (lpcd) for rural areas and about 100-120 lpcd 
for urban areas because of the need for sewerage. There have been discussions about increasing rural allocations 
and in drought prone areas, the state has in principle accepted 70 lpcd because of the livestock needs of people, 
which they calculate with their water requirements. However, most of the WASMO projects were designed to 




Maharashtra: Rural Water Supply, Decentralization and 
Gender 
Section I: Rural drinking water in Maharashtra  
Maharashtra is the third largest state in India, having an area of 3.08 lakh sq. km. It is the 
second most populous state, having a population, according to the census of 2001, the 
population of Maharashtra 96.8 million (9.42% of India's population). The total number of 
villages in the state is estimated to be 43,722; in addition, there are about 45,528 hamlets 
(wadis/padas). The state has been urbanizing rapidly and at 42% is the second most urbanized 
state in the country as per the 2001 census. Its population density is 341/sq Kms. 
Government data point to a sufficiency in the availability of drinking water in the state. There 
are about 1,505 watersheds in the entire state. The Groundwater Survey and Development 
Agency (GSDA), an organisation of the Government of Maharashtra (GoM), categorises the 
watersheds of the state into three – white, grey or dark52. According to the assessment done 
by the GSDA, 92% of the total 1505 watersheds in the state are categorised as white, i.e. with 
adequate water availability  
These data would give the impression that the situation in the state is very comfortable in 
terms of availability of ground water. However, this does not present the true picture. The 
exploitation of ground water has not been uniform across the state, due to skewed 
development pattern across the state. There are different regions in Maharshtra – Konkan, 
Western Maharashtra, Marathwada, Khandesh and Vidharbha. The stress on development has 
always been in the Western Maharashtra region due to mostly political reasons. The 
exploitation of water has also been the most severe in these areas. In these drought prone 
areas of Western Maharashtra, excessive and disproportionate development has taken place to 
support sugarcane and banana, two of the highly water intensive crops. For e.g. it is ironic 
that Ahmednager, one of the rainshadow districts and one which has tremendous water 
shortages, boasts of the highest number of sugar factories in all of Maharashtra. This has 
dangerously lowered the ground water table in these areas.  
Wells – dug wells and bore wells – contribute significantly to irrigation and there are about 
1.51 million wells in the state. Currently, 35% of the groundwater resource in Maharashtra is 
estimated to have been exploited. According to a survey by GSDA, groundwater 
development is maximum in 10 districts of western Maharashtra (42%) followed by 8 
districts of Marathwada (27%) and 11 districts of Vidarbha (15%). Groundwater development 
in four districts of Konkan is the least (7.6%). In 76 areas in the state comprising about 5% of 
the total state area, groundwater is over-exploited causing concern about resource 
sustainability. The over-exploitation is manifested by progressive decline of water table at the 
rate of 0.3 m per year. 
                                                 
52 White is one where exploitation of groundwater is less than 65% of the total annual recharge, grey has 65-
85% exploitation and dark is where 85% has been tapped. Maharashtra has 1392 white watersheds, 87 grey and 
26 dark as per the GSDA data. 
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Table 4.1 Changes in wells and area irrigated 
 
Sr. No. Item 1960 1998 (till March) % change 
1 No. of dug wells 779,000 1,453,654 87
2 No. of borewells / tubewells 2925 215,941 7283
3 No. of electric pumpsets - 2,100,000 Very high
4 Area irrigated by Ground water 1,092,810 1,628,092 49
 
















































Maharashtra 3.77 1.24 2.55 2.29 1.26 0.88 1.66 34.7
India 43.39 7.13 36.26 32.63 19.29 13.50 22.73 37.2
(Mha-m-Million hectare-metres) 
Source: Annual Report, 2002-03, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India taken 
from Economic and Political Weekly October 4, 2003 
Policy on ground water  
Since the early 1970’s the government of Maharashtra has laid a lot of emphasis on ground 
water development. It advanced several loans for the exploitation of groundwater for both 
drinking water use as well as irrigation. There is no regulation of these vast resources which 
covers a vast expanse of the state and remains in the private domain. 
The only regulation that has been introduced by the GoM in connection with Ground water is 
through the Ground water act in 1993, along with associated rules in 1995.  The institution 
which is mandated to operationalise this act is the GSDA. The act sought to achieve its 
objective through a series of measures – for e.g. control ground water usage in close 
proximity to public drinking water sources as well as in area scarce in water. 
Quality of water  
Several villages in the state experience excess iron and fluoride in their water. Studies show 
that 875 villages in 28 districts, which include Sindhudurg, Nagpur, Thane, Ratnagiri, 
Solapur and Raigad, are affected by excess iron. 1183 villages in 28 districts are affected by 
excess fluoride – they are in the districts of Chandrapur, Sindhudurg, Solapur and 
Ahmednagar. About 600 villages in different parts of the state are also affected by salinity 
problems (GoM, 2001) 
Another issue is that of the bacterial contamination of drinking water in rural areas. The 
sample studies by GSDA found that the contamination levels varied across districts from 
19% to as high as 55% in some districts. Inadequate dosage of disinfectant as well as 
recontamination in the distribution network was blamed for this high level of contamination.  
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Brief history of water supply programmes  
There have been many programmes undertaken by the GoM to supply water to the rural 
areas. Some of these have been from its own funds, while others are from the funds provided 
by the Government of India or from multilateral funding agencies like the World Bank, 
Department for International Development (DFID) etc. 
The provision drinking water is a state subject in India. The central government sponsored 
programmes are not legally binding on the states, but operate through financial influence, as 
state governments have limited prospects to raise their own funds. Taking into account the 
magnitude of the problem and to accelerate the pace of coverage of problem villages, the 
Central Government introduced the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) 
in 1972-73 to assist the States and the Union Territories with 100% grants-in-aid to 
implement the schemes in such villages. The Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission 
was introduced by the Central Government in 1986 to give fresh impetus to the drinking 
water delivery system. 
Piped drinking water supply schemes are designed for larger habitations. The minimum 
number of people for eligibility of a piped water supply scheme is 50 for MNP programme 
and 100 for AWRSP. Piped water schemes are designed where the reliability of the source 
from where the water is to be lifted is about 95%, planning is done for a period of 30 years. 
The Operation and Maintenance (O & M) of the projects are done from the 10% of the capital 
costs allocated under the project; this has been increased to 15% as part of the recent sector 
reforms by the Government of Maharashtra. In smaller villages where piped water supply 
cannot be undertaken, the GSDA drills borewells and installs handpumps. GSDA has a 
restriction of going down to a depth of sixty metres for digging borewells under its borewell 
programme. 
In addition to these programmes, there are some specific programmes implemented by the 
Government in some selected districts out of the funding received from bilateral or 
multilateral funding agencies. The World Bank supported Maharashtra Rural Water Supply 
and Environmental Sanitation Project ran from 1991 to 1998 and covered 560 villages in 10 
districts with a total outlay of Rs.400 crores. The DFID, U.K. supported the Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Programme, which was implemented in 200 villages in the three north 
Maharashtra districts of Nasik, Jalgaon and Dhule. The project was operational from 1991 to 
1999 and cost about Rs. 45 crores. The Government implemented another water supply 
project in the three districts of Ahmednagar, Aurangabad and Pune districts, starting from 
2001 and continuing until 2007. This project is being supported by the German Agency for 
Development (KFW) and involves Rs.153 crores. 
The reform guidelines came from GoI in 2000 and the era of decentralization began.  Under 
this, the Government has started implementing pilot projects in 4 districts of Maharashtra in 
different parts of the state – Dhule, Amaravati, Nanded and Raigad. The implementation is 
between 2000 and 2003 and costs Rs.140 crores, provided by the Government of India. The 
condition for receiving these funds from the GoI was to implement the sector reforms, which 
the GoM has agreed to do. 
Key institutions  
Major changes were brought in the institutional set up. The management of the drinking 
water projects in the state of Maharashtra is characterized by a multiplicity of institutions at 
different levels, right from the state level to the villages concerned. In fact even at the same 
level, different departments are responsible for different aspects of the water delivery system, 
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making co-ordination difficult, resulting in inefficiency. The Government of Maharashtra 
came out with a ‘White paper’ on the drinking water situation in the state. An outcome of this 
was the setting up of the Water Supply Sanitation Department (WSSD) as separate from the 
Rural Development Department, in 1996. The WSSD has the overall responsibility in the 
state for urban and rural water supply; it is responsible also for the development of policies, 
establishment of institutions for implementing the projects, monitoring and evaluation of state 
as well as central programmes and mobilisaton of resources. In addition, ground water 
monitoring, development and implementation of the Ground Water Act, 1993, also come 
under its purview. The Reform Sector Project and Management Unit (RSPMU) has been set 
up within the WSSD to implement the special projects funded by the foreign aid. 
The WSSD has various institutions under it to operationalise its mandate. These include the 
Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran, the GSDA, the Zilla Parishad, the Panchayat Samiti and the 
Gram Panchayat. 
Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran (MJP)  
The MJP has over a period of time grown into a mammoth organisation, currently employing 
about 14,000 staff in six divisions across the state; almost 95% of these are Class C and D 
staff like valve operations, administrative and clerical staff. 
The MJP executed all projects of regional and individual rural water supply, where the capital 
outlay was more than Rs. 15 lakhs; those below that outlay was managed by Zilla Parishad. 
On completion of construction of the scheme and its testing, it is handed over to the local 
authorities to operate and maintain for which a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is 
signed with local authorities. Despite clear guidelines to this effect, local authorities often did 
not take over the management of the schemes thereby leaving the task to the MJP53 
The MJP was entrusted with the execution of about 349 drinking water schemes till 1999, of 
which 88 schemes were completed, the remaining being at various stages of completion. 
These were all supply driven programmes and delays were anticipated. By 1999, the 
organisation was expected to provide safe drinking water to 14,679 villages and 10,565 
hamlets; however, it could manage to achieve completion only in 2,773 villages and 2,834 
hamlets. The MJP has come under heavy attack from the state as well as from the local urban 
authorities for its lack of competence in completing schemes on time and handing them over 
to the local authorities.  
Groundwater Survey and Development Agency (GSDA)  
The GSDA has been in operation since 1972. Its functions includes the forecasting and 
monitoring of ground water condition in state, installation and maintenance of borewells for 
irrigation and drinking water, giving technical advice to agencies involved in ground water 
based minor irrigation activities as well as private owners, as well as the implementation of 
the Ground Water Act, 1993. 
Status of rural drinking water in Maharashtra  
According to the draft report of the Sukthankar Committee (2001) set up by the Government 
of Maharashtra, as on April 1, 2000, the availability of safe drinking water is as below: 
                                                 
53 Eight urban local authorities have filed a case stating their inability to manage the drinking water schemes set 
up by MJP 
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Table 4.3 Status of availability of drinking water in rural  Maharashtra, April 2000 
 
Coverage 
Village Hamlets (Wadis) Category 
No. Percentage No. Percentage
Total number of villages 40,402 100 45,528 100
FC – villages fully covered (i.e. per capita 
supply > 40 lpcd) 22,209 54.97 29,149 64.02
SS – villages with safe source but supply 
inadequate (i.e. per capita supply between 10 
and 40 lpcd) 
13,636 33.75 10,311 22.65
NSS – villages with no safe source (i.e. per 
capita availability < 10 lpcd) 3,333 8.25 4,362, 9.58
NC – villages not at all covered by the safe 
source 1,224 3.03 1,706 3.75
Source: Water Supply and Sanitation Department: Sukthankar committee 2000 
The state government had to intervene almost every year to provide emergency drinking 
water to problem villages by tanker; during the 8th FYP, the total expenditure incurred for this 
was Rs. 282 crores. 
Institutional set up  
District level  
The WSSD had issued resolutions to set up a separate division within ZP for managing these 
water supply schemes, following which 19 ZPs set up water supply division while another 14 
established water supply cum minor irrigation divisions. In additions, 5 ZPs have set up 
Water Management Units (WMU) to handle exclusive projects (this was first established in 
Jalgaon district to manage the DFID project). ZP is empowered to fix water rate, collect share 
from GPs and take action against them if they don’t pay. 
Village level  
GPs can themselves plan and implement individual water supply schemes on their own. It has 
the powers to fix water tariffs, collect them and also has powers of recovery against 
defaulters. The Gram Sevak54 is responsible for serving the bills and collecting the water 
charges. He is expected to serve both the Government and the GP. Gram Sevak is responsible 
for two or more GPs. This results in a very high workload, which has a bearing on the 
function of collecting the water charges from the people. 
The VWSC has been created by the state Government and formalized through a Government 
Resolution (GR) in November 96. The tenure for this body is 5 years and the memberships 
includes the Sarpanch and members of the Gram Panchayat as well as other representatives – 
a 50% reservation for women exists, in addition to others for Schedules castes, Scheduled 
tribes and other marginal groups. The main mandate of this Committee is to manage the 
water supply at the local level. 
Funds for maintenance – Gram Panchayat level (heading 3) 
The GPs have the power to fix and collect water tariffs from the households of the village 
under the power given to it by sections 124 and 176 of Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 
                                                 
54 Village level worker representing the lowest rung of the Block development office (BDO) 
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1958. However, this tariff cannot be arbitrarily fixed, but within the minimum and maximum 
rates prescribed by the Government of Maharashtra. The rates fixed by the Rural 
Development Department were Rs. 75 and Rs. 250 respectively.  In March 1997, the GOM 
issued a resolution to revise water tariff for private connections (both metered and 
unmetered) – minimum Rs.360 p.a. and maximum Rs.450 p.a. However despite all these 
provisions, the status of revenues to the GPs remains precarious.  
Table 4.4 Status of tariff collection in the different divisions of Maharashtra 
 
Division wise number of villages 





that have sent 
information 1804 3512 4119 1859 2131 149 13574 100
Villages with no 
tariffs 578 22 364 686 377 2 2029 14.95
Village with old 
tariffs (for 30 years) 587 1,394 802 446 319 118 3666 27.01
Village with tariffs 
in the range of Rs. 
75 – 150 per annum 
(as per RDD’s 
resolution) 486 2,047 2,707 694 1,397 26 7357 54.2
Village with tariffs 
in the range of Rs. 
151 – 250 per 
annum (as per 
RDD’s resolution) 153 49 246 33 38 3 522 3.85
Source: WSSD, 2000 in Sukthankar Committee Report, 2000 
This is the financial context in which Jalswarajya scheme was launched. Usually elected 
representatives are wary of raising tariffs of any kind as they could result in political failures 
for them. The Jalswarajya scheme, launched with great fanfare, in a sense went against the 
grain by introducing a 10% capital contribution over infrastructure and the full responsibility 
of operation and maintenance of the scheme by the community. 
Rural drinking water scenario at present  
In 1999 survey was done to classify villages under four categories: Not-convered (NC), 
partially covered (PC), Water Quality affected (WQ), and Slipped Back. NC included the 
villages where lper capita water availability per day was below ten litres.  For PC this figure 
was 20 litres per capita per day (lpcd). Water quality problems such as fluoride or arsenic 
contamination were recognized and villages were given priority. Slipped back were the 
villages where either the wells went dry or the construction was damaged over the years and 
hence have to be included for the new schemes. In 2005 another survey was done and more 
updated information was made available. It appeared that almost more than 35,000 villages 
required assistance of one kind or another. Apart from Aple Pani (our water) and Jalswarajya, 
which are foreign funded schemes, Central government too had, under Rajiv Gandhi 
Drinking Water Mission (RGDWM) allocated funds for the state under the sector reform 
programme, highlighting the demand based approach. Demand was recognized in terms of 
public contribution of ten per cent towards the capital cost as well as with owning the 
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responsibility of construction with the help of VWSC, a sub committee of the GP. The main 
features of both these schemes is largely the same. The difference lies in a) introduction of a 
special purpose vehicle at the district level which is called the District Facilitating Team 
(DFT) b) presence and participation of NGOs or what they are called in the Jalswarjya 
scheme as Support Organisations (SO’s). Both these set ups are supposed to motivate the 
communities and implement the scheme in a time bound manner.  
The funds were made available under ARWSP, Swajaldhara, and also under Bharat Nirman. 
Out of those funds Maharasthra is utilizing the large funds under Bharat Nirman and has 
ambitiously targeted 19,877villages during the period of 2008-2009. Swajaldhara programme 
too is implemented in some districts since 2002- 2008 and the latest figure for completed 
schemes is 1138 villages, those which have started with O&M are 998,  and ongoing are 420 
The total number of villages is 1573 schemes.    
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Table 4.5 Past trend analysis of the drinking water schemes 
 
Description Period Highlights 
 
Dug Well Era 1960-1970 • Providing dug wells 
• Mainly manual drawing, sparingly with power pumps 
Bore Well Era 
 
1971-1985 • Bore well digging technology introduced 
• Providing hand pumps and power pumps on bore wells 
• As on date around 2.2 Lakh hand pumps and 14,000 power pumps/ piped 
water supply schemes functioning in the state 
• Large scale digging of bore wells for irrigation purposes (around 20lakhs 
bore wells dug) causes drying up of bore wells for drinking water supply 




 • Increase in the number of piped water supply schemes in rural areas 
based on surface water sources 
• First World Bank project with a cost of INR 504.25 crores implemented 
during the period 1991 to 1998 implementing 17 single village schemes 
and 47 multi-village schemes covering 560 villages in 10 districts 
• DFID project (1990-2000) building 3 regional schemes in 3 districts 
costing INR 74.3 crores  
• A White Paper on drinking water supply was published in 1995 to set a 
direction to the plans and programmes to solve drinking water problems.   




• Highest expenditure for regional and single village piped water supply 
schemes 
• Estimated cost of INR 7,300 crores  
• Till December 2002 expenditure INR 4,500 crores 





Since 2000  
 
• First state in India to adopt a state wide new reform policy in water 
supply and sanitation sector 
• Demand-driven approach to delivery of rural water supply and sanitation 
services  
• Use of participatory processes  
• Adoption of 10% capital cost sharing and 100% of O&M cost sharing by 
beneficiaries 
• Shifting the role of Government from direct provider of service to that of 
policy formulation and capacity support 
• Beneficiaries to participate in planning, implementation and O&M of 
facilities 
• Emphasis on women involvement in water and sanitation related 
decision-making through VWSCs and Mahila Mandals 
• Introduced norms for social audit of the activities under the new policy 
• A three pronged strategy was adopted for water conservation, 
preservation and utilisation through increasing water supply, managing 
demand and regulating over abstraction of ground water 
• Well designed IEC campaigns to precede planning/designing of schemes 
• Independent monitoring and evaluation studies by reputed institutions 
• Human resource development activities or village level employees 
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Section II: A brief overview of the schemes under study: 
Jalswarajya and Aple Pani  
Both the schemes, Jalswarajya and Aple Pani were introduced in the Sector Reform Phase of 
the Rural Drinking Water Policy. Aple Pani programme which was introduced in 2000 was 
funded by KFW, a German Development Bank. Jalswarajya project which is funded by 
World Bank started in 2003. Both these schemes are largely similar, except that Jalswarajya 
has a special women's development component, which was not there in Aple Pani.  
Some of the salient features of both these schemes are as follows 
• Both these schemes are based on demand based approach. In the schemes there is a 
shift to village level water supply schemes from earlier regional water supply.  
• Gramsabha is the final decision making body. Schemes emphasize people's 
participation.  
• Capital contribution of 10% is expected to come from the community 
• Entire operation and maintenance (O&M) to be borne by the community. 
• Along with the water supply, total sanitation is given importance.  
• Village level committees to be formed to see to the implementation of the scheme of 
which the village water and sanitation committee or the VWSC is the most crucial. 
• Special emphasis has been given to women's participation and 50% quota has been 
given to women in the committees formed at village level.  




As mentioned earlier the first phase of project started in 2003. The Project has been designed 
using participatory methodologies involving to a great extent the primary stakeholders – the 
users and the beneficiaries of a pilot initiative in 30 VPs in 3 Districts of the State. In the first 
phase 9 districts were covered. The second phase started in 2006 and is supposed to end in 
2012. Both the phases together will cover 26 districts in Maharashtra. Scope of the project 
could be seen in the following table. 
Table 4.6 Jalswarajya: coverage in Maharashtra (2008) 
 
Districts covered 26
No. of GPs selected 3464




Population covered 93.87 Lacs
Source: 
(For detailed district wise coverage see table 1in annexure) 
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Objectives of the project  
The two main objectives of the project are: Increase the access of the rural communities to 
improved and sustainable drinking water and sanitation services; and to decentralize rural 
water supply and sanitation service delivery through three tier Panchayati Raj Institutes in the 
state. Expected outputs and outcomes of the project are mentioned as follows: 
Table 4.7 Objectives, output and outcome: Jalswarajya 
 
Objective Output Outcome 
Improved and sustainable 










improvement of water 
supply to give 40 lpcd 
2. Source strengthening 
3. Water quality testing 
4. Construction of soak pit 
toilets, parasbaag, lane and 
drain improvement, 
community toilets 
5. Construction of compost 
pits 
6. School water supply and 
sanitation 
1. Availability of 40 
lpcd water on 
sustainable basis 
2. Partial utilization 
of sanitation 
facilities 







decentralization of rural 
water supply and sanitation 
service delivery to rural 
local governments and 
communities 
1. Strengthening of gram 
sabhas through capacity 
building 
2. Formalities of VWSC, 
WDC and SAC 
3. Involvement of CBOs, 
Mahila mandals 
1. Decentralization of 
powers 
2. Gram sabha has 
become the central 
point for decision 
making 
3. Women are 
holding leadership 
positions and are 
coming in the 
main stream 
Selection of the villages  
As mentioned earlier, it is demand based project and the villages have to demand for the 
scheme. At the district level then from the villages who have applied, villages for 
implementation were selected on the basis of following criteria: 
1. Need for the project (Weightage 45%): It includes different criteria regarding draught 
proneness of the village such as number of tankers deployed, number of habitations 
without safe drinking water source, number of non covered habitations etc.  
2. Socio-economic characteristics (Weightage 25%): It includes percentage of backward 
classes, tribal and BPL households.  
3. Potential of the village (Weightage 30%): It includes implementation of different 
schemes by the village such as Sant Gadge Baba Village Sanitation Campaign, Shiv 
Kalin Water Harvesting Scheme, Yashwant Rural Development Scheme etc.  
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Scheme structure  
Institutional arrangements  
For the implementation of the scheme a huge institutional set up has been established. 
Different components at the level of state, region, district and village could be discussed as 
follows.  
State level  
RSPMU has been set up at the state level especially to handle multi and bi lateral funding 
around drinking water. It does the overall co-ordinating and monitoring of the different 
projects that come under foreign funding. 
District level  
At the district level different teams like DFT (District Facilitation Team), DAMT (District 
Appraisal and Monitoring Team) and DFMT (District Financial Team) have been formed to 
carry out different functions. 
Village level 
At the village level gramsabha is the main decision making body. To implement the scheme 
there have been three committees established: Village Water Supply and Sanitation 
Committee (VWSC), Social Audit Committee (SAC) and Women's Development Committee 
(WDC). Support Organizations (SO) have been appointed to help villages to implement the 
scheme.  
Project cycle  
It is supposed that the project should be completed within time period of 18 months. A 
project cycle has been developed accordingly. Main phases of the cycle are community 
mobilization and planning, community implementation and operation and maintenance. Time 
limit for each phase and expected activities are mentioned in the following table. 
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Community mobilization and 
planning 
6 months • Village level sector sanitation report 
• Baseline situation 
• Formation of committees 
• Solution to existing water supply and sanitation 
problems identified 
• Participatory Village Action Plan (VAP) 
developed 
• VAP appraised  and sanctioned 
Community implementation 9 months Implementation  of solution to water supply and 
sanitation problems of the village  
Operation and maintenance  3 months Sustainable delivery of water supply and sanitation 
services 
Financial flow  
Funds are allocated from the state to ZP, and then are transferred from ZP to village level. At 
village level a different account would be opened to receive funds from ZP and to credit 
capital contribution. This account would be operated on behalf of VWSC by two office 
bearers of VWSC as joint signatories, and one of them has to be a woman. Funds are divided 
in three addendums, Addendum I, II, and III. Addendum I is provided mainly for community 
mobilization and capacity building. Addendum II goes towards actual cost of building water 
supply infrastructure and Addendum III is given as Women's Development Fund.  
Quota  
To ensure participation from all the sections, regulations for quota have been set up. In all the 
three committees one third members are selected from GP. There is also 30% quota for SC 
and ST. In VWSC and SAC 50% quota is reserved for women. In case of WDC, it is 75%.  
Tribal development programme  
There are 11 districts in project which have prominent tribal population. There is provision 
for forming 'Pada committees' as sub committees under VWSC in such tribal villages. In case 
of tribals capital contribution has been decided as 5%, of which 4% could be paid through 
labour.  
Women development programme  
Jalswarajya project emphasizes on women's participation and empowerment. As mentioned 
earlier, women have provided 50% quota to ensure their participation. With implementation 
of project, mahila gramsabhas have became mandatory, and they have to precede general 
gramsabha. Emphasis is given to formation of SHG. A special fund has been provided for 
women's development. It is mainly used for capacity building through trainings and exposure 
trips and also as revolving seed money to SHGs. (For more information on women's 
development component see table 2 in annexure) 
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Financial outlay  
The total financial outlay for the scheme is USD $268 million. Of this USD$ million 181 
would be through World Bank assistance 73 million and USD$ 14 million through people's 
contribution. 
Aple Pani  
Project background  
The Project has a long history. Initially, it was proposed to be implemented on the basis of a 
feasibility study prepared for GoM and KfW in 1998. The DFID had implemented a project 
based on external water in four districts – Jalgaon, Nashik, Dhule and Nandurbar. Based on 
the lessons learnt by GoM, DFID and the World Bank, in past projects with emphasis on 
regional systems and limited involvement of the users, the new project proposed by DFID in 
1999 followed a demand responsive, participatory approach. KFW appreciated this approach. 
This approach involves all stakeholders in all stages of the preparation, implementation, 
operation and maintenance of the project thus ensuring high degree of appropriateness, 
sustainability and equity. In brief: 
• The ToR issued by KfW (as summarised below), contains the guidelines for the 
Project implementation and also reflects this approach and concept: 
• Bottom-up village centred and demand driven approach; 
• Village specific supply level; 
• Site specific solutions with emphasis to local groundwater based schemes; 
• Full O&M cost coverage and partial capital cost contribution; 
• Full responsibility of the local administration (Gram Panchayat through Village Water 
Supply and Sanitation Committee) for the O&M of the schemes; 
• Integration of relevant complementary measures in the fields of watershed 
management, sanitation and health education; 
• Implementation with the cooperation of NGOs as far as possible. 
The purpose of the project is summarised under the following aspects: 
• Greater awareness of key economic, social, ecological and institutional conditions 
encountered 
• Greater awareness of and certainty about major economic, social, ecological and 
institutional implications of the Programme's schemes, enabling better adaptation of 
strategies to the potentials and constraints of the target population 
• Improving methods in the planning and participation procedures and ensuring the 
adaptation of the local schemes to the capacities of their target groups in order to 
achieve sustainability 
• Participatory decision-making regarding some key issues and strategies, such as the 
role and corresponding strengths of the DPMUs, role and selection process of the 
NGOs and the village selection process. 
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Profile of the project   
The project was instituted in 1999. SETU was the consortium, which included Karve Institute 
of Social Sciences, Pune, (social processes) Kirloskar Consultancy (engineering) and the 
German person as a CEO for overall monitoring. Three districts were selected: Pune, 
Aurangabad and Ahmednagar. In total 75 villages were identified for implementation of the 
schemes. The mechanism for implementing the project was same as Jalswarajya except the 
fact that the special component of women’s empowerment in terms of funding was not 
worked out at that time. Coverage of the scheme could be seen from the below table 
Table 4.9 Coverage, Aple Pani 
 
No. of districts selected 3
No. of GPs selected 75




Population covered 2.16 Lacs
Financial profile  
Estimated project cost was 152.44 crores, out of which KFW funding was 107.16 crores and 
GoM funding was 40.02 crores. Remaining 5.26 crores was estimated to be collected from 
public contribution.  
Following table gives summary of expenditure as in November 2005. 
Table 4.10 Cumulative expenditure, Aple Pani, November 2005 
 
Expenditure item Amount in Rs 
Water Supply system 94,64,50,000 
Latrine campaign 23,00,000 
Consultants 16,10,00,000 
NGO, training, IEC 2,30,00,000 
   (For some more information about financial details see table 3 in annexure)  
Institutional arrangement  
District level: DPMU  
These District Planning and Monitoring Units (DPMU) were established in 1999 in the Zilla 
Parishads of the project districts of Pune, Aurangabad and Ahmednagar. The DPMUs are 
headed by Executive Engineers and have staff assigned to them for the different professional 
roles. 
The GoM has issued a GR dated 7 October 2002, in which certain staffing pattern is 
sanctioned for the DPMUs (the process of placing of the staff in the DPMUs is in progress): 
The staff posted or being posted in the DPMUs is from different departments having different 
work cultures. The concept of participatory methods of project implementation is also new to 
them. Intensive orientation and training is therefore necessary to build the capacities of the 
staff members of the DPMUs to shoulder the responsibility of project implementation. Such 
training activities are also planned after identification of the training needs. 
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The DPMUs are the main actors in the project implementation activities. These units will also 
work closely with: 
• District authorities (of Zilla Parishads) and the DRDA, Soil and Water Conservation 
Department, Public Health Department etc. for implementing of supplementary 
measures 
• NGOs for village mobilisation and organisation activities, participatory planning 
process in villages 
• Gram Panchayats and the VWSCs for implementation of the project activities in their 
respective village, capital cost contribution and other project operations 
• Information, Education and Communication Bureau (IECB) for development of 
educational/promotional material and the organisation of promotional activities 
• Groundwater Survey and Development Agency (GSDA) in connection with 
exploration of groundwater, definition of watersheds and watershed-protection 
measures. 
• Local institutions and non-governmental organisations involved in similar activities 
locally for general participation and cooperation of local activities. 
DPMUs are at present functioning under the administrative control of the CEOs of the 
respective ZP. Functionally, the DPMUs are however reportable to the Director PPMU. In 
order to avoid problems of dual reporting, it is desirable to issue clear directives regarding the 
matters to be reported by the DPMUs to the CEOs and to the Director, PPMU. 
The roles to be performed by the individual staff members of the DPMU are detailed in the 
Approach Paper.  
Village level: GP, gramsabha and VWSC  
At the village level, the Gram Panchayat is an elected body of representatives of the villagers. 
The Sarpanch is head of the Gram Panchayat. According to the 73rd constitutional 
amendment, subject committees are formed to look after the matters of public interest like 
health and hygiene, water supply and sanitation, education etc. Major issues are discussed in 
the Gram Sabha (village meeting). 
Village Water Supply and Sanitation Committee is one of the subject committees, which will 
be established in each of the project villages – if not already existing – or reconstituted if 
necessary. At least 50% of VWSC members will be women. VWSC will co-opt additional 
members as invitees if felt necessary in the interest of the Project. These committees will be 
responsible for planning and implementation of the project activities at village level and will 
be supported by the NGOs and DPMU staff in this task. VWSC will be responsible for the 
participatory planning process and the development of the local village action plan (VAP). 
Section III: Methodology and profiles of the districts selected  
As explained in the perspective we decided to obtain information on two core elements of our 
research proposal; the decentralization process designed in Jalswarajya and Aple Pani 
Projects and its impact on the empowerment process of women under its influence. To 
understand the operationalisation of decentralization process in the field we had to investigate 
the management side of the project and the functioning of crucial elements which were built 
into the design of the project. To understand the empowerment process we needed to talk to 
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the women who got selected through gramsabha to be members of three committees; VWSC, 
SAC and WDC. 
Understanding the government perspective  
Before we started visiting the districts we met the Principal Secretary and Joint Secretary of 
WSSD to understand their perspective on the design of the Jalswarajya. Also we had an 
opportunity to participate in the workshop organized for the Outcome Budget project 
undertaken by TISS on behalf of Finance Department of GoM, where officials from RSPMU 
were present and we could discuss with them the roadblocks reported to them from the 
district teams. This interaction was useful to understand the ethos within the management 
team of Jalswarajya at the state level, which was found reasonably optimistic and assuring the 
existence of necessary will and support of the project. The workshop was also repeated once 
the Outcome Budget report and the Public Verification Exercise report were to be submitted. 
These two occasions were important for us to get a feel about how much the objective of 
decentralization and institution building has gone down well at the highest level of 
bureaucracy and has not remained a grudging exercise under the pressure of the World Bank.     
Understanding the SO perspective  
A one day consultative meeting was organised in Pune to understand the perspective of the 
SOs on the two schemes. This helped us in getting insights into the scheme and the role of 
SOs in the scheme. Since many of them were well into the scheme, they shared their 
experiences in implementing the schemes, the problems encountered while doing so both 
with the village community as well as with the government officials. This helped us in 
designing our questionnaires and checklists as well as in the sampling procedures. 
Sample selection  
Selection of districts  
Discussions with RSPMU at CIDCO Bhavan, Mumbai helped us decide on our districts from 
across five regions of the state i.e.-Konkan, Western Maharashtra, Northern Maharashtra 
Marathwada and Vidharbha.  Six districts were selected a little randomly, from these five 
regions, on the basis of response to our request of visit to that district. They are Sindhudurg 
(Konkan), Satara and Pune (Western Maharashtra), Jalgaon (Nashik), Chandrapur (Vidarbha) 
and Jalna (Marathwada). Of these five were from the Jalswarjya scheme and Pune district 
was from the Aple Pani Project initiated earlier (2000). 
Chandrapur was selected as it had a dominant tribal population and because of the fluoride 
deposits in the water, which had made potable water scarce in this district. Sindhudurg was 
selected because of its peculiar geological structure of basaltic formation which made 
percolation of groundwater difficult. This is also a district, which has a large female 
population due to male outmigration.       
Selection of villages  
From these six districts 17 villages were selected. The selection was done based on the 
following criteria: 
Primary criteria  
• Population size (both large and small villages) 
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• Percentage of SC and ST population 
• Opinion of the SOs55 please do the needful 
Secondary criteria  
Villages at the different stages of the project cycle- to include ongoing, just started and 
completed villages where scheme is functioning for some time and O & M is managed by 
villagers               
We used the data base provided by the WSSD for 3000 villages. However, this selection did 
not go by any systematic sampling process as we realized that the data base for 3000 villages 
was inaccurate in terms of the different stages at which the Jalswarajya project was at. Also 
many of the villages were being dropped for various reasons ranging from non participation 
of people, inability to pay towards 10% contribution, village level conflicts and several such 
reasons. We therefore were not in a position to do a systematic stratified sampling across the 
state of Maharashtra. We used the above criteria as a baseline and then used information 
provided to us by the WSSD, local NGOs and the district level set up of the Jalswarjaya to 
select our villages. 
Typically, we would carry a full listing for that district of names of villages covered under the 
Jawswarjya with their entire census information in terms of population size, dalit non dalit or 
tribal population and any other special features that the 3000 village data base provided us. 
Based on this information and on the field realities we selected our final sample. However, in 
every district we ensured that the primary and secondary criteria that we had set for our 
village selection were met. 
In Maharashtra we had an additional advantage due to our collaborating partner’s i.e. Tata 
Institute of Social Sciences involvement in the outcome budgeting project of the State 
government which sought to evaluate several schemes in the state and one of them was the 
Jalswarjya and as a matter of fact the domestic water sector as a whole. This allowed us 
access to different data sets of the government, access to different villages through the district 
level apparatus of the domestic water scheme and importantly access to government officials 
at different levels in the WSSD. This association also helped us understand the 
decentralization process from the inside and how the government perceives it and what kind 











                                                 
55 These are NGOs who have been appointed by the government after a certain process of scrutiny to implement 
the community organization aspects of Jalswarajya in a decided number of villages which can range from 3-20 
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Map 4.1: Selected districts, Maharashtra  
 
Interaction with the districts  
Interacting with government officials at all, the levels despite the advantage that the team 
carried were many. The district level officials rarely responded to our requests. Formal 
communication was often difficult with phones not working, e-mail out of order, frequent 
transfers of key officials and of course, the procedural delays due to decisions to be taken in 
several rounds of their meeting. Persistent follow up was what finally yielded results and we 
could plan our field trips. Often posts that were meant as communication points for the 
scheme were vacant. Records were not maintained so accessing data was difficult, moreover 
there was complete resistance to share information in a form that can be understood and used. 
Often the district authorities complained that the RSPMU, too often changed the formats for 
filling in information and this led to difficulties in keeping pace with procedures up to the 
village level. Despite the claims for transparency we found very little of that in practice.  
While the district was difficult, the RSPMU was nothing different. The baseline data 
provided by the RSPMU for 3000 villages we found that except for one the villages that we 
had selected through our primary and secondary criteria did not feature in the list at all. 
The steps during the district visits  
Met Chief Executive Officer(CEO), who is in charge of the project there and whose office 
releases the funds 
Discussion with the DFT leaders and the Monitoring and Evaluation person. The objectives 
of the study were discussed and then they were asked to share thier own experiences 
regarding roadblocks and also the way mitigation was achieved. Discussions with DFT and 
DAMT presented good insights into the processes of operationalization of PIP. 
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Presented them with our proposed list of villages and sought their opinion 
Checked the data available on these villages in compliance with the processes described in 
PIP and got the printouts. 
Contacted the Consortium wherever it existed and collected the reports prepared by them. 
Contacted the concerned Support Organizations who were working in the villages tentatively 
selected by us. They were our main guides to the village level data collection process 
Final selection was done based on the information provided by the DFT and the SO’s as to 
the actual status of the villages in the project cycle. Our insistence was on villages from batch 
one so that an older experience could be studied. 
Since this was a collaborative study with TISS and TISS was also involved in the Outcome 
budget study, its objective was also explained. 
The observations from the district visits would be presented as annexure in tabular 
format.(V.1) However, the highlights of observations would be presented in the text. 
Similarly, the table (V.2) based on progress reports procured during visits is presented as 
annexure but highlights on some essential components would be presented in text in brief. 
Interaction at villages: questionnaires and FGDs  
Our data that we present is across seventeen villages from six districts and we spoke to 114 
women from the three different committees. Since this was a study around the process of 
decentralization and how well it has been understood by women, we decided to interview 
women committee members primarily. However, we also discussed the processes in the 
village with other women through the Focus group discussions and informal interactions in 
different vastis. Many of the questions were left open ended so that women could articulate 
well. We had also hoped that we would pursue discussions with certain women who we 
found very active through case studies. But this was not possible as the time frames and 
resources were limited. As mentioned in our challenges section in chapter 1 we were unable 
to attend the gram sabhas and observe the dynamics of decision making, because in most of 
the villages that initial process and the enthusiasm was waning during our data collection 
period. 
In the section that follows we present the data for 17 villages under different themes. We 
have tried to look at data across caste and districts. Data from our FGDs is also discussed in 
this section which is our primary data base. 
District and village profile  
Detailed profiles of six districts are presented in the table below. The selected villages are 
listed below (Table 4.11 and 4.12). The list also consists of support organisations and 
consortia., which were assigned to those villages.  
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Table 4.11 Demographic features of selected districts 
 
Districts Features 
 Chandrapur Jalgaon Jalna Pune Satara Sindhudurg 
No of households 462632 732767 303886 1517041 570606 192666
Total population 2071101 3682690 1612980 7232555 2808994 868825
Sex ratio 948 933 951 919 995 1079
Child sex ratio (0 to 6 years) 939 880 903 902 878 944
Percentage of SC population 14 8 11 11 9 4
Percentage of ST population 18 12 2 4 1 1
Literacy Rate 73.2 75.4 64.4 80.5 78.2 80.3




Table 4.12 Demographic profile of selected villages 
 
District VIllage Population Sex Ratio 
Child Sex 
Ratio 








rate Support Organisation Consortium 
       Male Female   





Kanhalgaon 777 877 929 11.97 52.4 65.3 34.7 Dilasagram  
Chandrapur 
Mendhamal 934 930 1268 25.16 10 60.3 39.7 Dilasagram  
Hadsan 573 1018 1000 4.01 39.8 61.3 38.7 Matrubhumi Sarvangin Vikas Sanstha 
Mundkheda 1043 1002 682 1.05 15.4 54.7 45.3 Samajkarya Mahavidyalay 
Jalgaon 
Shelave 2496 932 738 13.66 12.7 58.7 41.3 Rashtra Vikas Samiti 
Scott Wilson 
Akola Dev 2972 949 859 21.43 0.98 64.3 35.7 Vision Plus Foudnation 
Ambadgaon 818 925 803 14.67 9.17 66.1 33.9 Dnyanjyoti Foundation 
Jalna 
Singona 1778 1058 1093 6.81 0 60.9 39.1 Dilasa Pratishthan 
Dilasa 
Pratishthan 
Harni 1580 1153 1147 4.24 0 52.9 47.1 Gramvardhini 
Koye 1746 957 789 2.63 21.65 61.2 38.8 Chaitanya 
Pune 
Golewadi 
(Mhasar) 606 1090 688 4.62 6.44 56.1 43.9 Nari Samata Manch 
Setu 
Bhondavade 805 1099 1065 5.84 0 53.3 46.7 Shramjivi Sanstha 
Manewadi 464 1090 806 0 0 48.2 51.8 Bhumiputra  
Satara 
Nandgane 355 1076 1150 1.69 6.2 57.3 42.7 Shramik Janta Vikas Sanstha 
AFPRO 
Parabwada 1279 1097 803 0 0 50.6 49.4 SidhhagiriGramotkarsh Mandal 
Sindhudurg 




 Table 4.13 Coverage of committee members in selected sample from each village 
 




Members M F M F M F Open OBC SC ST NT 
Hadsan 34 0 12 0 12 0 10 3 2 NA 3 NA
Mundkheda 36 6 6 6 6 0 12 5 1 NA 1 1
Jalgaon 
Shelave 41 8 6 3 10 4 10 1 3 NA 4 NA
Bhondavade 42 6 7 9 6 0 14 4 1 2 NA NA
Manewadi 48 7 7 8 8 0 18 5 3 NA NA NA
Satara 
Nandgane NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 8 NA NA NA NA
Jambharla 52 9 9 7 10 3 14 NA NA NA 5 NA
Kanhalgaon 60 9 11 10 11 4 15 1 1 NA 5 NA
Chandrapur 
Mendhamal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 2 NA NA NA
Parabwada NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NASindhudurg 
Vabhave 37 6 7 6 6 3 9 4 2 NA NA 1
Akola Dev 60 7 9 12 12 4 16 5 1 1 NA NA
Ambadgaon 52 11 7 7 9 18 0 5 NA 3 NA NA
Jalna 
Singona NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 1 NA NA NA
Harni NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 2 NA NA NA
Koye NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 7 1 NA NA NA
Pune 




Section IV: Performance of decentralization  
This section largely draws on our field observations and detailed discussions with 
committee members as well as various vasti wise meetings with non-committee members 
and importantly our discussions with the government officials at various levels. 
The overall performance: capsuling the government view  
Here we present a capsule of the data provided to us by the district level authorities on 
how they view their performance. The data was not complete as information from some 
districts in some areas was missing. The district level data has been analysed on seven 
counts outlined in the table below. It basically tells us about the coverage of villages in 
the district, average cost of VAPs, financial progress in terms of collection of capital 
contribution and installment release for capacity building and VAP and finally of course 
women’s empowerment. 
The main components of Jalswarjaya as outlined earlier are laid out in three Addendums 
which are as follows 1) Addendum I is the initial money for capacity building 2) 
Addendum II Village Action Plan is the physical cost of the scheme and 3) Addendum III 
Women’s Development Fund 
Table 4.14 Jalswarajya: overview of financial aspects for the entire State 
 
Costs (In Rs.) Description of Cost 
Highest Lowest 












5% Public Contribution in cash 











Table 4.15 Overview for selected districts 
 
Profile of implementation 
Chandrapur has maximum number of villages 243 
Satara selected  maximum Gram Panchayats 153 
Jalna and Satara covered Padas (distant vastees attached to GPs) 41 
Jalgaon covered maximum total population 3.26 Lacs 
Physical progress 
Average VAP cost is highest in Sindhudurg Rs. 65.44 Lacs 
Average VAP cost is lowest in Jalna Rs. 21.18 Lacs 
In Satara maximum old sources are strengthened 26 
Financial progress 
Capacity development: Addendum I 
Satara had maximum GPs who received IInd installment 137 
Satara had maximum GPs who received IIIrd installment 115 
Village Action Plan: Addendum II 
Jalna had maximum GPs who received II installment 118 
No third installment was received by anybody  
Public contribution achievement 
Jalna raised maximum PC Rs. 253.00Lacs 
Chandrapur raised lowest PC Rs. 32.51 Lacs 
Only Chandrapur collected PC in labour Rs. 34.71 Lacs 
Women’s empowerment picture 
Jalgaon has highest number of women VWSC presidents 135 
Chandrapur had highest number of women VWSC secretary 124 
Jalna, Satara and Sindhudurg formed SHGs post- project 808 
Satara VWSC total (President and Secretary) 149 
Jalna VWSC total (President and Secretary) 120 
Satara WDC total (President and secretary) 444 
Jalna WDC total (President and Secretary) 273 
Special purpose vehicle  
One of the innovative aspects of this project has been to create a parallel structure, which 
is like a special purpose vehicle for the implementation of the programme. The 
introduction of the DFT, DAMT and DFMT and recruiting of experts on contract basis 
alongside deputation of some zilla parishad functionaries at the district level seemed to 
have a galvanising effect on an otherwise lethargic district administration. Although a 
special structure did have an impact in terms of building enthusiasm, it also did create 
several tensions in authorities 
Tensions over authority  
Jalna and Satara were given ranking56 A+ on the website of Jalswarajya project. Two 
important causal factors appeared to be that the CEOs of the district were very supportive 
and all the posts in the three teams DFT, DAMT and DFMT were filled. In Jalna district 
                                                 
56 The WSSD provides a rank to the best performing districts the criteria for this ranking has not been 
disclosed. A+ is the highest ranking and most district CEOs would strive for that. 
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the regional facilitator for the Marathawada region was very active in monitoring the 
scheme. As a part of the monitoring there was a SWOT analysis carried out and this 
showed that it was the co-ordination between the three teams that allowed them to work 
in harmony with each other. They also had a good communication with the RSPMU at 
the state level. 
In Satara district there were tensions over the issue of authority between the executive 
engineer from MJP who was assigned the duty of approving Village Action Plan for the 
construction of the scheme, and the DFT leader who was given responsibility of overall 
in charge. The Engineer challenged the authority of the DFT leader who is a social sector 
person and argued that the scheme should have technical person at its head. 
We realized that the initiative of the district head i.e. the CEO, the key person responsible 
for the scheme is critical for the effective implementation of the scheme. In Jalgaon, the 
CEO was never interested in the scheme and this lethargy was transmitted to the officials 
on the lower rung. As a result there were delays in getting money from RSPMU. 
Chandrapur CEO was enthusiastic otherwise but had problems with DFT leader’s 
appointment. This district also got its second installment from RSPMU late and this was 
evident in the delayed schemes in the villages. Sindhudurg had initially some problems 
because of CEO but later it picked up when new CEO came. But the many posts 
remained vacant for quite some time. 
As per the RSPMU report of January 2008, 33 posts out of 234 posts required for all the 
districts were vacant. The post of Monitoring and Evaluation expert generally known as 
person in charge of computerisation of data was found vacant in three districts out of five. 
It had hampered the objective of transparency in the project. Gender experts too were not 
available at many places. 
Role of consortium  
In both Jalna and Satara which came across good performers, we realized that the role of 
the consortium was important. In Satara AFPRO had built a good network of the SOs in 
the district and also had maintained good relations with the DFT. In Jalna, Dilasa, an 
Aurangabad NGO was active in the capacity building phase. Chandrapur consortium was 
not active and  Jalgaon consortium too had problems with payment from CEO. 
Sindhudurg did not have a consortium at all. Consortium was supposed to provide the 
much needed support at the district level. Not only was it supposed to train and build 
capacities of SOs to implement the schemes well in the villages, it was also support to co-
ordinate the activities of the SOs at the district level and be link between the DFT and the 
SOs. Most consortiums failed to provide this support. In fact the selection process of the 
Consortium and the duress under which they were supposed to function are important 
factors for the lethargy of the Consortium or their complete absence. In many of the 
districts the consortiums were not local to the place and in fact not even to the state. They 
were management companies in most cases, who hired experts in an assorted manner. 
There was no team spirit that was inculcated among the various experts who were hired 
on a person day basis and neither were there shared goals. This led to a dampening of the 
spirit of civil society participation. 
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Community mobilisation and capacity building: role of SOs  
The community mobilisation and capacity building component of Jalswarajya was 
considered as an important one and here the role of the SOs and the DFT and their co-
ordination was seen as critical. One SO was to manage a cluster of 10 villages and 
support the DFT in community mobilsation. This was seen as important for devolution of 
power and finances to the VWSCs. The role of support organsiations was seen as 
important for information dissemination and thereby helping DFTs in performing its role 
effectively on the one hand and on the other to help develop capacities within VWSCs for 
implementation of the scheme. Although this showed signs of hope on paper, it did not 
seem to translate into action. 
Typically an SO was to be selected by the community after they had heard presentations 
from the prospective SOs and were convinced that the SO was capable of handling the 
community. DFT was usually present during these presentations. An apparently 
transparent and accountable process often turns out to be very biased in a structural 
context of inequities and vested interests. At the foundation of the failure of the 
community mobilsiation prgrammes lies this divide between the communities and DFTs 
on the one hand and the SOs on the other. So while communities and DFT joined hands 
in their complaints against SO’s, the SOs in turn were critical of the DFTs and the 
communities as well.  
Many of the SOs were selected randomly, without any prior experience of working in this 
sector. Tenders were requested and those with the lowest tenders were usually selected. 
Many of them were small time NGOs and their only work was to implement schemes of 
the government. Few had any radical vision of their own on either people’s participation, 
water sector and least of all women’s empowerment. (For a brief profile of the SOs see 
table 4 in annexure) As a result of this they were not equipped to handle the village level 
conflicts and neither were they able to bring an idea of change57. There were exceptions 
of course and they did try to drive the scheme in the initial stages, but the apathy of the 
DFT on the one hand and their nexus with the local elite, discouraged them and they 
finally either withdrew or they became run of the mill partners. Narayan Ashram an 
active SO in Sindhudurg district tried to bring in change in their ten villages by proposing 
alternative VAPs. They stressed the need for bringing in Jalswarjya as part of the larger 
water resource development programmes in the village. They also opposed some of the 
technical flaws in the sanitation models in the villages. They were immediately sidelined 
and eventually the organization withdrew out of some of the villages and refused to 
accept money from the community for its services. Nari Samata Manch in a successful 
effort went in for roof top harvesting in one of their cluster villages Palshoshi in Pune 
district. This has been lauded as a unique experience in the Aple Pani project. They 
narrated to us the planning process in this village which could just now have completed 
in 18 months. The initial few months only went in exploring various possibilities and 
                                                 
57 Dilasa Janvikas Pratishthan in Aurangabad a consortium for Jalna had been asked to do mid-term evaluation. It reported that the study tours organized by SOs 
were not well planned, in the sense that proper selection of the villages for the exposure tour was lacking and thus the desirable impact of the exposure tour was not 
achieved.    
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when none were feasible this alternative was chosen by the people. The entire time frame 
went well beyond the stipulated time. 
Interviews and group discussions with SOs showed that they were paid meagerly and 
often were left at the mercy of the VWSC. The budgets were made as per the 18 month 
time frames, but often the time period got extended and the SOs were not paid for that 
additional time. Nari Samata Manch an SO for the Aple Pani programme in Pune district 
has maintained a detailed financial account to show the paucity of fund allocation to the 
SOs. This was also evident from the budgets allocated to the SO’s which were much 
lower than that allocated to the experts from both the DFT as well as the consortium. 
Chaitanya another SO in the Aple Pani programme of Pune district informed us that they 
are into the 5th year of the scheme in Koye village, officially they have completed all their 
tasks and have withdrawn but still have not been paid the final installments.  
SOs were expected to recruit technical staff in their team, but they were totally ignored 
during planning and implementation of Village Action Plan activities. The technical staff 
was supposed to have educated the VWSC members about the technical aspect and 
should have taught them how to monitor the Technical Service Provider’s activities as 
well as those of the contractor. It would have helped to make the process transparent, and 
less corruption would have taken place, which did not happen. Many of the SOs came in 
only after these processes had taken place. 
The DFT members too treated the SOs with great disdain and often showed their 
disrespect during the village meetings, which further eroded their status. This tension 
between the SOs and the DFT was evident in all the districts that we studied.  
This also speaks about the apathy of the state in involving meaningful participation from 
the civil society. Consortiums too were selected in a haphazard manner. Our interviews 
with the senior officers in the WSSD and the RSPMU also seemed to resonate a similar 
feeling. They were convinced that they did not really see the need for SOs. The SOs were 
included in the scheme to ensure participation of the hitherto excluded sections like 
women, dalits, tribals etc, but they were not provided the time and space to get these 
processes going. These inequities have a long history and cannot be addressed in 18 
months time. The attitude of senior officers was that addressing these inequities was part 
of micro-management and the state cannot be expected to be involved in this. For them 
working towards devolution of power with Gram Panchayat, or Village Water and 
Sanitation Committee was sufficient commitment to institutional changes intended in the 
project. This feeling was transferred very well up to the district and the village level. 
The paradox was that DFTs continuously complained of inadequate time and staff to 
reach out, but did not see the SOs as meaningful partners in this process. 
One of the key learnings from this is that although decentralization may have been 
introduced as a ‘good intention’ programme from the top, it is the dynamics at the local 
level that governs its success. Here the nexus between the local level officials and the 
vested interests in the VWSC partnered to subvert the very reason for which 
decentralization was launched. 
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Village level committees  
Three committees had to be constituted at the village level under the Jalswarajya 
programme and two under the Aple Pani programme. These were the VWSC, WDC and 
the SAC.  
In all the Jalswarajya villages the three committees had been formed and in place as per 
the required quotas. However in none of the villages did we find that they were 
performing their roles separately, there seemed to be a merged identity especially of 
VWSC and the SAC committees. 
VWSC’s which is the most important committee was seen to be fairly active in most of 
our villages. There were often 2-3 key people who led the process in each of the villages 
and they were the ones we needed to contact when we went to the villages. Our findings 
and physical verifications show that in most of the villages basic records were 
maintained, meetings were minuted and accounts registers too were maintained. WDC 
accounts were kept separate. In the initial phases the VWSCs did meet frequently for 
planning processes. Often the SAC and WDC too met commonly with the VWSC for 
planning related to water sources etc. 
The SAC is expected to perform an audit of the VWSC, monitor its functioning and 
ensure that it fulfils its role. However, we did not see the SAC in that kind of a role in any 
of the villages. They often met together and decided on matters together. 
The WDC did have a distinct role to play in building collective identity of women and 
facilitating their participation in the water management project. One of its main strategies 
to attract women was to form SHGs and allocate special funds for economic activities. It 
was believed that this is the best route towards women’s empowerment. It provided a 
space for women to not only get together, form SHGs, save and borrow, but also to 
handle funds in a fair and just manner. Unfortunately the route became an end in itself 
and they seemed to be largely concerned with the special fund that was instituted towards 
SHGs formed under the scheme. In fact, our findings showed that women were overtly 
concerned about the SHG activity rather than the main activity of water management. 
This has been corroborated by a rapid assessment done by Dilasa, the Aurangabad based 
consortium for Jalna district in its report where it states that the secretaries and presidents 
of WDC across the state have largely focused only on SHG activities almost entirely 
sidelining the main scheme. 
Empowerment of women then largely remains restricted to the area of economic 
empowerment. From women’s groups point of view this was the main activity of the 
project and they were therefore seen complaining about the lack of resources to meet the 
needs of all the SHGs in the village. Women also said that many a times there was no 
follow up after the initial skill training process and so women could not use their skills 
towards income generation goals. In Jalna, the DFT without consulting the local women, 
went ahead and purchased few machines such as Dal processing; Mirch pounding etc. out 
of the revolving fund allotted to the WDC and delivered them to the villages. There was 
no opportunity for women to say whether they would like these activities, no training 
about running it as a co-operative activity or maintaining it etc. Rather than being 
paternalistic, the DFT should have allowed the women to explore and learn form their 
mistakes. Parabwada was the only village where they managed to have an SHG 
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Mahasangh or federation of 20 SHGs and they had started collecting shares from 
members for setting up the core funds to facilitate eligibility to bank loans. 
We can see how the WDC role had deviated from its main purpose of getting women 
together to rally around the scheme and participate in its planning process. Unfortunately, 
many of the SOs too got sucked into implementation of this activity and failed to see its 
broader role in consolidating women’s collectivity.  
However, it also raises questions in terms of whether the economic route is the best route 
to invoke women’s collective values. One it is used it needs to be followed to its logical 
end, or else it would lose its meaning both as an end in itself as well as a vehicle towards 
building collective identity. 
Aple Pani did not have this committee and neither the fund and perhaps we did not see 
enthusiasm amongst women the way it was present in Jalswarjya.  
Women’s Participation  
The progress report of each district had separate section to report on women’s 
participation in quantitative terms. Such as percentage of women members in each 
committee: VWSC, SAC and WDC. In addition, the percentage of women in the 
leadership position was also separately noted down. The attendance of women in 
women’s gramsabhas was recorded. The number of SHGs formed before and after the 
project was an important indicator to assess the impact of the project. Women’s responses 
from the interviews too showed us that the project had made some difference, to different 
groups of women in different ways, but overall did create enthusiasm. It stirred them to 
take interest in the public life and the governance issue.   
In Sindhudurg, particularly, women were very active. In one of the villages a male 
Surpanch attributed his election to his work in the VWSC and importantly women’s 
support for the water project. We do a more detailed discussion of this towards the end of 
this chapter. 
Pricing of water  
As per the scheme, a 10% capital contribution is to be made by the community. We made 
a separate enquiry on collection of capital contribution and found that in most villages up 
to 5% was paid up by people. Methods and amounts of collecting capital contribution 
varied from village to village. Whereas in some villages it was based on per capita in 
others it was based on per household. There were no uniform rates decided either. In 
most of the villages we found that the range varied from Rs 50/hh to even 50,000/hh. In 
some villages like Hudson for example the Bhil vasti was unaware of the capital 
contribution and had not paid up anything so far while the Rajput family from where the 
woman surpanch came had paid a large amount of Rs 10,000/-. This family was looked 
upon as the benevolent household of this village and was providing drinking water for the 
whole village. 
In none of the villages did we find any discussion on the remaining 5% contribution. It 
was assumed that this would be either waived or paid for by the contractor.  
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Full costs towards O&M are to be borne by the community and the implications of this 
had not completely been internalized by the people. At the moment O&M seemed 
relavant to only a few villages which had completed the scheme. In Jambharle village for 
example Rs30/month/hh was the rate decided and a 3 month collection in advance was 
already done. But there was a lot of uncertainty about the rates and women and men felt 
that they are likely to increase. 
There seemed to be a lot of ambiguity about both CC as well as O&M charges. We 
discuss this in detail in the women’s responses. 
Section V: Responses of women  
Here we present our findings from our discussions with women committee members as 
well as draw on the FGDs with women from SHGs and also general group of village 
women.  
Profiles of women  
We present here the profile, which indicates the socio-economic location of our sample, 
which would help us seeing its relation with empowerment. 
The women we interviewed were spread over three committees which were constituted 
under the Jalswarjya and Aple Pani scheme. The three committees we studied were 
VWSC, SAC WDC. Their strength differed across villages depending on the will of the 
local community to make the process more inclusive. 
District wise committee members  
The chart below shows the district wise spread of committee members. In Jalgaon and 
Satara we interviewed 24 and 23 members respectively and in Pune (14), Chandrapur 
(15), Sindhudurg (15). 














VWSC happens to be the main committee, more active in day today functioning. Out of 
total 114 women 54 were members of the VWSC, 32 were from WDC and 28 were from 
SAC. Thus it appears that we could capture overall good representation of our 
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constituency, the sections of which differ in the intensity of their involvement in the 
project implementation.  
Committee post wise distribution of the members  
We had total 13.16 percent presidents, 7.89 percent secretaries, 0.88 percent vice 
presidents and 2.63 percent treasurers among our sample. The rest were simple members. 
The sample in fact corresponds to the overall spread of women functionaries as per the 
data provided by the RSPMU. Among total numbers of VWSC, only 7.41 percent were 
presidents, among WDC members 28.13 percent were presidents and among SAC only 
7.14 were presidents. It is obvious that WDC presidents were more in numbers since it 
mainly consisted of the women members who were supposed to be the members of 
SHGs. Men’s participation in the WDC was merely tokenistic.  



























Among the category of secretary WDC had largest percentage of 15.63, VWSC had 5.56 
percent and SAC had only 2.63 percent. Secretary is a key functionary in the VWSC. 
S/he has the signing authority and can call for meetings of the VWSC.  
In cases of women secretaries, we have seen some other male member of the community 
taking the lead or sometimes her own husband as well. 
Caste profiles of women  
Out of 114 women respondents 52.63 percent belonged to open category, 17.54 percent 
belonged to OBC (Other backward castes) 15.79 percent belonged to ST (tribals) 
category, 12.28 percent belonged to Scheduled caste (previously untouchables) and 1.57 
belonged to NT (nomadic tribes) category.  
These percentages are in proportion to the population of these communities in these 
villages. Chandrapur is the only district where there was a dominant tribal population. 
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Table 4.16 Caste and sex wise membership in committees (for 7 villages) 
 
Open OBC SC ST NT DT 
Village 
  
 Committee M F M F M F M F M F M F 
VWSC 4 3 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 0
WDC 2 6 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1Akola dev 
 SAC 6 6 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 1
VWSC 11 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
WDC 0 14 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0Ambadgaon 
 SAC 7 7 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
VWSC 6 4 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
WDC 0 12 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0Bhondavade 
 SAC 6 5 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
VWSC 0 8 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
WDC 0 8 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0Hadsan 
 SAC 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0
VWSC 3 5 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0
WDC 0 8 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0Mundkheda 
 SAC 2 3 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 2 0 0
VWSC 5 3 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WDC 4 6 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Parabwada 
 SAC 4 3 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VWSC 7 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
WDC 2 6 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0Shelave 
 SAC 2 7 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
 













Our caste wise profile for the key functionaries shows us the following- not surprisingly 
that VWSC president ship (15 out of 114) had largely gone to the open category women. 
VWSC secretary ship too had gone 100 percent to the open category women. And we 
must remember that it is the most influential committee. Number of WDC presidents 
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were divided proportionately into open category, SC, ST as per the size of their 
population in our database. OBC had a little less representation such as 11.11 percent 
whereas their proportion was 17.54 percent. The percentages were 44.44, 22.22, and 
22.22 respectively. The NT caste did not have representation at all. They live in a 
separate vasti and hence may be it was not possible to access them for interviews. In fact 
many of NT women are quite enterprising and have their own saving groups and work on 
the principles of SHG. SAC presidents were only two and one post went to open category 
and another to ST woman. Secretary was also one among SAC member, belonging to 
open category.  
Table 4.17 Caste wise post in the committee 
 
  Caste groups  
Committee Membership Open SC ST OBC NT Total 
President 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Secretary 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00




 Member 50.00 6.52 17.39 23.91 2.17 100.00
President 44.44 22.22 22.22 11.11 0.00 100.00
Secretary 60.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 100.00




Member 35.29 29.41 23.53 11.76 0.00 100.00
President 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Secretary 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00




Member 54.17 12.50 12.50 20.83 0.00 100.00
Education wise distribution of the sample  
Education contributes to empowerment and hence to trace education level of the women 
in our sample was important. It was surprising to find that 15.79 percent women were 
non-literate. On the other end graduate women were only 3.5 percent and most women 
were in the class of 5-7th standard (30.70%) followed by those in 8-10 std (18.42) and 
then by 1-4th standard (13.16%). So although the overall profile did show high levels of 






































Marital  status wise distribution of the sample  
Marriage provides status and post reproductive status for married woman does allow 
them some mobility. Our sample showed that 80.70 percent women were married and 
only 1.75 were found unmarried. About 7 percent reported that they were widowed and 
0.88 reported that they were divorced. 
Chart 4.5 Marital status wise distribution of the sample 














Class profile of women  
Analysing income is a complex task and requires meticulous data collection procedures 
over a certain time period. To understand the class status we looked at women’s 
landownership patterns in terms of their own land as well as land owned by their families. 
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Land in her own name signifies power and hence this too is presented here. We have also 
looked at whether the women are included under the BPL lists by looking at the ration 
cards that they hold.  
Landownership by the household  
If we look at the household wise ownership of land, we see that 42.98 women members 
come from landless households. This is indicative of increasing percentage of rural 
landlessness due to a variety of reasons. Increasingly this represents the reality of rural 
Maharashtra. In a sense, we can say that the project did include women from different 
classes and castes. 
Land holding intervals of 1-3, 4-6 and 7-15 acres had 21.05, 20.18 and 12.28 percent 
representation from all the caste categories. 16-50 acres class interval had two households 
and more than 50 acres had two households, which is a real power base.  








1 to 3 24 21.05
4 to 6 23 20.18
7 to 15 14 12.28
16 to 50 2 1.75
More than 50 2 1.75
Total 114 100.00
Castewise landlessness was much less among the open category compared to their 
composition in the sample, such as 34.69 percent compared to 52.63 percent. SC, ST, 
OBC and NT had much more landlessness among them compared to their proportion in 
the sample such as 22.45 percent (12.28), 18.37 percent (15.79), 20.41 percent (17.54) 
and NT 4.08 percent (1.75). Open category was prominent in all the categories 1-3, 4-6, 
7-15, 16-50 and more than 50 acres such as 54.17, 65.22, 85.71, 100 and 50 percent. ST 
had good representation in the categories of 1-3 and 4-6 such as 16.67 and 21.74 percent 
but SC had very little in the first such as 8.33 and nil in the rest with one exception of 50 
percent in the category of more than 50 acres. OBC also had reasonably good 
representation in the three categories of 1-3, 4-6 and 7-15 acres such as 20.83, 13.04 and 
14.29 percent.  
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Table 4.19 Caste wise landownership, land owned by household 
 
Castes Landownership 
(In Acre) Open OBC SC ST NT 
Total 
Landless 34.69 20.41 22.45 18.37 4.08 100 
1 to 3 54.17 20.83 8.33 16.67 0.00 100 
4 to 6 65.22 13.04 0.00 21.74 0.00 100 
7 to 15 85.71 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
16 to 50 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
More than 50 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100 
Total 52.63 17.54 12.28 15.79 1.75 100 
If one looks at district wise proportion of land ownership by households Jalgaon ranks 
first (28.57), Jalna comes second (24.49) Sindhudurg (18.37), Chandrapur (16.33) among 
the landless women members. Pune and Satara had only 6.12 percent women form the 
landless households. Pune and Satara had evenly distributed households among all the 
categories except 16-50 acres and above 50 acres. Satara had one household which 
owned land above 50 acres. Chandrapur and Sindhudurg were characterized by having 
landowning households in the categories of 1-3, 4-6 acres only. Jalgaon and Jalna had 
HHs in all the three categories of 1-3, 4-6 and 7-15 acres. Jalna had large number ( 35.71) 
in the category of  7-15 acres. We did not ask whether the lands were irrigated or not. 
Irrigation does bring in prosperity to the household in terms of enhanced production 
leading to better incomes. 
Table 4.20 District wise landownership, household owned land 
 
Districts Landownership 
Chandrapur Jalgaon Jalna Pune Satara Sindhudurg 
Total 
Landless 16.33 28.57 24.49 6.12 6.12 18.37 100
1 to 3 12.50 20.83 8.33 8.33 37.50 12.50 100
4 to 6 17.39 8.70 13.04 21.74 26.09 13.04 100
7 to 15 0.00 14.29 35.71 21.43 28.57 0.00 100
16 to 50 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100
More than 50 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 100
Total 13.16 21.05 20.18 12.28 20.18 13.16 100
In brief, Sindhudurg and Chandrapur appear to be very distinct areas geographically as 
well as socially, which we would take into account while describing their responses for 
implementation of the scheme. Chandrapur had mainly tribal population and less 
education. Sindhudurg is closer to Mumbai and has a large migrant population to 
Mumbai but in close contact with their roots. This is also one district with a strong 
educational profile of women. Similarly Satara district too with its connection with 
Mumbai and better literacy has an advantage over other districts. It is also the fertile 
ground for movements and new political ideas. 
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Women’s self owned land  








1 to 3 13 12.28
4 to 6 3 2.63
7 to 15 5 4.39
16 to 50 1 0.88
More than 50 0 0.00
Total 114 100.00
79.82 percent women reported that they were landless. The maximum land owned by a 
single woman was between the category of 16-50acres and she was an SC. She inherited 
the land from her parents. 12.28 percent women had 1-3 acres of land and 4.39 percent 
women had between 7-15 acres of land. Caste wise 51.09 percent women from open 
category reported that they were landless and the numbers for SC, ST, OBC and NT were 
as 14.13, 17.39, 15.22, and 2.17. Thus it appears the landless was proportionate to their 
representation in the sample size. In the class interval of 7-15 acres Open, ST and OBC 
had proportion of ownership such as 60, 20 and 20 percent. SC did not qualify there. In 
the two other class intervals 1-3 acres and 4-6 acres Open caste women represented 61.54 
and 66.67 percent. OBC percentile was 38.46 in the class interval of 1-3 acres. ST did not 
have women in the class interval of 1-3 acres, but had 33.33 percent in the class interval 
of 4-6 acres. 
Table 4.22 Caste wise land ownership, self owned land 
 
Castes Landownership 
Open OBC SC ST NT 
Total 
 
Landless 51.09 15.22 14.13 17.39 2.17 100.00 
1 to 3 61.54 38.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
4 to 6 66.67 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 100.00 
7 to 15 60.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 100.00 
16 to 50 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 52.63 17.54 12.28 15.79 1.75 100.00 
On the whole it can be said that ownership of land by women is in negligible proportion 
and does not constitute a power base to become a committee member. 
Poverty line  
Ration card in India is used as an identity for many things, such as your residential status, 
domicile status etc. but its main use is to identify your status for access to subsidized food 
available through Public Distribution System. The BPL status is denoted by yellow 
colour of the card and the orange denotes above BPL status and the foodgrains are 
available at higher price. 24.56 percent women reported having a yellow card, 42.98 held 
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an orange card and 32.46 did not respond. Among these no responses some were women 
who did not know their card colour but in most cases data was not recorded correctly. In 
most poor/rural societies women would invariably know the colour of their ration cards 
as it is closely linked to their food security. 
Castewise profile of ration card holding shows that of the total yellow card holders 50 
percent belonged to open category, 7.14 belonged to SC, 28.57 belonged to ST, 10.71 
percent belonged to OBC and 3.57 percent to NT. Among the orange card holders open 
category was heavily represented (55%). Similarly among no response also one notices 
52.63 percent women are under open category, i.e. they don’t know what card they have.  
District wise picture is that Jalgaon and Chadrapur had more yellow cardholders 32.14 
and 25 percent respectively compared to Sindhudurg, which has lowest (7.14%) along 
with Pune (7.14%). Satara had 10.71 percent yellow card holders. This picture sounds 
realistic in the context of the status of districts. Jalgaon has more disparity and 
Chandrapur has ST population. 
Membership of organisations  
Membership to different organizations and committees is also an indicator of the 
capability and experience of the women. We asked if women held membership to what 
we considered as key rural institutions such as SHG, GP, credit cooperative society and 
anganwadi. 50 women said that they were members of other organizations before 
becoming committee members. Most of them were members of either SHG and GP.  





We also tried to look at if women have started participating in other institutions after they 
became committee members in water supply scheme. 37 women responded positively to 
that. Most of them (24) became SHG members, as a part of mobilization by SO. 9 women 
reported that they could think of participating in the election of local bodies, either in GP 










Status of participation  
Selection process  
A number of factors determine which women are selected, why they are selected and how 
far was the process democratic and fair. Do men and certain caste groups dominate the 
decisions around selection or is it their own initiative. It is a combination of several 
factors of agency and structure and this is amply evident from our findings. 
Our findings show that one of the important reasons for participation for women in the 
pani samitis was their own interest. 59.65 percent respondents said that they decided to 
participate because of their self interest. 14.04 percent said that they became willing to 
participate after influential people in the community persuaded them. 9.65 percent 
women reported that the villagers suggested names in the gramsabha convened in the 
beginning of the project. Only 5.26 percent women said that it was their family that 
showed keenness. Only 1.75 percent women became a part of the committee because of 
their membership of grampachayat, and it was mandatory.  
Table 4.23 Reasons for participation 
 
Reasons 
No of women 
responding Percentage 
Self interest 68 59.65 
Asked by influential people of 
community 16 14.04 
Because selected by villagers 11 9.65 
Asked by family members 6 5.26 
Mandatory requirement 2 1.75 
No response 11 9.65 
Total 114 100 
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We thought this might vary across districts so looked at the district wise data on 
participation. Following Sindhudurg (100%) Satara (69%) and Pune (57.14) were the two 
districts that stood out in terms of their participation through self interest.  




















































Education too did have a role to play in motivating to participate on their own volition. 
Our findings showed that graduates and undergraduates answered affirmatively followed 
by those in the class interval of 8-10th (76.19%) and 5-7th standard (62.86%). The rest 
showed a low interest. 
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In our caste wise profiles too we see that a large number of women across dalits and 
OBCs also said that their own motivation or self interest was the most important factor 
for their participation. The OBC (80%), SC (64.3%)) and Open category (56.7%) figures 
do indicate that caste was not a barrier in exercising agency of women. Membership to 
these committees was important but did not carry any political power. Women across 
caste also found a space for representation so those having the initiative could participate 
without much contestation. Many of these women are less likely to have faced opposition 
from the family as against the upper caste women, who still are governed by norms of 
seclusion. 

































In the chart 4.11 above we see that although women responded by saying that it was their 
own self interest that motivated them to participate, only 10% women went ahead and 
proposed their own names for selection. A majority of the names were finally proposed 
by villagers in the gram sabha. 20% of the women said that their names were suggested 
by influential members of the village and only small numbers attributed their presence to 
SOs or the fact that they were GP members. When we discussed the procedure for final 
selection of the women, there was an overwhelming response by the women that it was 
the influential members who made those final decisions on selection processes. 
When we look at the preferred characteristics of women on committees the chart below is 
useful. It shows that articulation, being responsible and capable, active participation, 
education, having experience, has time for public activities and is active in SHGs were 




Chart 4.11 Who suggested your name for the post? 
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Chart 4.12 Reasons for which name was suggested for the committee 
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It is was important for us to investigate what motivated women to participate in the 
process and here the women’s responses were as follows : concerned about the water 
crisis (13.16%) in the village; want to do something for the village (14.04%);  help 
towards reducing women’s drudgery (3.51%); develop communication with other women 
(12.28%); interested in social  and public work (9.65%) and interest in water 
management issues(2.63%). 
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Nature of participation  
Women’s enthusiasm was evident when we asked them about the various responsibilities 
that they undertake as committee members. The most important responsibility cited by 
them was attending meetings of the committees and the mahila gramshabhas. They felt 
that it was their obligation to attend the meetings once they are selected as a member of 
the committee. Out of 114 women respondents 94 were positive. 77 of them also 
participated in training programmes and exposure tours organized by SOs. 32 of them 
were aware that the minutes were recorded for all the meetings and those who were also 
executive committee members signed them. 22 of them took initiative to collect capital 
contribution from the villagers. Dissemination of the committee decisions was another 
activity, which was undertaken by 22 of them. 21 respondents reported that they had been 
part of the committee to supervise construction. However, when asked whether any one 
of them went to purchase the material there was silence and only one woman responded 
positively. Conflict resolution was another area where nobody had taken responsibility.  
Chart 4.13 Nature of participation 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Attending meetings
Attending trainings/exposure trips
Recording minutes of the meeting
Collecting capital contribution
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Participating in village cleaning activities
Purchasing construction material








Degree of activeness  
Pursuing further on self interest and women’s agency we asked women the various areas 
where they take an initiative. Here we found that about 49.12 percent women said that 
they come forward to take up responsibilities, and 28.07 percent women said that they 
have not taken any responsibility so far, whereas 18.42 percent said that they only 
undertake activity, which is assigned to them. This is not very favourable considering that 
the self interest response was so overwhelming. We were also concerned about 
 133
assignment of tasks by men and whether these strengthen gender stereotyping, but most 
women (63.16%) did not think so. However some women (13.16%) did feel that tasks 
such as making tea, greeting guests etc were assigned to them while the men would take 
on other tasks. 
How conducive is the environment for women to articulate their concerns was an 
important area of enquiry since it actually leads us to look at some of the facilitating and 
constraining factors for participation. As the table below shows us, 55.26% women felt 
that they were able to articulate their concerns. However, the negative response too could 
not be ignored  sizable, that is around 25%. 13.16% women said that they do not attend 
meetings in the first place. But 6.14% women said that as they themselves are not able to 
talk in the meetings they take help from other to do so. 
Table 4.24 Ability to articulate concerns in the meetings  
 
Answer 




Don’t attend meetings 15 13.16
Takes help from others 7 6.14
Total 114 100
This overall positive response in women articulating is encouraging and speaks to some 
extent about the spaces created by the scheme, which go beyond quotas. Here the role of 
mahila gramsabhas and separate meetings for women are seen as important. 
Further probing about awareness and facility of raising issues around water during the 
VWSC meetings, we realized that more than 43% answered positively, 23% answered 
negatively and there was  a large chunk of ‘no response’, i.e. about 32.46%. Among the 
women with ‘no response’ SC and open category women contribute a lot compared to 
OBC and ST. Integration of SC has been found problematic. It appears that SOs had not 
done extra efforts to encourage them to participate in the empowerment process in a big 
way. 
Table 4.25 Awareness and articulation of women’s issues around water 
 
Response No of women Percentage 
Yes 50 43.86 
No 27 23.68 
No response 37 32.46 
Total 114 100 
Our Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) revealed that in Hadsan and Mundkheda Rajput 
(upper castes) women were well aware of the scheme and also were active, but Bhil 
women (tribals) were totally unaware. In Mundkheda they explained that almost six 
months they migrate for work to Gujarat and thus could not keep track of what is 
happening in the village. But in Shelave three separate meetings in the Leva Patil (upper 
caste) vasti, dalit vasti and Bhil vasti revealed that all women were reasonably aware of 
the scheme and gave credit to gender expert, Sunanda Visave from Rashtra Vikas Samiti 
(SO). Thus it was very clear that the SO’s role was important in bringing marginalised 
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groups like women and especially women from the marginalised groups into the process 
of participation. In fact all the villages where the women’s participation was significant 
as well as inclusive of all women, we could make connection that it has to do with having 
a good SO as one of the factors, such as Koye-Chaitanya, Manewadi-Bhumiputra, 
Nandgane-Shramik Janta, Kanhalgaon-Dilasagram, Parabwada-Siddhagiri, Vabhve-
Narayan Ashram 
What we see through this data is that caste, class (migrant women find it difficult to 
participate) and the role of SOs is critical in determining women’s active participation 
that goes beyond presence in the meetings. 
Conducive atmosphere in committees  
Women require conducive atmosphere for their active participation and it is a duty of the 
SO and men folk to see to it that encouraging atmosphere is created by providing space, 
physical and also psychological to them. An attempt was done to capture these feelings. 
Suitable timing and location was one such factor, which definitely allows more space for 
women to attend the meetings. Overwhelmingly, i.e. 83.33 percent women responded 
positively. Not only that but they confessed that their preference for the date and time for 
the meeting was taken into account. Also, 57.02 percent said that their opinions were 
sought for and accepted. They could raise some issues as priority issue and it was taken 
for discussion. (55.26%). Women in Parabwada and Vabhve were very positive and 
articulate about men’s cooperation for their participation. In Parabwada, all the 
committee members were carrying an information brochure about the facts and figures 
related to the scheme, so that they could narrate many things in the interview. Some of 
them also maintained diary to note down the dates of some important decisions. Woman 
sarpanch and VWSC president being the same person had created positive atmosphere. 
No conflict of roles was experienced. In Vabhve the male sarpanch had been very 
supportive and encouraged them to come forward along with efforts done by Narayan 
Ashram (SO). In Sindhudurg women’s educational background had a positive impact but 
also, men in the committee. In Santose village of Sindhudurg, sarpanch admitted that he 
could get elected without spending much money because of the unleashed energies of 
women committee members who supported him and canvassed for him during the 
election campaign.     
Those who did not attend meetings and do not contribute to the process of participation 
gave following reasons for the same. There were multiple answers. Lack of confidence 
(15), lack of information about the meeting’s timings and venue (10), unable to 
understand discussions (6), have to go for wage labour and thus cannot spare time to 
attend (8) and does not feel need to talk (1) were some of the responses from very few 
women as we would notice here. 
Support from the household  
Often one of the important barriers for women is the resistance from her own family. 
Women coming out for public work is therefore a major change both in terms of the 
household as well as the woman herself. The PRI experience shows that women have to 
an extent overcome some of the barriers, coped and negotiated through to participate in it. 
Participation in PRIs has earned a sense of respectability due to the power and prestige 
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associated with it. Water committees are in a sense new and whether they can be seen as 
stepping stones for entering into power politics is questionable. From our own 
assessments across the 17 villages we have seen that the scheme has earned a tremendous 
amount of importance and therefore respect in the village. Its presence in the village 
stands no comparison to any other scheme launched in the recent years. This is also 
because of the large financial inceptives provided with its sister scheme on sanitation. 
This ‘earning of respectability’ is what we see as the main reason for such an 
overwhelming participation from women which has gone uncontested on the family front. 
Let us look at women’s responses here - 97.37 percent said that there is no opposition 
from the family for their participation in the committees 93 percent women admitted that 
the family members showed considerable understanding while the woman is busy with 
the committee work. Only 4.39 percent women complained somewhat that family 
members do not understand their role in the committee and hence sometimes create 
problems.  So the response has been overwhelming. 
Costs of opportunity  
The question of opportunity costs is often difficult to assess as women rarely find an 
opportunity to go beyond the realm of household work. So opportunity and work burdens 
can be understood differently by women located differently. For many of these women 
this was the first opportunity to participate in public matters and hence they did not really 
see this as a burden or an additional cost. The opportunity of participation was also seen 
as one converting into a real opportunity of time saving due to the water scheme. How 
this was negotiated in terms of time can be seen through some of the responses of 
women. 
Chart 4.14 Who takes the responsibility while she is busy in committee work 
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The most obvious question that follows from here is who then shares work at the 
household level. Since there is some amount of consent to participate, women obviously 
did have to negotiate around their housework as well. Here we see a large number of 
women saying that often these work burdens were transferred to other women members 
in the family (44.74%) usually the co-sister or daughter-in-law or daughter. Surpanch and 
president of Parabwada admitted that she could not perform these roles if her co-sister 
had not taken on these responsibilities.  
Although we did not probe into this further in terms of how and why they agree to take 
on their share of the work, women do accommodate with an understanding that this 
would be returned in some form or the other. The other issue is also of hierarchy within 
the family. Rarely did we see a mother in law taking on her work. It was largely women 
in the family who were lower on the age hierarchy. 
In a large number of cases (29.82%), however women said that they did most of the 
housework and then participated in the committee meetings. Some women interestingly 
reported that their husbands did share in the household tasks (8.77%).  
The important learning from here, is that a) although there are costs of this opportunity, 
women do negotiate and use this space b) they do not really challenge the division of 
labour between men and women 
Impact of new water scheme on their lives  
Impact of water availability  
Despite the strict timelines inbuilt into the scheme in most of the villages, delays of 
different kinds had not actually led to a proper functioning drinking water scheme. In 
fact, this was one of the major reasons for loss of the initial enthusiasm generated through 
the IEC. Needless to add that women (50%) could not therefore firmly state their 
responses on how the scheme had made a difference to them. They innfact complained 
how delays meant that they still had to walk long distances to fetch water. The responses 
collated here are from those villages where the scheme was completed and to an extent 
from anticipations of women in other villages. 
Time saving was the main impact cited by most women (46.49%), followed by a positive 
impact on health of family (45.6%) followed by its contribution to village and home 
cleanliness (42.9%). Women (35.09%) said that the saved time could be used for other 
activities and this is shown in the chart below. Of the 38 women who did respond to time 
saved, said that they were now using that additional time for additional household work 
(15 women) and agricultural work (16) speaks a lot for how time created is consumed by 
additional household and subsistence burdens for women. 
We also asked women if they were able to find additional uses of the newly created water 
and 17.54% said that they are using it for their cattle and for kitchen gardens. 
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Change in health 
of the family 
Increased 
cleanliness 
New usage of 
water 
Has not received  
water from scheme yet 50.88 48.25 47.37 49.12
Yes 46.49 45.61 42.98 17.54
No 2.63 1.75 1.75 33.33
no response 0.00 4.39 7.89 0.00
Total 100 100 100 100
Impact on women at household level  
Increased participation in decision making processes  
We assumed that participation of women for 18 months of intensive activity must have 
generated some awareness among women respondents of their dignity and independence 
in decision making. Amartya Sen criticizes the utilitarian approaches, which measure 
increased well being in terms of ‘adaptive preferences’, i.e. preferences adjusted to their 
second class status.(Nussabaum:2003).  We tried to go beyond this utilitarian approach to 
find out whether women have feeling that the milieu where they are situated has changed 
or not and they are getting sense of it.  
Issues such as children’s education, health issues and the expenses for children as well as 
their own parents are most dear to women, where they would like to have say. There were 
three kinds of responses for each issue. For children’s education, one was positive 
response of change (24), second was that the pre-scheme treatment was bad enough and it 
has not changed much (48), and the third was that there was somewhat acceptance from 
the beginning but it has not changed (27). 










Yes it has increased 24 31 20
It is there from before 27 22 25
There is no change 48 48 52
No response 15 13 17
Total 114 114 114
It was interesting to analyse caste wise responses for decision making in the matter of 
expenses for children and parents. Large number of women did not see any change in 
their lives at home, which they could attribute to public participation. This response was 
most prominent among the tribal women from Chandrapur.  
Comparatively women from open categories said that there was some change at the 
household level. Among the dalit and tribal households, we see that there was some 
decision making power prior to the scheme and this is important from the point of view 
of the benchmark it provides. For each caste and class these benchmarks differ and this 
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only confirms the point that attribution of empowerment cannot really be singled out to a 
particular activity/event. 
The response was not positive in terms of decisions around health and it was worse on 
decisions related to spending money for children and parents. Only 20 women said that 
there was change in this respect, 52 reported that their earlier bad experience continued 
and 25 said that they had some leverage in this respect, which continued. 
Table 4.28 Caste wise changes in participation in decision making at household (%) 
 
  Open OBC SC ST NT 
It is there from before 28.33 25.00 21.43 5.56 50.00
There is no change 31.67 35.00 35.71 88.89 50.00
Yes it  
has increased 26.67 20.00 21.43 5.56 0.00
Children’s education 
No response 13.33 20.00 21.43 0.00 0.00
It is there from before 16.67 30.00 21.43 11.11 50.00
There is no change 41.67 30.00 42.86 61.11 0.00
Yes it  
has increased 30.00 25.00 21.43 22.22 50.00
Health related 
No response 11.67 15.00 14.29 5.56 0.00
It is there from before 25.00 25.00 28.57 0.00 50.00
There is no change 33.33 40.00 42.86 94.44 50.00
Yes it  
has increased 21.67 20.00 14.29 5.56 0.00
  
Expenses 
No response 20.00 15.00 14.29 0.00 0.00
Respect in the family and mobility  
Increased respect among family members got a better response (41%), whereas negative 
response was (32.46%) and very few thought that they had sufficient respect earlier too 
(6.14%). As was pointed out in the methodology section we did see that it was difficult 
for women to respond to abstract questions such as these beyond a point and hence about 
25% women did not respond to most of them. 
Table 4.29 Increase in respect at household level 
 
Answer No of women Percentage 
Yes it has increased 41 35.96
It is there from before 7 6.14
No there is no change 37 32.46
No response 29 25.44
Total 114 100.00
Few women thought that their opinions were taken seriously in the household. However 
increased mobility was seen as a change by 29.82% but 34.21 percent women felt that 
nothing had really changed in that respect either and 8.7% women said that they were 
mobile prior to the scheme.  
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Table 4.30 Changes in acceptance of vies at household level and mobility 
 




 No of women Percentage No of women Percentage 
Yes it has increased 19 16.67 34 29.82
It is there from before 11 9.65 10 8.77
There is no change 41 35.96 39 34.21
No response 43 37.72 31 27.19
 Total 114 100 114 100
Impact on women at community level  
In assessing this, we used the communities’ perception as well as that of women. About 
62.28% women said that there was an increase in respect from the community and 48.2 
percent women reported that they had a better say in the community decisions. Women 
(28.9%) also reported that they were now taking interest and visiting other local 
institutions The important response however was with respect to leadership qualities 
which significantly a fairly large number of women (40.35%) attributed to the scheme. 
This was very evident in the group discussions especially in Parabwada, Vabhve, 
Manewadi, where women asserted that the project gave them opportunity to learn 
governance aspect of the drinking water facility and procedures required in the process. 
Many of the women were first time entrants in the public sphere and felt that this did 
provide them an opportunity to participate. 
A few more concerns too were added in the questionnaire such as whether their capacity 
to articulate women’s concerns was increased or not and participation in the campaign 
against alcohol was motivated due to the increased concern or not. For the first concern 
of increased in articulation 50.88 percent responded positively and for the second, i.e. of 
campaign against alcohol only 27.19 percent responded. However, ‘no backlash’ due to 
the new euphoria of empowered women was reported by majority of 94.7 percent 
women.  
Economic change  
As has been stated earlier one of the important components of the Jalswarjya scheme was 
the Women’s empowerment fund, which mainly disbursed a revolving fund for income 
generation activities. Several skills based trainings were organised for the better 
implementation of this fund.  
Interestingly a large number of women (78.95%) said that they had benefited 
economically from the scheme. In fact, 85% said that they could purchase some income 
generating assets from this fund and this had led to an increase in income, reported by 
75% women. Many of them felt confident that they could now access small consumption 
loans.  
This euphoric response can be explained in two ways, one is that committee members 
were gaining from this process, as they were closest to accessing the revolving fund. The 
other women we spoke to in the village had not heard much about this fund and were in 
fact not benefiting much from it. Many of the committee members too on further probing 
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were a bit vague in their answers and not clear how they had been benefited by this. 
Several of these responses need to be understood in the way the components are being 
drilled into the minds of people. So immediate responses often do show positive impacts 
which on further probing have diluted.  
Women’s perception  
Capital contribution towards the scheme  
Capital contribution of 10% towards the scheme is one of the contested issues. From our 
field work it was evident that somehow people are fully convinced of the need to 
contribute. Responses from women too echoed a similar feeling with 74.56 percent 
women agreeing to the contribution. A small number of 2.63 percent said that everybody 
cannot afford it and 22.81 percent had no opinion of their own. 
Knowing that social and economic disparities do exist in a rural context, we wanted to 
understand what women thought were the appropriate criteria for deciding on who pays 
and how much. Every village had been given freedom to arrive at this criterion in their 
own manner, which was in a way dangerous, considering the social and political power 
the rich hold in the village, which nullifies the effect of formal democratic structures.  
In their responses, women gave varied weightage to the decisive criteria- Very few felt 
that economic condition of the families should be the basic criterion for deciding capital 
contribution (8.77%). Few (6.14%) could state their opinion on the appropriateness of 
differential contribution mechanisms  
In most of the villages, women said that the criteria used was based on ‘per household’ 
contribution (61.40%) and others i.e. mostly in Vabhave village (21.93%) said it was 
based on ‘per capita’. In some villages the criterion was not yet evolved (19.30%) and 
(7.89%) women did not know what was the criterion followed. Fewer could really judge 
whether what was decided was appropriate or not.   
In our FGDs of course we had very insightful discussions on the capital contributions and 
in many of the villages men and women were almost certain that there would be a 5% 
waiver since there were no discussions around it in the subsequent meetings. The first 
instalment of 5% was tied to the VAPs being prepared and approved for the funds flow to 
start.  
There were large variations in how the 5% was collected in the 17 villages that we 
visited. In some it was the very rich in the village who paid in some it was differential 
rates and the poor were paying small amounts, in some villages like Parabwada and 
Vabhave in Sindhudurg district contributions largely came from the salaried people living 
in Mumbai. This indeed is a peculiarity of the people in Konkan who despite years of 
migration still have strong ties with their villages. Chandrapur, being a tribal district only 
5 percent contribution was required. In a sense the poverty was shared and disparities few 
so here we saw that every household had paid some contribution, which was not the case 
in districts like Jalgaon which have very wide inequities. In this district the tribal vastis of 
Hudsan and Mundkheda villages, the bhil vastis were completely unaware of capital 
contribution and how much each of them was expected to pay. None of them had paid 
towards that and were not even sure if they would get access to water.        
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Water tariff  
In case of water tariff the same criteria, per household and per person were reported by 
57.02 percent and 4.39 percent respectively and 19.30 percent women did not know what 
was decided. Low incidence of reporting is because the scheme is not completed in most 
villages and water delivery has not yet begun on these villages. 
In FGDs it was revealed that Manewadi had already decided about the tariff and has 
already collected three months tariff so that their scheme could be handed over to them as 
per the preconditions. In Jambharle village too the scheme had become functional. 
Although at the first instance women were usually giving the well tutored response of 
how O&M by the community was the defining characteristic of a well functioning 
scheme, on further probing, men and women seemed to show concern on its feasibility. 
In all the villages women thought that it might be difficult to pay for water on a regular 
basis. In Koye village the FGD with men committee members was very vibrant and they 
narrated their story of how lands in their villages were being taken over for an 
International airport. In this context of being deprived of their very source of their 
livelihood, people were skeptical abput the viability of schemes such as this. “What will 
people eat and how will they pay for the water’ Incidentally, this is one village where the 
scheme started in 2002 and it is 6 years and still it has not been handed over to the GP 
and neither has the SO, chaitanya been paid for their work. 
In Sindhudurg, women were trying to find out the possibility of meter system, which was 
going to augment the cost further. But women were convinced that it would help 
measuring of water and allow the family to decide how much water they can afford. They 
were afraid that the water may be used for rickshaw cleaning and animal bathing etc. At 
this point in our data collection different villages were trying out different ideas on water 
tariffs. Most of them were considering a differential tariff system, but could not discuss 
this in detail as to how they were planning to do it. 
In the chart below we discuss women’s responses on what they think should be the 
criteria for deciding O&M. Four major criteria were discussed with women such as 
electricity bill, salary of the person managing the infrastructure, recurring costs on repairs 
and maintenance charges and others such as TCL powder etc. Only 7.89 percent women 
reported all the four major components 28.07 percent reported three of them, which was 
quite creditable. 27.19 percent gave no response. On the appropriateness of these criteria 










Chart 4.15 Factors considered in deciding water tariff  
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Regarding paying of the tariff, large number, i.e. 64.04 percent women said that people 
must pay and take the responsibility of maintenance. However, 2.63 percent women were 
of the opinion that the government should jointly pay with the household, i.e. subsidy 
should be there. 
Public vs. private connections  
The other contentious issue was the compulsion on nature of connection. The initial 
scheme was planned largely with public standposts, however along the way the 
government realized that collection of water tariffs on public connections would become 
a difficult tasks and affect the overall recovery. This led to a major drive of the officials 
to drive the idea of mandatory private connections. Women were divided in their 
responses- some especially the younger ones thought that private connections were easier 
(63.1%) as they would get water at their doorstep and they would not have fights with 
other women on the standposts (however women also have positive stories of seeing the 
standpost as a point of common interaction platform). Others (17.54%) were keen on 
public standposts. They (8.77%) also suggested that 10 households could share one 
standpost rather than the government norm of 40 households per standposts. Some 
women (35.96%) also thought that three households could share one standpost. 14.91 % 
were happy with the current planning in their villages.  
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Water sources  
Location of water sources was another critical issue for women; firstly it is for the sake of 
sustainability and secondly because they have to fetch water, they care for the distance of 
the stand post.  Regarding decision about the source of water 42.98 percent women were 
positive about the current selected source. The rest had some problems such as 7.89 
percent felt that it was not accepted by all. 31.58 percent had no response. 38.60 percent 
reported that the decision regarding the location of well was taken in gramsabha. 4.39 
percent reported that it was basically a decision of the ground water experts (GSDA). 
Large number did not know how the decision was taken. 
Preferences regarding timing of the water were largely dependent on class. Most women 
were found happy to get water once a day, i.e. in the morning (54.39%), but (18.42%) 
women opined that it should be twice a day, since some of them did not have enough 
storage capacity to fill water at a time and that due to their day long labour they could fill 
water only in the evenings.  
Section VI: Summary of findings: implications of decentralized 
management of domestic water sector for women’s 
empowerment in Maharashtra  
An important finding of our study is that decentralization is a process, which cannot be 
capusled into tight time frames such as the ones we saw in Aple Pani and Jalswarajya 
especially if it hopes to achieve the goal of people’s participation and women’s 
empowerment.  
Transfer of funds to VWSC was achieved without much delay. For the first time such 
large amounts of money was being handled by a local level committee which in fact does 
not have a statutory status beyond being a sub-committee of the GP. Although there were 
instances of corruption the scale was minor and most of the people were generally aware 
of the use of funds. Double entry bookkeeping practice was introduced first time at the 
village level. The need to keep the water tarrif account separate from the gram panchayat 
account so that the maintenance of the piped water scheme would never face problem of 
sustainability, was convincingly communicated. 
To maintain transparency the major decisions should get ratified in Gramsabhas was the 
important message communicated to all the concerned. It was learned that sometimes 
some villagers used Right to Information Act (RTI) to get the information needed. 
Although, it was felt that more often it was used to harass the VWSC members rather 
than the genuine case of information seeking. Thus, all the institutional strengthening 
goals were achieved in a manner of procedure. 
The new structures of management do bring in some enthusiasm but questions about their 
sustainability remain unaddressed. There is little clarity on how the scheme would be 
handed over to the GP and who would take on the major task of collection of O&M. 
The structures also created tensions over authority and this was translated in a lack of co-
ordination especially between the SOs on one side and the DFT and the communities on 
the other. Within the DFT structure too tensions over authority arose between engineers 
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and the development persons. The point we try to make here is that often the donor 
driven discourse manifested as the design of the scheme, which tries to bring in 
‘apolitical’ structures and rules fails due to the strong nexus between local interests and 
the lower level bureaucrats58 (Baviskar 2004) 
The spaces created for people’s participation, often become a victim of the project design 
itself, which is set in tight time frames but hopes to address some of the historically 
structured inequities. Our findings point to an overall lack in the area of community 
mobilization process to involve women, dalits, tribals and the other marginalized sections 
in a meaningful way. There was little effort on part of either the SOs or the DFT to 
enagage with these groups to increase their capacity to assert democratic value. There 
was very little training again in the crucial areas of accountability and transparency. Use 
of funds and areas of possibilities of corruption were not sufficiently dealt with in the 
trainings. 
Participation of dalit and tribal women was very low as was evident from our ‘no 
response’ category, which was primarily of these groups. There could have been 
systematic training programmes on gender and caste issues, which would have 
strengthened the conviction of the SOs’ cadre about interventions required for integrating 
women and dalits in the mainstream activities. Several case studies on the factional 
conflicts, community conflicts, and patriarchal domination could have been prepared as a 
part of this activity. It would have helped to deepen the process of participation and 
democracy. We were surprised to notice that none of the SOs had documented any 
processes of conflict resolutions and also individual empowerment.  
Technological choices were limited and people did go in for the highly technical and 
energy consuming choices of ESRs, pvc piplelines etc. In fact in none of our villages did 
we see any alternative model of technology emerging. The pattern was set and variations 
in decision making choices came only in the form of which sources and quality of the 
material. 
The other lacunae were in terms of designing the pipelines according to different levels in 
the villages. Low-lying areas receive abundant water in a gravity scheme and the outlying 
areas which often are the dalit and tribal vastis receive water only when the valve in the 
low lying areas are closed. This has an equity implication which affects the water 
availability of the dalits and tribals. Special valves, which distribute water with equal 
pressure, are available to make water available simultaneously to all the HHs in the 
village. None of the TSPs showed awareness of the same. Alternatively, direct pipelines 
too can be laid to supply water for these areas for equity. These may be costly options but 
equity does come at a cost. 
Sustainability of the water resource is an important area on which hinges the entire 
prigramme of drinking water. In none of our villages did we see a very systematic effort 
at doing yield tests of the sources selected. Most of the technical officials we met in the 
DFT were of course confident about the yields of the sources and said that they would 
meet the needs of a growing population for the next 12 years. People in the village 
(largely committee members) seemed to corroborate this. The bhil and dalit vastis we 
                                                 
58 This point is made very sharply by Amita Baviskar in her paper on watershed initiatives in Madhya 
Pradesh 
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visited in different villages were largely oblivious of these decision-making processes. 
The question of sustainability can be assessed more meaningfully in the coming few 
years. Although from our understanding of the water resource we can say that many of 
the factors that should have been considered before deciding on a source were not 
seriously considered. 
It is in this context that we need to look at and understand women’s empowerment.  
Our first observations during the data collection phase show that women were euphoric 
about this scheme and their participation in it. One cannot deny the public euphoria and 
the presence that this scheme has had in every village that we visited. Women would talk, 
discuss and come for our meetings as well. Knowledge that this scheme exists had 
percolated to almost all the women in the village. The details of who knows how much 
varied significantly across groups. We think the special focus on women through the IEC 
campaign and the women’s empowerment fund has been instrumental in building this 
enthusiasm. Many of the committee women, were aware of the complex procedures of 
the scheme than the women panchayat members who do not generally handle such big 
budget activities. 
Our findings from both FGDs and interviews with women clearly show that although 
quotas have been filled and we do not find exclusion in terms of representation across 
class, caste and tribe, we do see that the degree of active participation varies widely 
across these social groups. Even among the upper caste women, who have participated in 
the public sphere for the first time, we see a limited understanding of their roles in the 
committees. For most of them attendance in meetings is the only task that they perform, 
they do not really do anything beyond that. Women therefore did not feel that they had 
made a major difference to the decision making process although they had attended the 
meetings. Effective participation is long-term process and cannot be achieved in 18 
months time frames. For women to break the structural barriers and participate 
effectively would require a much longer and informed engagement of not only them but 
of the larger community as well. 
The benefits of the scheme in terms of time saved etc were seen in areas where water had 
started, but not so in villages which were still completing the schemes.  
Presence in meetings and through that participation in public sphere however has not 
translated into empowerment at home. Most of the women still do all their household 
duties and then go for the meetings. Some of the women higher up in the age hierarchy of 
the household are able to transfer the work to the other women of the household usually 
their daughters in law or the younger co-sisters, but husbands or men of the households 
rarely co-operate. 
Collective activity for women largely begins and ends with the SHG and women’s 
empowerment fund instituted in this scheme. Of course, this is not to deny that informal 
networks and collectives do not get formed, but there is little that seems to have 
translated in terms of collective action for better water management or for other social 
causes such as anti alcohol campaigns etc. 
The most important issue is whether we are expecting too much from the women who are 
moving at a pace granted to them by their contexts. Or are we expecting too much out of  
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the water focused scheme which has a limited life? The state does mandate participation 
of all in water management, knowing that the terms of participation are unequal and 
therefore its meaning would vary for different groups.  
Specific recommendations for the sector in Maharashtra  
Broader recommendations on gender and empowerment in the context of decentralization 
are laid out in the final chapter. Here we focus on the Jalswarjya and Aple Pani schemes 
and their restructuring to facilitate space for women’s empowerment. 
Our larger context, which we will elaborate as a broader recommendation in the final 
chapter, is to approach the water sector programme in an integrated manner and not as 
sectors of domestic and irrigation.  Our slogan therefore is to advocate the right to water 
for livelihood. This will also address the interplay between sustainability, equity and 
participation.  
1. The project needs a better linkage with the water resource development 
programmes in the village. As part of its source strengthening programme it needs 
to look at the watershed programme. This also calls for a systematic 
understanding of water requirements of people for livelihood, which needs to 
form as part of the baseline survey. PRM59 kind of methods could be used for 
these assessments. 
2. Second phase of Jalswarajya is likely to start soon. One of the learnings the 
government officials claim is that the 18 months timeframe for any village 
scheme to be completed is too short and they plan to extend it. This is a welcome 
decision, since it would give more time for SOs to educate the people especially 
women and build their capabilities.  
3. The role of the special purpose vehicle is important in the implementation of the 
scheme, however it needs to be strengthened taking into consideration our 
findings which suggest a better co-ordination with the ZP, the SOs and the 
technical teams. There needs to be transparency in the selection of these various 
components of the special purpose vehicle. Programmes like the Bharat Nirman 
are not eager to have these structures and this may affect the overall 
implementation of the scheme. 
4. In addition, we would recommend a setting up of a monitoring and evaluation 
committee, which is external to the state apparatus and performs the role of 
monitoring and evaluation- like a watchdog. The initiative to set this up however 
needs to come from the State and this needs to be instituted before getting the 
district and village level processes started. 
5. Capable SOs are important for a genuine participatory process to emerge at the 
village level. Selection of the SOs has to be a transparent process monitored also 
by the committee mentioned above. There main role has to be seen in the area of 
                                                 
59 PRM is participatory resource mapping which is a detailed resource use survey done through people’s 
participation. the method was first developed in Kerala and later modified and adapted to Maharashtra by 
SOPPECOM as part of the BGVS programme. 
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ensuring participation of the hitherto excluded groups. They need to be given 
more  training on the issues around gender and marginalised communities.  
6. Less emphasis should be placed on SHG activity, which has to be treated as 
marginal to the project. The measure of women’s empowerment has to be their 
involvement in the VWSC meetings, Gramsabhas etc. rather than in the WDC 
meetings. Also, they should be made aware of the likely corruption spaces and 
hence should be able to monitor the money transactions. In fact some of them can 
be made to participate in the process of purchasing the material. We cannot hold 
women responsible for ‘moral conscience’ of the community. However, at present 
they are not completely immersed in the commercial transactions, public or 
private and hence likely to possess ‘ethical’ attitude for public work. It could be 
invoked.  
7. Special components need to be introduced in the project to ensure participation of 
various sections. IEC can be used effectively for some of these aspects. These 
groups need to be involved from the outset or else they may remain distant from 
the ethos of participation, waiting to know how their stakes are going to be taken 
care of. 
8. Capacity building in the areas of choices of technology that link directly to 
sustainability issues need to incorporated in the trainings. People also need to be 
educated about the ground water act of 1993 so that they can use it effectively. 
9. There needs to be more clarity on the exit policy and also about how O&M would 




































Ratnagiri 141 10 131 262 1454 2.67
Sindhudurg 83 8 75 126 867 2.29
Thane 129 12 117 263 954 2.22
Pune region 
Satara 153 12 141 138 41 2.53
Sangli 130 14 116 116 126 3.67
Kolhapur 127 12 115 116 195 3.5
Solapur 124 21 107 103 405 1.82
Marathwada region 
Osmanabad 150 7 143 164 13 482417
Beed 154 15 139 144 61 2.92
Hingoli 150 12 138 138 37 188605
Jalna 126 8 118 118 41 171500
Latur 150 4 146 23 31 31.47
Parbhani 137 7 131 144 31 3.06
Nasik region 
Nasik 166 33 133 133 133 2.83
Jalgaon 145 11 134 159 0 3.26
Nandurbar 68 10 58 157 579 2.08
Amravati region  
Buldhana 161 19 142 195 0 3.98
Yawatmal 138 12 126 223 82 1.72
Akola 125 26 99 134 0 1.59
Washim 128 16 112 142 0 1.84
Nagpur region 
Chandrapur 126 11 115 243 13 1.52
Wardha 145 35 110 206 6 1.56
Nagpur 146 10 136 335 0 2.44
Bhandara 131 14 117 174 13 2.06
Gondia 107 6 101 149 117 2.7
Gadchiroli 124 44 80 287 65 1.73
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Table 2 SHG formation, Jalswarajya  
District SHG Before 
Jalswarajya 
SHG After 
Jalswarajya Total SHGs 
Konkan region 
Ratnagiri 691 1542 2233 
Sindhudurg 429 737 1166 
Thane 828 1047 1875 
Pune region 
Satara 1015 705 1720 
Sangli 1648 2222 3870 
Kolhapur 1279 1370 2649 
Solapur 479 929 1408 
Marathwada region  
Osmanabad 822 1337 2159 
Beed 611 1048 1659 
Hingoli 592 859 1451 
Jalna 481 624 1105 
Latur 321 1233 1554 
Parbhani 707 915 1622 
Nasik region 
Nasik 342 1063 1405 
Jalgaon 944 437 1381 
Nandurbar 421 910 1331 
Amravati region 
Buldhana 616 1991 2607 
Yawatmal 900 778 1678 
Akola 513 762 1275 
Washim 673 803 1476 
Nagpur region 
Chandrapur 1465 217 1682 
Wardha 765 341 1106 
Nagpur 669 646 1315 
Bhandara 1324 226 1550 
Gondia 979 133 1112 
Gadchiroli 594 50 644 
Total 20108 22925 43033 
 
 150
Table 3 Overview of financial aspects, Aple Pani 
 
Cost in Rs Description of cost 
Lowest Highest 








5% Public Contribution 
in cash 







Table 4 Profile of SOs  
 
Name Background 
Shrmaik Janata  
Vikas Sanstha 
The organization was established in 1987 with the initiatives of Mr. Adinath Omble. Since then the 
organization is working in more than 75 villages of Jaoli, Mahableshwar, Wai and Koregaon regions 
of Satara district. Since there beginning they have been involved in implementing different programs 
like women organization and awareness program, adivasi Organization and development programme, 
village communication program, local leadership development program, educational program, rural 
health program, agricultural development and organic farming movement, Income generation 
program, Ideal village program and Watershed development program 
With their support many organization are working actively. Some of them are: Janata Milk Co-
operative production society, Koynamai women rural non agricultural co-operative orgnization, 
Shramik women rural non agricultural co-operative organization, Venna women industrial co-
operative organization, Adivasi social and educational mandal, Semi adivasi fishery co-operative 
orgaqnization and Shramik women micro credit co-operative organization. 
Social work  
college 
It is a social work college based in Jalgaon city. They are active since past 10 years. They found out 
that their passed out students who had good theoretical knowledge faced problems working on grass 
root level. So to give their students more field experience they decided to take up such projects 
themselves. Jalswarajya is one of such projects. They are working on some other projects as well. 
With help of their students they have been engaged in different programs like awareness campaigns, 
surveys and preparing reports for government. They take a special theme every year and work 
according that. They have some work done on women’s issues like awareness against female feticide. 
Matrubhumi  
Sarvangin Vikas  
Sanstha 
The organization was registered in 1998 and is one of the earlier NGOs in North Maharashtra. Before 
Jalswarajya implementation they have been working in the field of Health camps, rural sanitation, 
Mahatma Phule Jalabhiyan, soil and water conservation, rainwater harvesting. They have also been 
engaged in providing trainings for young girls (cooking, embroidery etc.) which would help them 
fulfill their duty as wives 
Dnyanjyoti  
Gramin Vikas  
Sanstha 
The work of organization started with formation of Nehru Yuva Kendra in 2000. They have 
experience of implemeeenting Ramai Women’s Empowerment scheme for MAVIM, which basically 
includes formation and strengthening of SHG. This work is spread about 23 villages. In the 





The organization is situated at Ballarpur in Chandrapur district. The organization has been set up in 
1985 and since then has been working in 20 villages of Ballarpur taluka and 25 villages of Rajura 




Gender and Decentralised Irrigation Management in 
Maharashtra  
Introduction  
This chapter outlines the key findings from the irrigation sector in Maharashtra. We did a 
detailed study of five Water Users Associations (WUAs) across different irrigation 
projects in Maharashtra. These Irrigation projects fell in the categories of major, medium 
and minor and four of the five are covered under the Maharashtra Water Sector 
Improvement Programme (MWSIP), which we discuss in detail a little later in the 
chapter. 
This chapter is broadly divided into three sections- the first section is about decentralized 
irrigation management in Maharashtra. It takes a brief historical overview of 
decentralization, discusses its present form, and then goes on to discuss our findings on 
this.  
The second section looks at women’s empowerment in the backdrop of the 
decentralization process in Maharashtra and the factors that have facilitated and 
constrained this process. 
The third and the final section of the chapter summarises some of the key findings on 
decentralization and empowerment and gives sector specific recommendations. 
Section I: Decentralized irrigation management: a brief 
overview  
This section gives a brief overview of the nature and form that decentralization process 
takes in the irrigation sector. Here we trace the history of decentralization in the irrigation 
sector and the way it presents itself today. We then go onto present our overall findings 
that provide us the larger picture in which we can then locate women’s empowerment.  
Maharashtra: irrigation and drought 
Maharashtra has around 900 large dams (dams above 15 meters) as compared to 2900 for 
the entire country. Most of these dams are concentrated in the western and central part of 
Maharashtra. In irrigated agriculture, groundwater plays a dominant role through 1.51 
million wells. Despite this infrastructure in ground and surface water, Maharashtra has an 
irrigation coverage which is only about 15% of the area under cultivation as compared to 
the national average of above 35%. In a comprehensive study on irrigation development 
and management made by the State Irrigation Commission in 1962, the Irrigation 
Commission had assessed that the ultimate irrigation potential both from the surface and 
underground sources would be about 7.08 million ha (Mha) out of which 5.26 Mha (5.9 
million ha as per revised estimate) would be from the surface sources and 1.80 million ha 
from underground sources.  
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The area under irrigation is limited and it is said that even with the full utilisation of its 
irrigation potential, the total area under irrigation (in the conventional sense) would not 
cross 30%. Wells – dug wells and bore wells – contribute significantly to irrigation and 
there are about 1.51 million wells in the state. Currently, 35% of the groundwater 
resource in Maharashtra is estimated to have been exploited (This section draws largely 
on Joy and Kulkarni 2006) 
Map 5.1 Drought prone area in Maharashtra  
(Source: GoM, 2003, Agro-climatic Zones) 
If we look at the drought statistics, we see that 52% of the total area is drought prone and 
there is variation across different regions. For example in Nashik, Pune, Aurangabad and 
Amravati divisions more than 60% of the area is drought prone whereas in Kolhapur and 
Latur divisions it is about 40%. The drought prone areas are affected by low and 
inadequate rainfall, long dry spells and an erratic distribution of rain through peaks and 
troughs. A very limited part of this area gets the benefit of major irrigation projects. The 
area under cultivation is very high in drought prone areas.  
Agricultural productivity  
As per the data from government sources we see that cereals occupied about 44% of the 
gross cropped area (GCA) in 2000-01 though there is a declining trend in the area under 
cereals. The proportion of area under pulses and oilseeds shows an increase. There has 
been an increase in productivity for almost all the crops except for a few crops like Rice 
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and Tur (Pigeon pea). Area occupied by sugarcane has been steadily increasing. 
Sugarcane, being a very water-intensive crop, consumes bulk of the irrigation water. 
Productivity for most crop categories is below the national average. The only crop that 
stands above the national average is sugarcane, which is fully irrigated in the state. 
Maharashtra Human Development Report also highlights the concern over the declining 
importance of agriculture in the GDP of the state. The share of agriculture has declined 
from 42.14% in 1960-61 to 27.69 in 80-81 to a drastic decline of 17.445 in 1999-200060. 
This is generally due to the declining productivity of irrigated agriculture, stagnation in 
rainfed agriculture, low investments, fragmentation of holdings, skewed preference to 
certain crops like sugarcane etc. This trend suggests that issues of productivity in both 
irrigated and rainfed areas need to be addressed urgently. In fact it means restructuring of 
both water resource management systems as well as agricultural systems 
A historical review of decentralized management  
Basic concepts and salient features of WUAs  
For the familiarity of a different audience, here are a few concepts explained 
• WUAs that we are referring to here are formed on surface irrigation projects or 
what are commonly known as dams or irrigation tanks.  
• WUAs are formed at the lowest level of the irrigation conveyance systems which 
is known as the Minor Canal which branches out of distributory, main canals, and 
finally these main canals branch out of the main site of the dam. 
• At the canal level then a command area or service area is delineated or 
demarcated. This is a hydraulic unit i.e. based on technical assessments (very 
often politically determined) to define an area that can be served by the canal. All 
the land that falls within this service area is land that can be irrigated by this canal 
and is known as the command area of the project. At various levels below i.e. the 
distributory, branch or minor a command area is defined. All the owners of this 
land then become the members of the WUA making the membership limited to 
land ownership in a service area.  
Map 5.2 Command area, Waghad project, Maharashtra 
 
                                                 
60 Human Development Report, 2002, GoM  
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• Until recently entire Irrigation management was done by Irrigation Department 
(ID) without any consultative process with the users 
• With formation of WUAs management at the minor level and with the recent 
legislation up to the project level will now be transferred to the users 
• Before preparing an Agreement / Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 
ID and the WUA a joint inspection of the canal is done to identify repairs and 
maintenance works to be done by the ID 
• Before handing over water management to the WUA, an MoU has to be signed 
jointly by the WUA and ID. Among other things, the MoU specifies the 
seasonal/annual quotas, methods of measurement, delivery system, water fees to 
be paid to the Department, incentives/penalties for early/delayed payments, rights, 
duties, responsibilities of the concerned parties, etc.  
• Water is delivered to the WUA at the Minor head (i.e. in the jurisdiction of WUA) 
on a volumetric basis. Similarly, rates are based on volume delivered to the 
Societies. Though the Government fixes volumetric rates for payment to the 
Department, the WUA is free to determine the rates to be paid by the farmers to 
the WUA.  
• Once the quotas are fixed for each WUA, the Department does not insist on a 
given crop pattern. In other words, WUA has complete freedom of cropping.  
A demand management crisis  
Surface irrigation was introduced in the state in the second half of the 19th century. The 
emphasis then was to address the severe famines by a) providing employment through 
construction of dams and b) by enhancing food production. 
Most of these dams were largely constructed in areas where the soils were black and 
applied water requirements were only in low rainfall years. The main problem of 
irrigation then was related to a lack of demand rather than its over or misuse. In fact the 
measures that followed were largely to tide over this crisis of demand. First the British set 
up several measures some of which laid the basis for participatory irrigation 
management. In a sense Maharashtra has been the leading state as far as the Participatory 
irrigation management efforts for the country go. As early as 1938, Vishwerayya, the 
then senior irrigation engineer in Maharashtra had called for farmer's participation to 
improve the use of the irrigation system and for better management. One of the measures 
suggested by him was that the irrigable area under each canal should be distributed 
equitably by giving each village and as far as possible to each cultivator, just enough land 
so that s/he can manage irrigated crops properly. This held a great potential to further the 
goal of equitable access to irrigation.  
The Committee recommended the formation of user groups and also recommended that 
water be measured and given to the users. The idea was to encourage demand for 
irrigation and leave the management to the users at the village level (Lele, Patil, 1994).  
Another measure introduced that provided an incentive for irrigation demand was what is 
called as the block system. A block system is one where water rights are assured for a 
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certain area for certain crops and for a certain period of time. Usually these blocks have 
been around crops like sugarcane, grapes etc. the block periods have been up to six years 
or more which have often continued after a review. These block systems have been on the 
Nira-Pravara systems in Maharashtra and are guarded to this day as well. This system 
encouraged irrigation demand no doubt but laid the foundation for inequities in irrigation 
access. Unfortunately, this measure was the only one preferred over the other equity 
oriented and participatory measures suggested by Viswesharayya. 
1960s-1990s  
In its long history since then there have been efforts to decentralize irrigation 
management in the state with both political and bureaucratic resistance interchangeably. 
Sporadic users co-operatives did come up largely initiated by the sugar factories which 
wanted a dedicated supply of sugarcane. Often these were caste specific user groups61 
Several committees and commissions were set up since the early 60s to the present to 
address some of the problems the sector was facing. None of these commissions until the 
90s spoke of the importance of user participation. There were several recommendations 
related to taxing the well water recharged through canal rotations, fixing ceiling on 
irrigated area for a more even distribution, different pricing measures which could then 
improve the revenue of the ID etc. None of these recommendations were really taken in 
the spirit they were meant to and the sector as a whole was deteriorating.  
The first serious efforts to decentralize irrigation management came in the mid eighties 
when some committed irrigation engineers and social scientists got together to try out 
different experiments around farmer management. The main aim of this group of 
engineers and social scientists was better management of the resource leading to 
enhanced productivity and equitable access to all in the command areas of the projects. 
This largely meant that a great deal of effort had to go into the fine tuning of irrigation 
systems, water scheduling to ensure equitable and timely access to all the beneficiaries. 
Appropriate system of rotations was critical from the point of view of encouraging 
cropping diversity.  
In the early eighties, this team inspired by some of the experiences in Srilanka and 
California water and irrigation districts, set up committees around the minor canals. 
These were informal bodies that basically looked into the management of water. It is 
important to remember here that the World Bank was not actively advocating any of 
these shifts in the early eighties, but were definitely arousing interest in senior level 
irrigation officials through supporting lateral learning programmes (Personal interview 
with S N Lele, Retd. Chief Engineer GoI and architect of PIM in Maharashtra). Some of 
these ideas did take root in Maharashtra through the efforts of this interdisciplinary team. 
One of the first experiments was on a Minor irrigation project in the mid eighties where a 
committee was set up and functioned well for a few years. Then the question of the 
statutory status arose and there were two options before the advocates of these 
decentralized bodies, registering it as a charitable trust under the societies registration act 
                                                 
61 Samvatsara Water users co-operative was one with members from the mali caste (gardener caste) which 
is a farming community and was initiated at the behest of the sugar factory in Ahmednagar district of 
Maharashtra. 
 156
and the second was that of registering as a cooperative society under the co-operative 
Societies Registration Act (SRA). In Maharashtra and Gujarat, users went in for Co-
operative societies and in other states they went in for registration as charitable 
institutions under the SRA. 
This entire history shows us that efforts of decentralization in the irrigation sector were 
delinked from the locally elected bodies. 
The first pilot at Chanda  
The first formal experiment of setting up a WUA initiated by SOPPECOM was in 1989 
in Chanda village of Ahmednagar district on the Minor 7 of the Mula major irrigation 
project. This was the first effort of its kind in PIM (Participatory Irrigation Management) 
in India. The main idea was to improve irrigation management system from the point of 
view of equitable access, sustainability of the system and of the resource and enhanced 
productivity. It was hoped that participation of users through decentralized management 
would lead to meeting these goals of decentralization. One of the important assumptions 
on which the entire success of this experiment hinges is the putting in order of the sector, 
which was on the verge of collapse. Since the first society set up in 1989 through a 
voluntary effort, Maharashtra has come a long way in participatory irrigation 
management through the introduction of the State water policy and other legal 
instruments around water to qualify for a large loan agreed upon by the World Bank. We 
shall discuss the status of the current phase of PIM in a later section. 
Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Programme 2003- the new era 
of sector reforms  
Our study is located in this context of Sector Improvement. After the initial success of the 
PIM efforts, there was a move to formalize the process through legislative reform. This is 
an overall shift that we see at the national level as well, but Maharashtra seems to be 
leading the way here. 
From the different documents of the World Bank on decentralisation as well as water 
sector62 we see that World Bank has decided to play a much larger role in the water 
sector in India as the outlay itself will go up from $ 700 million over the previous four 
years to $ 3200 million in the coming four years. This is more than a four fold increase 
annually and would definitely impact on the direction of water sector reforms in India.  
In the case of Maharashtra we see that the Government of Maharashtra and the World 
Bank have been working jointly since 2002-2003 to address some of the challenges of the 
sector. As part of this the World Bank through the Bank Netherlands Water Partnership 
programme has been a critical knowledge advocacy partner to the State. The main aim 
was to establish a more appropriate policy and institutional framework for multisectoral 
and environmentally sustainable water resource planning, management and allocation and 
to separate the over all water resources planning and allocation functions from the service 
delivery functions. It is in this context that the Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement 
                                                 
62 Refer to the World Bank document on Rural Decentralisation in India and the Country Assistance 
Strategy papers of the WB outlining the strategy for water sector reform. 
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programme was launched in 2003 through an agreement with the World Bank with a loan 
assistance of USD 325million (GoM). The loan brings in with it some of these crucial 
measures  
• Maharashtra State Water Policy 2003 (MSWP)  
• Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority MWRRA 2005  
• Restructure the Irrigation Development Corporations (IDC) into River Basin 
Agencies 
• Maharashtra Management of Irrigation systems by Farmers Act 2005 (MMISFA)- 
to promote more efficient, equitable and sustainable irrigation service delivery 
through effective involvement of WUAs and to reduce the canal irrigation 
subsidies, through raised canal water charges to cover the full O&M costs through 
government order authorsising an automatic 15% increase per year during the 
period between 2001-2004 and  
• Restructuring of irrigation sector institutions including downsizing of the staff. 
The rationale for the loan and the subsequent measures is that irrigation coverage will 
improve by 22% and irrigated crop yields by 5-20%. Farm incomes are expected to 
increase by 49% and about 33610 farm families who are fully dependent on agriculture 
will be brought above the poverty line at project closure. It claims that water pricing 
reforms will improve efficiency on farm while promoting accountability and financial 
and fiscal sustainability of irrigation services. 
The total cost of the project is USD393.77 million of which the bank's support would be 
USD325 million the GoM would support USD 61.15million and the beneficiaries would 
contribute USD 7.62 million 
It is part of a long term partnership with the state for 12-18 years. The present project is a 
6 year one with a strategic focus on creating and supporting an enabling environment for 
the efficient, sustainable and equitable development and management of the water 
resources in the state beginning with establishing the appropriate policy, regulatory and 
institutional framework in the water sector.  
Scope and coverage  
It will cover 286 irrigation projects in Maharashtra of which 9 are major irrigation, 13 are 
medium irrigation projects and 264 are minor irrigation. 
Project components  
• Water sector institutional restructuring and capacity building (US$21.11 million) 
comprises of institutional reform- capacity building of the Water resources 
department (WRD), Water and Land Management Institute(WALMI), which is 
the nodal agency for training and capacity building and enactments of MWSP, 
MMISFA, MWRRA 
• Improving Irrigation Service delivery and management (US$321.35 million) 
through improved irrigation service delivery and productivity in irrigated 
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agriculture, increased cost recovery, implementation of water entitlements,. It will 
improve 286 selected projects covering 670,000 ha of CCA with WUAs 
contributing Rs500/ha towards the cost of rehabilitation and modernisation of 
irrigation systems. Of this 200 would be paid upfront in cash and 300 would be 
paid in kind. All the rehabilitation works would be carried out by the contract 
management committee (CMC) consisting of representatives from WRD and 
WUA enhancing the safety of 291 dams supplying water to the project area 
through rehabilitation and modernization 
• innovative pilots (US$4.80million) which would support 4 pilots of user centred 
acquifer level groundwater management and 4 pilots of innovative irrigated 
agriculture 
• Project management (US$4.02million) this would support the state level PPMU 
and an IEC campaign to create awareness of the scheme and develop a broad 
based consensus and support for State water policy and reform programme in the 
water sector. 
It is important to look at some of the key instruments introduced as part of the MWSIP 
2003 here in brief.63 
Maharashtra State Water Policy 2003  
Maharashtra is one of the first states to come up with a water policy after the National 
Water Policy was introduced in 2002. The Maharashtra State Water Policy document is 
organised around 10 broad themes and some of the important issues discussed include 
user or community participation in the management of water resources – irrigation and 
drinking/domestic water, participation of private sector, water auditing, water use 
priority, water use entitlements and rights, and water pricing. The policy would be 
reviewed after every five years or as per the requirement.  
The policy document talks of user participation and public private partnerships in the 
same breath. One of the important shifts in the Maharashtra water policy from the 
national water policy is the change in the priority of water use. The national water policy 
lays out the priorities as domestic, irrigation, industry etc. the state differs in this respect 
with industry being prioritized over irrigation. 
The policy is pretty emphatic about the participation of private industrialists and 
commercial enterprises and water service providers in the preparation as well as 
implementation of river basin plans. The mode of participation of private parties is in the 
form of what is being called as “private-public (government) partnerships” basically for 
financing and implementing the projects. However, the policy does not make it clear as to 
what is the incentive for the private parties to invest in the water sector. In fact this is the 
crux of the problem and the fear is that probably the private parties would be given 
certain share in the water as “compensation” on which they would have absolute control 
in terms of use. Many also interpret this as the window opened for water privatisation. 
                                                 
63 For a more detailed discussion on this refer to NCAS paper Joy and Kulkarni. 
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The Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority (MWRRA) 
2005  
The second important instrument is the MWRRA which has been set up “to regulate 
water resources within the State of Maharashtra, facilitate and ensure judicious, equitable 
and sustainable management, allocation and utilisation of water resources, fix the rates 
for use of water for agriculture, industrial, drinking and other purposes …”. A need for a 
regulatory authority can be justified only in the presence if multiple players in the 
planning and utilization of the resource. This is a clear indication of the state withdrawing 
from the planning processes and instead taking on the regulatory role.  
One of the highly contested elements of the MWRRA is the clause around access to 
water to households having more than 2 children after the legislation was introduced. It 
said that water charges upto 1.5 times would be levied on such households. This was 
strongly opposed by women's groups across the state, but the clause stays with small 
changes brought in.  
The Maharashtra Management of Irrigation Systems by Farmers Act 
2005  
This legislation is the one that directly deals with decentralized management of 
management at the local level through formation of WUAs. This was one of the few 
legislations that was debated extensively among the civil society groups. The draft bill 
was presented in 2002 and after a series of debates, it was enacted in 2005. The new 
legislation largely follows the same principles that were inherent in the co-operative 
society's act under which WUAs were registered earlier. The main difference here is the 
mandatory nature of the new act where only members would be given access to water and 
all the people who hold land in the designed command areas are deemed to be members. 
The objectives as before were to increase efficiency in utilization of irrigation capacity, 
as well as in distribution, delivery, application and drainage of irrigation systems (WB, 
2005) as is outlined in the Sector Improvement document. 
Some of the important elements of this legislation are as follows 
1. Formation of users groups at the minor level, which is the WUA, Distributory, 
level (DLA), Canal level (CLA) and finally the Project level (PLA). This creates a 
space for decentralized participation for users to participate in the planning 
process from the bottom to the top. Earlier there was a strong resistance for this 
kind of federation up to the project level. 
2. Representation of three women from each of the canal reaches i.e. the head, 
middle and the tail in the Managing committees. 
3. Rotation of chairpersonship such as to allow for two turns for a woman in one 
single term of the WUA 
To sum up our discussion on the new sector reform era, we can see that while elements of 
older proposals and recommendations around user participation are seen, the new 
legislative framework clearly marks a shift from the previous era in more than one ways. 
Water pricing reforms and institutional arrangements seem to be the central theme here 
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with a large investment in improving irrigation infrastructure as well. While user 
participation is emphasized, political participation is discouraged, participation by private 
players is also encouraged increasingly under what is termed as the public private 
partnerships. 
Notes on methodology  
Before we go onto discussing our findings a brief note on methodology, is described here. 
It highlights our process of sampling, data gathering and capability building of team. Our 
team in the field was a mix of senior irrigation experts from SOPPECOM, feminist 
researchers and young postgraduates from the disciplines of sociology and social work. 
• Discussions with the state level irrigation officials on the official list of WUAs in 
Maharashtra 
• Based on this list a one page questionnaire was sent to about 300 WUAs across 
Maharashtra to facilitate the sample selection process. These carried basic 
questions on understanding the caste and gender profiles of the committees, 
formation of the WUAs and its functioning, basic physical features of the system 
and main problems faced by the WUA. Of these 47 WUAs responded 
• A second round of questionnaire was sent to these 47 WUAs getting a little more 
details on cropping patterns, water quotas, number of wells etc 
• A one day consultative meeting was called in Pune where 11 of these 47 WUAs 
were invited and the final process of selection of the sample was done based on 
the above two sets of information and the willingness of WUAs to co-operate. 
Government officers too participated in these meetings 
• One day training of the investigating team to familiarize themselves with the 
irrigation sector and its links with gender. 
• Initially 7 WUAs were visited and finally 5 WUAs were selected based on their 
diversity in caste and gender membership to WUAs and the category of the 
irrigation project. A profile of these is given a little later in the chapter.  
• Key functionaries were interviewed, focus group discussions with the WUAs 
were conducted. 
• In each of these WUAs, we had detailed interviews with women committee 
members as well as ordinary members both individual and group interviews 
• For the first time we also interviewed men in groups belonging to different ends 
of the canal to understand their problems and their perceptions of women’s 
participation. 
• Canal inspections were done and discussions with the farmers in every end of the 
canal 
• Interviews with local level government officials to understand their views on 
decentralization 
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• Interviews with landless and farmers outside the command areas were also 
conducted to understand their view on the command area framework of the ID 
• secondary sources of data, available from the WUAs locally as well as on the 
websites of the ID were studied 
• Policy reviews of all the newly introduced policies in the water sector in the state 
were studied. 
Findings in this section as well as in the next one where we discuss women’s responses 
are an outcome of all of these steps followed meticulously.  





Table 5.1 Project details and location of WUAs 
 
Name of WUA Name of the 
project 
Type of  
project 
Location of WUA 
Shivdas Maharaj Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Ujani Major Minor 39 of Ujani left bank canal  
Pragat Bagayatdar Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Mula Major Minor 1 and 2 and direct outlet no 2 of 
distributory No 1 of Branch 2 of Mula left bank 
canal 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha 
Mula Major Minor 2 and direct outlet no 2 




Pani Vapar Sanstha 
Waghad Medium Minor 8 of Waghad right bank canal 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha  
Irrigation tank 
at Varve  
Minor Irrigation tank at Varve 
(For more details about selected WUAs see annexure)  
Performance of decentralized irrigation management: Our findings   
At present there are about 1500 WUAs in the state, about which there is very little data 
published in terms of their performance at different levels. Following is an overview of 
the number of WUAs in the state. 










Proposed Total Sr.  
No. Project 









Major & Medium irrigation projects 
Within 
CAD 437 136812 247 83736 626 249218 673 328197 1983 797963 
Outside 
CAD 227 73214 98 29992 344 114066 680 282496 1349 499768 
A 
Total 664 210026 345 113728 970 363284 1353 610693 3332 1297731 
B Minor irrigation projects 




774 250521 426 151936 1201 433410 1650 704948 4051 1540815 
Source: www.mahagovid.org 
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Historically we see that there never has been a political demand for decentralized 
management and neither has the demand come from the beneficiaries. The concern has 
often arisen as a response to a loan conditionality or due to lack of revenue recovery. 
The compelling factor often has been from the ID, which has been in a crisis over the 
recovery on infrastructure that has been set up. From managing lack of demand in the late 
19th century to its present form with an emphasis on user participation through 
decentralized management, the ID has come a long way, but without any evident 
commitment to equity, sustainability or democratic participation. In the light of this 
understanding, we can now look at how decentralization has really performed with 
reference to key principles that we have outlined in our conceptual framework. To 
reiterate them here, these are principles of equity, sustainability, enhanced productivity 
and participation. The differences in levels at which these principles are met would also 
tell us the form this process of decentralization took- whether it was devolution of power, 
delegation of authority or deconcentration. 
Chart 5.1 Problems faced by WUAs, data received from 47 WUAs  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Inadequate funds
Inadequate staff
Measuring device not in place
Non participation of the members
Not getting information about water availability
Rules not followed by the members
Seepages from the canal






Percentage of WUAs reporting
 
The chart on problems faced by the WUAs captures in brief the diverse set of problems 
that WUAs are facing. This is our data of the 43 WUAs studied in the first round of our 
investigation. It makes a statement on all of the goals that decentralized management set 
it self out to do. Some of the problems stated by the WUAs were as follows -lack of 
participation in planning, lack of access to information on water availability, canal 
seepages which affect equity, measuring devices, which is central to equitable access to 
water, not in place etc. We shall discuss how each of these has in fact affected the goals 
of equity, sustainability, enhanced productivity and democratic participation. 
Equity  
As we have seen in the conceptual chapter, equity is not a fixed concept and it operates at 
many levels. For example, equity within the command refers to every piece of land 
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within the command to have access to water. Starting from this simplest form, there are 
many other levels at which the issue may be posed, for example, that everyone in the 
command should have access to minimum water irrespective of his/her holding, that 
women in particular should have access to water, etc. 
Politics of exclusion  
Our data does point to different ways in which inequities across social groups are 
manifested in the irrigation sector. At the very first level, we see a politics of exclusion 
based on land ownership in the command areas of the canal systems. A large number of 
women belonging to landed families within command areas and men and women 
belonging to landless families and landed families outside the command area are 
automatically excluded from the process.  









































The above chart shows us the women’s membership across the 47 WUAs. On an average 
we see that 10-15% women are members of WUAs. These are women who own land for 
various reasons discussed a little later in the section. In the era of 33% reservations this 
figure falls far below the mark. 
Our data analysed based on a detailed castewise listing shows that dalits or the scheduled 
castes are rarely land owners in the command areas of irrigation systems. In the three 
villages where we had access to data we see that the proportion of dalit farmers in the 
WUAs is not commensurate with the dalit population of that village. This is the first and 
the primary level of exclusion that needs to be countered if the process of decentralization 
has to achieve the goals of equity. None of the documents mandate this as the goal of 
state led decentralization process, as the ID still operates within the established 
conceptions of the command area framework. This is irrespective of the global 
recognition of integrated water resource management as a guiding framework, which 
unfortunately only remained limited to changing the name of the ID to water resources 
department in Maharashtra.  
 165
Table 5.3 Caste wise membership of WUAs and representation in the Managing Committees 
 
Name of WUA 






















 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Open 245 97 5 2 131 41 7 3 495 233 6 3
OBC 95 28 1 1 31 13 2 0  2 0
SC 1 0 0 0 255 162 2 0
ST 4 1 0 0 103 57 1 0
DT 2 0 0 0  
NT    6 5 0 0  
Total 347 126 6 3 168 59 9 3 853 452 11 3
Grand 
total 473 9 227 12 1305 14
Source: Based on the membership lists provided by the ID at the district level 
The overall picture that the tables present before us is as follows- Kukana village has 
10.2% SC population, but if we see their landownership in the command area, it is 
negligible. In Bhairavnath society of Wadala village we find that SC population is 17.97 
and ST is 9.8%, but the representation as members is nil. None of the SC or ST families 
according to the ID data have land in the command areas of the canal for this village. 
In Dindori village the SC population is 10.6% and ST population is 26% and this seems 
very well represented in the command area, which is evident from the WUA 
membership. 
Representation to managing committees is highly influenced by caste. If we look at the 
data on women’s membership to committees, we see that only one society i.e. Pragat 
Bagaitdar, Kukana has an OBC woman represented on the committee. In a later 
discussion we see how her own individual agency, her education and her experience has 
contributed to her being on the committee. 
Equity in the command and deprivation of tail enders  
Once we move from the larger inequities where certain groups are excluded by virtue of 
their landlessness we move towards less complex forms of inequities in the command 
areas of the project. This is a fairly simple concept to define and it states that every piece 
of land in the command is entitled to an equitable share of water, usually a share of water 
proportional to its area. In this kind of a scenario too we find inequities resulting due to 
location. These inequities are seen both within the command areas of minor canals as 
well as between different WUAs located at different ends of the Project.  
In Babasaheb Ambedkar WUA, Dindori village, Nasik, users have complained of a 
severe tail end problem. In fact, there is no canal over a two km stretch on the tail side 
and people directly lift from another dam, which is adjacent to their lands. There is a 
grape garden on one km of that stretch where the canal should have been. The tail enders 
therefore do not make a demand for water here. There is a complex set of problems 
 166
involved here. The tail enders would not only have to face the wrath of the grape garden 
cultivator who has encroached ID land but they would also have to fight with the WUA 
functionaries and also take on the ID. None of them are geared to it also because they 
have found an easier way to resolve their problem by lifting water from an adjacent dam 
perhaps leading to a different set of problems in that command. In the Bhairavnath 
society in Wadala, Ahmednagar district farmers reported a serious tail end problem. Here 
about 60 farmers do not get water. The demand for water is overall poor especially from 
the tail end as they do not get any water at all. Farmers in the head reach too are not 
demanding water as they are benefiting from well recharge due to canal rotation. 
Gender equity in the sector  
Interestingly irrigation as a sector was until recently not concerned with gender equity. 
But for various reasons ranging from pressure of gender advocates, donor agendas PIM 
programmes now have a gender component and at least they discuss and attempt to create 
awareness about the general disadvantages under which women labour. However, there is 
very little serious thought given to involving women in PIM activity 64 and to theoretical 
treatment of how and what stake women hold in PIM. This tends to reduce genuine 
concern to lip service (Walmi-theme note). 
The lack of serious thought ranges from the very simple things like the timings of PIM 
meetings that are planned without thought to whether the scheduled time and venue are 
suitable for women or not to its broader theoretical treatment on women as stake holders 
in decision making and entitlements to water. This has been discussed in the later section 
on women's responses to decentralized irrigation management.  
Chart 5.3 Number of women on the managing committee of WUA, data received 






None One Two Three Four
 
Managing committees are the decision making bodies of the WUAs. The minimum 
membership to Managing committees is usually 9 and extends to even 11-13 members 
depending on the size of the WUA membership. In the present act it is now mandatory to 
have at least 3 women on the MC from each of the reaches of the canal. In the chart 
                                                 
64 Of course there are isolated cases of women's involvement reported from states like Gujarat, Orissa, etc. 
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above, we see that 21 WUAs have only one woman as a member on the managing 
committee and only one WUA has four members on the Managing committee.  
This indicates the extent of participation sought from women. The other area is access to 
water itself and in the irrigation sector it is determined by ownership of land which we 
have seen earlier is very limited in the case of women. 
Participatory planning   
Unfortunately, water use planning is not done participatively in most PIM contexts. It is 
the officials who prepare the plan and the WUAs often are simply implementing bodies 
with no real control over or participation in the process. It is important that WUAs learn 
the essential principles of water use planning, even if they get the requisite calculations 
done by technical people they may consult or employ. Only then can the minor level 
WUAs and their functioning prepare their representatives in higher bodies to participate 
in project level planning of water allocation and use. Water resource literacy becomes a 
pre-condition for informed participation of the users. 
Our data shows that water use planning is not done in a participative manner in most 
WUAs. It is the officials who prepare the plan and the WUAs often are simply 
implementing bodies with no real control over or participation in the process. In all of the 
WUAs that we studied, this was pointed out. In Pragat Bagaitdar Society, Kukana for 
example we saw that there were no records of demand of water, often demand forms 
were given after water was released. People were under prepared to receive water on their 
fields. As a result of this they could not plan for crops of their choice. No rules for water 
distribution were followed. A detailed time table of water release was not prepared before 
hand, simply because the WUA did not have the information prior to the water rotation. 
The WUA did not have a plan of water delivery from the ID on the basis of which a 
demand is prepared by the WUA. A similar story was shared by Ambedkar society as 
well as the other three WUAs studied.  
Water use planning is not treated as part of the training for WUAs and is considered too 
complex for them to absorb.  
Cropping diversity and productivity issues  
One set of motivation for participation of farmers in irrigation sector, or PIM, comes 
from productivity and efficiency considerations as PIM is meant to improve efficiency of 
irrigation, ensure economic use of water and increase both productivity and total 
production. In Maharashtra, the productivity of practically all crops irrigated on canals, 
except sugar cane, which is also decreasing in the recent years, is very low compared to 
all India averages and in some cases is less than the most backward states like Bihar, 
Orissa, MP and UP. Hence monitoring the yields per unit area is still more important to 
ensure that the irrigation service is improved. The main reasons cited by the farmers for 
low productivity is low frequency of irrigation. Two or three irrigations in Rabi cannot be 
considered as good irrigation practice especially when there is practically no rainfall in 
the season. Similarly, less than 5 to 6 rotations in summer are detrimental to the crop 
yields. As a number of crops are grown simultaneously and their critical stages are 
different, irrigation system needs to tune to allow for cropping diversity. The system 
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needs to provide irrigation with low intensity but high frequency so that most of the 
critical stages of all crops in different soils will be covered. The farmers need precise 
information on the exact quantity of water that would be delivered and the periods of the 
supply so that they can plan the crops, crop areas and arrange inputs. In all our WUAs we 
find that the number of rotations is not more than 3 in a season, in fact they have largely 
been limited to 2. The Kharif season does not have irrigation at all in most of the 
societies. The table below shows us that only in one year did the WUA have four 
rotations in rabbi. In all the other years, the rotations were not more than three and in 
some years just two. With such low frequencies of irrigation both cropping diversity is 
affected as well as is the productivity. A similar scenario exists for the other WUAs as 
well. The other observation is with regard to lack of irrigation in kharif. This indicates 
that the farmers are either not aware of the fact that applied irrigation in Kharif can tide 
over the crisis of a dry spell and increase productivity or that they are not given 
information on Kharif rotations in advance. 
Table 5.4 Number of rotations in past 3 years, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Water Users 
Association, Dindori, 
Season 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Kharip -- -- --
Rabi 4 3 3
Summer  3 2 2
Total 7 5 5
Once the farmers are confident that the assured or agreed quantity of water will be 
provided they can afford to take more risks in spending on the seeds, fertilizers and 
pesticides to get high returns. However, if they feel that getting water involves high risk 
they prefer to go for low risks in other items to minimize the losses due to not getting 
water on time or in adequate quantity. 
Issues of governance  
Some of the key areas of governance that we enquired were about the day to day 
functioning of the WUA and how participatory was the decision making process. In all 
the five WUAs we found that most of the members were not aware of the Managing 
committee meetings. In fact in most WUAs they are informal in nature and few and far in 
between. The Annual general body meeting is once a year and usually the attendance is 
poor. The only issue largely discussed in the AGM (Annual General Meeting) is the 
financial audit. Only one of the five WUAs studied had any sort of an annual report 
prepared and audit reports ready on time. None of the women members attends the AGM 
as we shall see later. 
In all of the WUAs we found that there was an active lead group that took most of the 
decisions. These were mainly large farmers and politically powerful. Despite the 
apolitical nature of the WUA, it did not remain isolated from the local power politics. 
These leaders had largely built a nexus with the Irrigation officers at the lower levels and 
were establishing their rights. 
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In Palkhed society where we in fact could not study women’s participation, there is a lot 
of negative feeling for the ID. According to the farmers in some of the WUAs on the 
Palkhed project, water quotas are being manipulated by political heavyweights and all 
their efforts of opposing this have been brushed aside for years. Farmers also complained 
of water thefts, which is one of the main reasons for their reduced water quotas. These 
issues are pushed under the carpet and there is no clear auditing of the water resource. In 
such a scenario then WUAs cannot function effectively and a few vested interests from 
such WUAs manage to push their interests ahead through building nexus with ID and 
political powers. 
Transfer of a sick sector: main reasons for poor performance 
Issues of equity, enhanced productivity or efficiency, sustainability and participation are 
all intertwined concepts and one cannot be present in the absence of the other as is so 
evident from the discussion above. The reasons for poor performance outlined below also 
underlines the need for an integrated approach to address some of the problems.  
Poor rehabilitation before handing over 
There are many factors involved in ensuring equity within the command. One of the most 
important ones is the issue of adequate rehabilitation of the system before transfer takes 
place. Inadequate rehabilitation only leads to inequitable distribution of across the 
different portions of the command. Our findings from the FGDs as well as secondary data 
collected from the WUAs, clearly indicates towards inadequate rehabilitation efforts 
leading to deprivation at the tail ends of the canal. In all the five WUAs studied, though 
the rotation was from tail to head ends, we saw that tail enders were complaining of 
reduced quotas and lesser number of rotations. Continued seepages through canals, poor 
maintenance of field channels and the minor canal, of main gates and outlet gates, 
absence of measuring devices are all part of the larger problem of rehabilitation before 
handing over. These not only affect equity within the command area, but also leads to 
other failures such as low irrigation performance, unsustainable system, lack of cost 
recovery etc. (See annexure for detailed discussion on the problems of WUAs) 
Volumetric supply- no measuring devices in place 
Volumetric supply and pricing is one of the cornerstones of the Maharashtra model in 
PIM. It was hoped that its introduction would lead to ensuring equitable access to all and 
relative freedom to the WUA both for revenue collection from its members as well as for 
deciding on cropping patterns. In all command areas, crop patterns have undergone a 
drastic change and this departure from crop patterns as they were originally designed is at 
the root of a host of problems. In fact, this has emerged as one of the main reasons for 
deprivation/tail ender problem in the irrigation commands as was seen in the tail 
ender/deprivation study conducted across different states.65 Volumetric supply ensures 
that there is an element of stability, a stable reference, for both farmers and system 
administrators. In all of our WUAs we found that there was resistance to volumetric 
supply mainly because the canals were not in good shape. Measured water makes sense if 
                                                 
65 For details refer to the report, “Study of tailender and other deprived in irrigation commands” (2003). 
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the canals offer better service where seepage losses are minimal and measuring devices 
are well maintained. None of the WUAs had any of this in order. The tail end users in 
fact did not have a stretch of canal at that end, so volumetric supply did not make sense to 
them. 
Lack of water use planning and proper water delivery mechanisms 
One of the pillars of efficient, equitable and sustainable planning is accurate information 
of water storages in dams and an appropriate schedule of water delivery and rotation 
through collection of demand from the different WUAs on the project. Despite the policy 
commitment of the government to prepare water audits and share information with 
WUAs, we found a complete lack of this both on field as well as through a thorough 
scanning of Water Audit reports published by the ID.  
This lack of information at the appropriate time only means that farmers are not fully in 
the know of the water rotation timetable from the ID until just a little before. Internally 
too, there is little planning within the WUA to discuss water needs and the cropping 
patterns. A combination of the two only means improper plans leading to inequity and 
unsustainable use of the water resource. 
Rotational water supply or RWS is a water delivery mechanism, which caters to water 
demands of the users. If done appropriately this can ensure equity in water management 
But flawed information flow at one level and vested interest politics at the local level 
contribute to poor planning processes.  
Lack of training and capability building   
Whether it is the top-down or the bottom-up approach PIM experience tells us that unless 
training and capability building of the WUAs is done, very little can be achieved in terms 
of success. For improving irrigation efficiency, it is necessary for the WUAs to be 
equipped with some basic understanding regarding crop-water requirements, water 
balance models. Water resource literacy therefore becomes critical for the optimum use 
of the resource.  
Similarly, democratic functioning of the WUAs is another area where training is 
essential. Evolving rules for water sharing, decision-making, record keeping, etc., are all 
crucial for the sustenance of the PIM institutions as well as for enhanced participation of 
the users.  
In the context of equity too training provides critical inputs. As we discussed earlier, the 
concept of equity varies with the context. However, providing information of different 
equity options in different contexts (and actual experiences of local communities working 
out different options) would equip the beneficiaries to make informed choices in their 
own situations. Providing examples through training of what works and what does not 
will facilitate the WUAs to make appropriate choices.  
Making a transition to the volumetric supply system is no mean task. It calls for a new set 
of rules in water use, planning and sharing. Here training would be necessary in areas 
ranging from the very basic operational aspect of monitoring flows to improved 
techniques in cropping. 
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From transfer of management to radical restructuring  
To conclude our findings on the big picture in decentralization, we feel that there is a 
need to move from a mere transfer view point to one which talks of a radical restructuring 
of the water sector. A complete lack of a) precision in measurements b) accuracy in 
accounting of seepage / transit losses c) Preparing time based distribution schedules and 
d) regular monitoring of the actual irrigation by the higher officers; the irrigation 
efficiency is entirely left to the best judgment and efforts of the Canal Inspectors, which 
still indicates a strong bureaucratic control over irrigation management. These technical 
failures only aid the interests of the bureaucracy as well as the interests of large farmers 
and head end users to capture most of the water resources. In such a scenario we see little 
space for equitable access to water for all and equal voice in decision making. 
Our entire discussion points to the fact that PIM has effectively meant delegation of tasks 
primarily of Operation and Maintenance of the canals and recovery of costs by the 
WUAs. All the users rarely have found space to effectively participate in the planning 
process even at the lowermost level. In fact the broader goal of PIM does not simply 
visualise turn over of the system at the minor level, but sees a progressive federation at 
every level, from distributary, branch canal up to the project level. Viewed from the point 
of view of user control, control at the minor level confers very little control and very little 
discretionary power over the resource. It is only as one goes up higher in the 
administrative ladder of the project that transfer of control begins to become real 
(SOPPECOM 2005). So while a large number of irrigation officials see the minor level 
transfer as a welcome change, it might be difficult for them to accept the new legislative 
changes that allow a space for power sharing at every subsequent level finally reaching 
up to the project level. 
Section II: Responses of women  
It is in this broader context of decentralization that we need to understand women’s 
participation. As we can see that their participation is recent and sought only minimally. 
We have five sets of responses from women committee members as well as ordinary66 
women members of the WUA.  
The first set of data is  basically is about their profiles which means where they come 
from, which caste or religion do they belong to, have they had a prior experience of 
participating in the public sphere etc. These profiles form our context in which the 
women are located. 
The second set of responses are based on their different levels of participation which 
range from complete absence in meetings, presence in the meetings, to knowledge about 
the WUA. It covers the entire range of participation understood from physical presence in 
meetings, speaking up, information and knowledge about the WUA formation and other 
details to the other end of the spectrum where women are able to articulate their own 
concerns and vision for management of the WUA.  
                                                 
66 Ordinary members are beneficiaries of the WUA, but do not have any decision making power 
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The third set of responses are those which try and understand women’s perceptions on 
critical aspects of decentralized irrigation management such as water pricing, equity, 
cost recovery etc. Responses put forth in this category are perceptions of women’s own 
knowledge and understanding of WUAs and therefore are presented precisely as that. Our 
effort here is to take women’s perceptions for the value that they carry and not to 
countercheck them with any other ‘informed’ member. Women’s perceptions are shaped 
by the conditions under which they are forced to choose or because they see a potential 
for expressing a transformatory perspective. Understanding women’s perceptions become 
important from the point of view of both understanding the context within which women 
live and function as members of WUAs as well to understand the vision they hold of 
change.  
The fourth set of responses are related to their perceptions of empowerment or of 
changes they see in themselves because of their participation in the WUA functioning. 
These changes are mapped at individual and community level. Again, these are 
perceptions which are shaped both by what they are expected to say and perhaps by what 
change they might like to see in themselves. These are a set of impacts of their 
participation both at their own personal levels as well as at the level of the WUA. It 
covers a range of responses from how women have or have not made any difference to 
the functioning of the WUA, whether their participation has resulted in better 
entitlements and whether it has translated into change in their relations with men at home 
and outside. 
A fifth set of responses look at the facilitating and constraining factors. How women 
have reasoned the factors that constrain or facilitate their participation in the WUA. 
These range from the policy level to the social, cultural, economic levels as well as to the 
very personal level of their own attributes such as skills, education and agency. 
Profiles of women  
We interviewed a total of 53 women members from different WUAs. Of these 10 were 
committee members and 43 were ordinary members. The interviews with 43 ordinary 
members were conducted in groups of 17 and except for the profiles, the rest of the data 
is presented in groups. Data for committee members is presented for individual women 
members. 
Table 5.5 Spread of the sample across WUAs 
 







Shivdas Maharaj 0 9 9 
Pragat Bagayatdar 2 12 15 
Bhairavnath, Wadala 3 9 12 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar  3 10 12 
Bhairavnath, Varve 2 3 5 
Total 10 43 53 
All these women own land in the command areas of these irrigation projects and 
therefore command membership to the WUA. With the new rule in the MMISFA three 
women, one from each of the reaches of the canal, i.e. head, middle and tail need to be 
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elected to the committee. We have tried to interview all the committee members in each 
of the societies. Among the committee members, nine were members and one was 
President of the WUA.  
Table 5.6 Post of the women committee members of WUAs 
























Non- literate 1st to 4th 5th to 7th
8th to 10th 11th to 12th Graduate
 
Of these 43 women, a small number i.e. about 12% have actually crossed 10th grade. The 
non-literate population is about 16% and so is the primary school educated women. 
Among the committee members, we see that about 42% of them have crossed the 8th 
grade level and of the 9.5% of them are graduates. So we do see a slightly higher 
representation of better educated women in the committee. 
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21- 30 31-40 41- 50 51- 60 60+
 
This indicates that women who are in their middle age and also educated are preferred as 
committee members. For women to be active in public sphere having crossed the child 
bearing and nurturing stage seems important.  
In the marital status we find that 81% of the ordinary members are married and 14 % are 
widowed and 2.0 % are deserted. Among the committee members 70% are married and 
20% are widowed. Marriage is a determiner for being on the committees as well as 
having membership of WUA. Few widows or deserted women would be able to stake 
claim to household lands as is evident from the data.  














Open OBC SC NT
 
A caste wise break up shows that 65 % of the women are from open castes, which is also 
the majority caste in the village and which indicates that land ownership in command 
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areas is higher among the open category castes in proportion to their population as is 
evident from the larger data base on the WUA. There is evidently lower representation of 
women from the dalit communities in the Managing committees as seen in Table 5.3 
where we have analysed data for three societies. 















0 to 3 3 to 6 6 to 15 15 to 50 No response
 
The sample comprised of the following in terms of the land ownership among women- 
55% of them come from the land owning class of 0-3 acres and 25% from the land 
owning class of 3-6 acres. This is of course not indicative of their income class since for 
most women this is surplus land of the family, which has been transferred in their names. 
Chart 5.8 Reasons for land holding reported by respondents 
0 5 10 15 20 25
Because of land ceiling act















It is generally difficult to find women as landholders and especially so in command areas 
of large irrigation projects. Therefore, we investigated into this aspect a little more only 
to find that of our total sample 22.5% women own land because their family saw this as 
the best way to evade the land ceiling act. Fifteen per cent of the women said that land 
was transferred in their name because the family wanted to get more shares in the sugar 
factory nearby. Ten per cent of the women had land in their names as they were widows 
and they have land as a matter of right. There were also cases of 7.5% women who said 
that they had received land from their parents households and the same number who said 
that they had newly bought land in the command area in joint names. Five percent of the 
women said that they had received land from their husbands and we do not know how 
this is different from other transfers made to avoid ceiling laws or for other benefits of the 
family.  
Levels of participation  
In this section, we look at the different levels of participation assessed largely through 
their presence in meetings, participation in the different decision making processes and 
through their knowledge and information about the WUA. 
Information and knowledge about the WUA  
Process of formation of the WUA: year, reasons and agreements with the ID  
Committee members  
Most of the committee members were not aware of the date of formation of the WUA. 
Only two of them were certain of the formation date. The main reason for this is that they 
have only now come on to the management committee after the quota was introduced in 
the sector reform process. The restructuring has taken place as recently as 2-3 months 
ago.  
Only one of them was aware of the agreement between the ID and WUA and none of 
them were part of it. 
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Chart 5.9 Knowledge about formation of WUA and agreement with ID, women 














Do know Don’t know
 
As far as reasons for formation were, concerned women felt that better management of 
the water resource was the main reason for the setting up of WUAs. 
One of them however had an additional reason, which brought in the role and 
responsibility of the ID. She said, “The ID could not manage the WUAs and thought that 
the farmers would manage their water resources better and therefore they promoted the 
formation of WUAs”. Two of them were completely unaware of the reasons. 
Ordinary members  
None of the women was very certain of the time when the WUA had started. Of the 17 
groups that we interviewed, seven of them said that they did not know anything about the 
formation of the WUA.  
Women had interesting responses for the reasons for formation of the WUAs. In the 
group interviews, some specifically said that the WUA started for conflict management. 
There were conflicts around water management issues and hence the farmers felt the need 
for a water management group and that was the main reason for the formation of the 
WUA. 
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Chart 5.10 Reasons for formation of WUA, ordinary women members of WUAs 
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Water management
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Role and functions of WUAs  
Committee members 
A range of functions of the WUAs came up as responses from the women- One of them 
thought that the main function was to receive the demand for water from the members in 
their words “fill in forms of water demand and fulfill the demands, proper distribution 
and understanding the problems of the farmers”. 
There was a varied response on what they thought were the rules and regulations of the 
WUA.  
Ordinary members 
Ordinary members gave a range of responses. Six of them said that they did not know 
anything. Among the others, five of them felt that the main function of the WUA was to 
collect demand forms and release water as per the demand 
Three of them said that collecting water charges and releasing water was the main 
function of the WUA. Three others said that field channel operations and water 
distribution together are the main functions of the WUA 
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Chart 5.11 Functions of WUA, ordinary women members of WUAs  
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Rules and Regulations  
Most did not know about the rules and regulations and those who know commented on 
criteria for membership to WUA as being limited to landowners in command areas of the 
canal. The other part of the rules and regulation was that a landowner was bound to 
paying water charges on time 
On quotas for women  
Committee members 
There were interesting comments that women had on this issue. One of them said that 
"quotas have been introduced so that women get the opportunity to go out of house, fight 
for their rights. I think there is 30% quota for women. This quota has also been 
introduced because women know the value of water". In general, women felt that quota 
was introduced for increasing women's participation. One of them said "I do not know, 
but nowadays it has become common practice for women to be there with men 
everywhere so perhaps that is the reason" 
Overall, all of them knew how many women have to be there and why they need to be 
there. It has now become mandatory for three women from the different reaches of the 
command area to be on the committee. 
Ordinary members 
Only one woman was aware of the women’s quota on the committee. Her interpretation 
was that there are three women in the committee and they have half of the rights. On the 
reasons for quota women said “because women can save money they have been brought 
on the committee”. Others said that the main aim is to improve the participation of 
women so that they get new information and are able to develop themselves.  
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One woman felt that quotas were introduced to dump certain kinds of activities on 
women “women must be on the committee to be given the task of writing records rather 
they must have been forced to do these kinds of jobs”. 
Term and selection process  
Committee members 
Only two of the eight-committee members were able to say that the term of the 
committee was for a period of five years the others did not know much about this. 




Do know Don’t know
 
In all these WUAs all the members were selected unopposed. The typical procedure was 
that some one suggested their name and they were selected after a discussion which 
usually went unopposed. This was followed by the fulfillment of some legal procedures 
which included affidavits to the effect that they were not defaulters and that they did not 
have more than 2 children after the MMIFSA was introduced in 2005 and that they were 
members of the WUA. In three of the cases where the women's family members had 
suggested their names women reported that they neither were consulted before suggesting 










Chart 5.13 Suggestion of the name for WUA committee, women committee 






Other male members of the committee
 
Ordinary members 
Seven of them knew the term of the committee. Others were not aware of what this 
duration is. 
Election of the committee members is something that none of the women knew.  
We asked them if the selection of the women committee members was done in a fair 
manner, women from the dalit community said that no women members from the dalit 
community were selected and all are from the upper castes. The others did not know so 
did not respond. 
Frequency of meetings  
Committee members 
Of the seven responses, four of them knew that meetings are to be held once a month and 
that in a year there are 12 meetings. The other three did not know this rule and those who 
knew it also said that they did not attend it because they cannot. 
About the General Body meetings, the same four, committee members said that they 
were held once a year, but again they cannot attend these for various reasons that they 
discuss in a later section. 
Ordinary members 
We asked them if they knew how many committee meetings take place in a year and 
three of them said it was one meeting per month. The others did not seem to know. These 
were among the more articulate and active groups that we spoke to.  
None of the other women knew about the existence of committee meetings 
One of them said “Only men meet. Not all members ever come together. It is only today 
that so many women members are coming together”. If we were to compare women’s 
knowledge with that of men, men would know about the frequency of the meetings, but 
participation of ordinary men members too is very little.  
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Functions of the Managing Committee  
Ordinary members 
Women did not respond to this question indicating they did not really know much about 
the functioning of the committee. Decisions of the MC are usually not conveyed or 
women were not aware of them if they were conveyed. The 2-3 active women said that 
the decisions are recorded in the minutes and this record is available in the WUA office 
and they could go and find out.  
Chart 5.14 Knowledge about functioning of the managing committee of WUA, 
ordinary women members of WUAs 
2
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Do know Don’t know
 
Conflict mechanisms  
Ordinary members 
Obviously, women were not aware of the existence or non-existence of the mechanisms 
for conflict resolution in the WUA. The few who responded said that the directors of the 
WUA, or the surpanch67 or the chairman of the WUA came and resolved the conflicts. 
Some times these were left unresolved.  
When asked if members breach the rules they said that usually this does not happen.  
However, many of them did not respond at all. When asked what should be done if there 
is water theft and breach of rules none of them answered except one who felt that if poor 
people would steal water they should not be punished because they do so for their 
survival.  
Nature of participation  
Role of women members in WUAs  
Neither the committee members nor the ordinary members seemed to be clear of what 
their roles were as members. No specific tasks were assigned to them. 
                                                 
67 Elected head of a Village gram panchayat  
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Surprisingly the committee members too were not aware of any separate tasks that were 
allotted to them. Except one, none of them attended committee meetings and only signed 
the register that came home. 
Articulation in meetings  
Since attendance itself is so low articulating and speaking up in meetings rarely happens. 
None of them speaks about any issues in the meetings even if they do attend, but as we 
can see from our data, none of the women actually attends any meetings. 
When we asked if she takes any other person’s help to articulate her problems, just two of 
the women responded. One of them said that she takes her son’s help and the other said 
that she takes the help of women who are articulate. 
Involvement in decision making process  
Women are also not consulted regarding the timing and location of the meetings. For 
many of these women middle of the day is a more suitable timing. Just one of the groups 
said that evening would be a preferable time.  
Women also reported that they were not involved in any manner in the decision-making 
processes around allocation of water, water-pricing, preparing annual budgets etc. 
Informal channels of participation  
On this whole area of informal channels of communication, we spoke to women at 
length. Women said that they did not discuss these issues with other women in any 
informal forum. Irrigation and the decisions around it are still seen to lie in the male 
domain and women therefore do not see the need for any alternative channels to lobby 
with other women. The other reason, which is perhaps an important one, is that unlike the 
domestic water sector, which has a public nature to it, irrigation still very much within 
the private realm with concerns, revolving around “my land getting water”. Women’s 
land ownership is rarely delinked from household landownership as we have seen in the 
profiles section. There need to lobby with the men of their households is more relevant 
than doing so with other women landowners. 
The other area of informal channels used by women to influence the opinion of men so 
that they could articulate their own household level concerns is an area that can be 
investigated through ethnographic studies. 
Women’s perceptions on critical aspects of decentralized 
management  
This section looks at different views and opinions of women on some of the key aspects 
of decentralized water management. Our thrust in this section was to understand if 
formation of decentralized water institutions had lived up to its mandate of equitable 
access to water for all at affordable rates, sustainable use of the resource, better recovery 
of water charges etc. We have also discussed here women’s views on the new elements of 
the sector reform process that include cost recovery and quotas for women. Obviously, 
these are women’s views and perceptions and although they were not counterchecked 
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with any other sources, we already have a section which discusses our own observations 
on the impacts of decentralization gained through discussions with men and women 
through FGDs, studying of the documents, field visits and discussions with the 
government officers.   
Access to water  
Committee members 
Of the seven respondents, five of them said that water was not really a problem and they 
do get sufficient water. Two of them said that they did not really need water as they had a 
well and one did not respond. This response also shows us how the demand for canal 
water is determined by the resources you may have in hand. A well in the command area 
automatically reduced the direct demand for water on canals, which means that as an 
indirect user you are not paying for the water used. A form of inequity, which we have 
already discussed in an earlier section. 
Ordinary members 
We had varied responses from women in this section, which ranged from how much 
better the earlier system was when the ID managed the canals to those, which said that 
there was a marked improvement in access, and assured supply after the WUAs were 
formed. These responses were very context specific. In areas where the efficiency of 
canals had deteriorated at present, women’s responses went against the WUAs, but in 
systems where technically there were lesser problems women’s responses were in favour 
of WUAs. In Kukana village almost all of the women felt that the situation has improved 
considerably now. Only one group felt that they had better access to water earlier and 
now get less water. 
Rotations and timings  
As far as rotations of water are, concerned women’s observation was that the rotations 
were far more regular earlier than after the management of the WUAs. This is also 
because the canal efficiency has gone down over the years and therefore the interval 
between two rotations has increased. This affects the kind of crops you can take and also 
the quality of the growth.  
Almost all the women both committee members and ordinary members felt that rotations 
were not timely and the intervals68 were too large. However, in some WUAs a few 
women said that in comparison to the earlier situation the rotation intervals were better. 
Most of them felt that the intervals between two rotations were very long. In most cases, 
it was not less than 21 days and sometimes even as long as 30-45 days. Women pointed 
out that if cropping diversity had to come in then the rotations cycles had to be better 
monitored. For example one of the women who has been cultivating land for a number of 
years said that for vegetables and certain short duration crops the interval between two 
rotations needs to be shorter. It has to be less than 15 days. Since that is not so she has to 
                                                 
68 Timeliness of rotations and appropriate interval between two rotations are critical from the crop growth 
point of view. Long intervals between tow rotations essentially mean that crops would be deprived of water 
and the growth would be affected. 
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go in for perennials or other longer duration crops that can take water stress. Women also 
said that a large number of wells have come up in the command areas mainly to cater to a 
water stress period. 
Demand for water 
Almost all the women knew the method of putting forth a demand69 for water. Both the 
ordinary members and the committee members however said that women never went to 
the office to fill demand forms. The men always did this. They did know however, that 
this was a critical procedure that had to be followed if water access was to be ensured. 
Entitlements: perceptions of water allocation and use  
Ordinary members 
None of the women were aware of whether entitlements have been created and how water 
rights had been created except the fact that each has access to water proportional to their 
land ownership in the command area and as per the demand form that is filled. There 
obviously was no conceptualization of equity even within the command area. 
Committee members 
Of the seven committee members, three of them feel that water rights should be held by 
those who own land and one woman did not respond and one of them felt that water 
rights should not be based on land ownership. In fact, she belongs to a large land holding 
family and is only a primary school educated woman, but appeared as one who has a 
strong sense of justice for all.  
Conflict management  
On the question of conflicts women said that there are conflicts around water. One of 
them said that these conflicts are less now that the WUA is there, but one of them also 
said that they have increased after the formation of the WUA. Five of them either did not 
respond or did not know since they did not participate. 
Cost recovery and water pricing  
Recovery of water charges 
Women did not really have anything to say on the whole issue of revenue collection. In 
fact, universally this has been the response as far as questions related to water pricing and 
water charges are concerned. “It is the men who manage the money, we do not know the 
rates nor do we know how the WUA is recovering money” was the standard response of 
most women 
                                                 
69 This is a formal application to be made by each beneficiary to the WUA stating the area and the crop to 
be taken. In the absence of this no water would be delivered to the field.  
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Cropping patterns and preferences  
All the women had a great deal to say when asked on cropping patterns and preferences. 
This is evidently so as women are intensely involved in agricultural operations. Women 
mapped the changes in cropping pattern from before canal irrigation to the present times 
when the WUAs are around. The older women did recollect with nostalgia how Jowar 
and Bajra were the prominent crops before canal irrigation, and how sugarcane then took 
over.  
In an irrigated area the cropping preferences between men and women do not seem to 
differ much. Although when we had a detailed discussion with women, they did talk of 
cultivating food crops for self-consumption, and how they would prefer food crops if the 
markets were not very oriented towards cash crops. However, as of today they do prefer 
sugarcane, bananas, onion and similar crops that would bring in assured income to the 
households. They did realize that this was often at the cost of nutrition at home and health 
if the soil. 
In nine cases women said that they would cultivate sugarcane if they were given assured 
water. In eight other cases women said that they would prefer diverse cropping which 
includes some cash crops like tomatoes and onions and food grains for self-consumption. 
Chart 5.15 Preferences of crops, ordinary women members of WUAs 
















Decision making  
There were no responses to the question of whether women are participating in the 
present decision making processes. Except a few who attend meetings all our data shows 
that decision-making and women are nowhere connected in this sector. 
Water pricing and willingness to pay more  
Knowledge about the charges -none of the women knew exactly what water charges were 
being paid by their households. However, they knew the basis on which the water charges 
were decided for each of the farmers. 11 of them said that it was decided on a crop area 
basis, which means that charges are based on both the kind of crops taken and the area 
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over which it is taken. We asked them if they thought this was the right way of doing it or 
if they could suggest an alternative. Many of them felt this was fine but there were 
variances in opinions where one of them felt that water should be affordable for all and 
the same charges had to apply for all. One of them also felt that water charges should be 
reduced and access to water should be improved according to crops and area.  
Eight of them felt that the water charges had increased in the last 3 years, but they felt it 
was justified as things have become more expensive and the WUA has to manage 
everything within meager resources. 
As far as increasing water charges is concerned, 11 of them felt that they would be 
willing to pay more if the services improve and if they are assured a water supply. This 
would lead to increased yields and they could then afford to pay more for that. 
Effectiveness of Managing Committee  
When we asked the ordinary members if they would like to become committee members 
11 of them showed a lot of enthusiasm. One of them added a caveat of “if my family 
agrees to this proposition.” 
Regarding the functioning of the present women committee members the ordinary 
members had the following to say “they never go for the meetings- someone comes and 
takes their signature at home” “they do not do anything do not use their position and 
power to do anything for women”  and a few said “they are functioning well” 
On being asked if men were involving women in the decision making process, women 
overwhelmingly gave a response that no such thing was happening. The rules set by the 
men are final. The dalit women had a very strong statement to make on this as they said 
that the committee members belong to a particular upper caste and hence they do not 
interact with us and therefore we are not able to articulate our concerns. 
It is interesting to see how caste does matter when it comes to an initiative in 
participating- dalit women have throughout their interviews shown interest and initiative 
in participating in the processes of the WUA. Their main complaint has been that they are 
not being sufficiently involved in this process. 
Levels of inputs: trainings or exposure trip 
This appears as a major gap in the decentralized management of irrigation. Only one of 
them said that they had undergone any training on water management issues. None of 
them had ever stepped out of their villages for any training or exposure trip on water 













Both these women who attended the trainings said that the training was about irrigation 
and had in fact nothing to do with women's participation in Irrigation. 
The overall response is that as far as access to water is concerned the situation is better 
than it was earlier. On most other aspects of decentralized management especially on 
pricing and recovery of water charges, women had little information to comment 
conclusively. 
Women did have a lot to say on aspects related to water distribution like timings of 
rotations and intervals between rotations both, which are critical from the point of view 
of agricultural operations. On both fronts women felt that changes had to be brought in as 
the functioning was not proper. 
As far as participation is concerned, it was evident that women did not participate in any 
of the decision-making processes and in fact, there was little physical attendance as well. 
Here the lack of inputs in information and knowledge, timings of meetings and nature 
and culture of meetings are critical areas apart from of course the socio-cultural context 
that prevents women’s participation. We shall look at each of these in detail when we 
discuss their responses in the section on facilitating and constraining factors. 
Perceptions on empowerment  
In this section, we look at how women perceive the changes in and around themselves 
because of their public participation, in this case the WUA. Here we look at the changes 
their participation has brought about in the WUA functioning itself and those that have 
resulted in changes in themselves and the way the community and their own family 
perceives them.  
Most of the responses in this section were more general and representative of how things 
have changed or not changed over time and cannot necessarily be attributed to the WUA 
membership. Their participation in the WUA has been at a very minimal level and hence 
it is unlikely that that may have led to any change at the household community, or for that 
matter at the individual level. 
Nevertheless, over the last few years there has been an overall improvement in women’s 
presence in the public sphere either through participation in panchayats or SHGs etc and 
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this leads women to believe that WUA membership too has contributed towards 
empowerment. What perhaps we need to read into these perceptions is that women do see 
the need for change and are not happy where there are no changes taking place. 
Change in WUA functioning due to women’s participation  
As we have seen in the earlier section on participation, women have not really even 
attended meetings so articulation and speaking up has been almost absent except in the 
case of a few. So the impacts on WUA functioning are commensurate with the responses 
in the earlier section. 
Timings and location of meetings  
Only one of the groups said that there was change in the WUA functioning due to 
women’s participation. This is indicative from the timings of the meetings and the 
regularity. Earlier the meetings were late in the nights, but now meetings are at a 
reasonable time and they are also more frequent now. 
Accountability and transparency 
Two of the women felt that there has been a change and the WUA is more accountable 
and transparent after women have come onto the committees and also as members. 
Most of the others did not have anything to say and one of them said that corruption is 
still there in the collection of water charges. 
For one of the committee members transparency is there in the functioning because of 
women's participation. However, all the other six women said that they did not know or 
they did not see any difference from before. 
Rotation practice and timings 
When the women were asked as to whether the rotation timings had changed because of 
their presence in the committee, they said nothing had changed and everything is just as 
before. Three of them said they are not aware of any change as they do not attend any 
meetings. 
The ordinary members also did not perceive any change in this aspect, but as they 
reasoned they had not really voiced anything about it until now.  
Culture of the meetings 
Women do have knowledge of how the meetings occur and in fact, this is one of the main 
constraining factors. All the committee members said that they have not seen any change 
in the culture of meetings despite the quota introduced for women. Meetings take place at 
the convenience of men and are male dominated.  
Two of them reported that the meetings are of an informal nature so they do not feel 
constrained to attend it. 
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Difference in decision making process  
One of the active committee members from the Kukana village said that she had actively 
spoken on behalf of the tail end farmers on how they do not have access to water. She 
herself is a tail end farmer. This was taken seriously and repair works were done on the 
field channels at the tail end. On another occasion the same woman had raised an issue 
around a faulty electricity line and that too was solved immediately and the water rotation 
started immediately. These are concrete examples given by Ashatai one of the active 
committee members in Kukana village. 
Changes at the household level-decision making  
Ordinary members 
When we asked the women as to how decisions are taken at the farm level and who takes 
these decisions. There was a mixed response. In four of the cases women said it is their 
husbands, in four of the cases women said they themselves take decisions, in five cases 
they said it is other men in the family and in one case women said it was her husband and 
her sons who take the decisions. Two of the widow respondents said that they have been 
taking the key decisions anyway, but there is interference from the household. One of 
them interestingly said that she changed the decision of taking sugarcane as a crop to 
taking cotton. This was heard and the family has benefited a great deal out of that 
financially. 
When asked about the decisions regarding children’s education six of them said they do 
participate. Seven of them did not respond at all, one of them said that it was because of 
her that her daughter could go in for higher education. But for many others it was the 
husband or the family taking the decisions and not allowing the mother to participate. 
Most of the women choose not to respond to certain uncomfortable questions regarding 
the decision making processes within the house. When we asked if women took decisions 
in the expenses of the household eight of them did not respond. Four of them said that it 
was the husband who takes all the decisions and one of them said that she takes her own 
decisions. But things have not really changed considering that women choose not to 
respond. 
However, interestingly when asked if women have any authority over income, three of 
them said they have the rights and three of them said that they have an equal right over 
the income. As usual, the no responses were eight and those who had no authority were 
three. 
Eight of them responded by saying that there has been an increase in their respect at the 
household level, but eight do not respond and one says that respect has always been there. 
Seven of them feel that there is an increased mobility after being members. 
Only four of them said that some amount of household work is shared by their family 
members, all the others said that there was no sharing of work. 
When asked about the physical violence meted out to them women said that this did not 
happen in their families.  
Committee members 
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Three of the women said that they do feel there are some changes at the household level 
especially as far as decision making at the farm level is concerned. One of the women 
said that she was actively involved in organizing labour for weeding in her farm the 
previous year. The other two women said that they too were able to take some decisions 
at the farm level especially regarding cropping preferences. 
As far as children's education is concerned women feel that they need to send their 
daughters for higher education. In fact, one of them has taken a decision and is sending 
her daughter to another town for higher school. 
As far as deciding on expenses at home are concerned, things have not changed for them. 
One of them is of course actively involved in everything and takes many decisions for the 
family. She in fact motivated her husband to purchase land in her name. 
Of the seven women, two said that they have been always handling income and that 
continues. One other said that she is aware of the financial transactions but does not have 
any authority. For the rest things have not changed from before. 
Five of the women clearly said that their own family members had started respecting 
them after their membership two of them did not respond. 
Four of them feel that their mobility has increased a little bit. Three others have not 
changed at all. Even the one or two times they may have gone out women have felt that 
things have changed for them. 
At the community level  
Ordinary members 
Women felt that there is some level of change in respect at the community level. When 
asked if any difference was made to decision making in community issues, eight of them 
did not respond and most of the others except two felt that there was no change and in 
fact they were not involved in decision making processes. The two who felt so were 
involved in SHG activities. 
On improved skills in collective mobilization, two of the 17 groups felt that there has 
been a perceptible change and women do come out in the public and organize for larger 
issues. However, a majority of them did not see any major change that can be attributed 
to the membership in WUA. 
Committee members 
Only two of them felt that respect in the community has increased. One lives away from 
the village and hence interacts very little with the village. The others do not feel any 
change also because they hardly have a presence in the community. Yet three of them 
feel that they can make a difference to decisions at the community level. 
Being a member of the committee has been beneficial for two women since they have 
better access to water and rarely have to face problems.  
One however felt that there is no difference despite the fact that she is the President of a 
WUA. 
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None of these women are active in issues of violence against women. One of them from 
Kukana is active as she has also been a GP member and active in other fora as well. 
At an individual level  
Neither the committee members nor ordinary members feel that they have gained much 
from their membership to the WUA, largely because they never felt that they had a role 
to play and that they could contribute. As a result, they have never participated in any 
meetings. In Dindori for example the women said “now that we know we have a role to 
play, we will actively do so. But people like you should come and train us, how will we 
become empowered otherwise?” These are voices of women who are keen on 
participating and making a difference to their own lives as well as to the WUA 
functioning. 
For a few women who have been active for many years, the self-confidence is evident 
and the participation in WUA has added to that.  
Section III: Summarizing the findings: decentralisation and 
empowerment in the Irrigation sector  
Performance of decentralisation: the larger context  
This has been discussed at length in the first section where we have looked at men’s 
views as well. We have also looked at the performance of decentralisation through 
women’s views. Based on these sets of data we argue that the poor performance of 
WUAs is one of the major reasons for lack of democratic participation in decision 
making process. A combination of technical and social factors have led to the weak 
functioning of decentralization in this sector. What set out to be success stories in the 
early nineties through good gains in recovery of water charges has not sustained to be so. 
Vested interests and nexus with the irrigation officials have led to the weakening of what 
held potential for good governance. 
Quality of participation is also affected by the overall lack of space for the larger 
(whether male or female) beneficiary group to participate. In almost all the WUAs that 
we visited, farmers complained of lack of information flows and democratic decision 
making. They complained that ID has left very little space for the beneficiaries to plan 
and manage their resource at the local level. In most of the WUAs therefore a standard 
response for lack of women’s participation has been that men themselves lack the space 
to participate meaningfully what then are the women going to do here. ‘The situation… 
they tell us ‘is so complex that women will never be able to deal with it. Imagine if a 
woman is a chairperson of a WUA, which has problems of canal seepage, water 
shortage, water theft what kind of things she would have to deal with. Will she be able to 
go out at midnight and resolve the conflicts that arise out of these shortages and 
inequities? Of what use then is a woman chief functionary”. 
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Design issues: policy and programme  
Apart from quotas, the present sector reform process does not introduce any other 
incentives for women to participate in the functioning of the WUAs. Unlike the domestic 
water sector we do not see any participation in either decision making or trainings or 
related campaigns. There is no special fund in the irrigation sector to facilitate women’s 
trainings and exposure to different activities. 
As discussed earlier the MWSIP, states in only one single line that a gender strategy 
would be separately worked out. No such strategy which is in the public domain is 
available and there is no financial commitment to ensure women’s participation in the 
irrigation sector. Here the sectoral differences become evident. 
Quotas  
Introduction of quotas in the committee of the WUA is certainly a facilitating factor as is 
evident from the numbers in the managing committee. As per the new legislation every 
WUA will have to have 3 women representing the three canal reaches on the committee. 
As a result of this legislation as we have seen earlier over 4000 women would be entering 
the public sphere in what is otherwise a male dominated sector. For these quotas to 
translate into meaningful participation women would need support at various levels. This 
is the first time that quotas for women have been introduced in the irrigation sector. 
However there is need to go beyond quotas and a combination of various factors become 
important in this context. 
Numerical strength of women in WUAs  
Some said that women have to become members first for better participation. Almost all 
of the women we spoke to said that more numbers of women on the committee and the 
WUAs would make a difference to their levels of participation. The main constraining 
factor here is that women lack land titles and that is the key qualifier for membership. 
Unless the Act is amended to this effect, it is very unlikely that larger number of women 
would actively participate. 
Trainings  
We reviewed some of the training manuals and documents developed by WALMI along 
with the WRD. All of these documents are in the nature of explaining the various 
legislations in the water sector. None of them are specifically addressed to women or 
cater to their needs. There has been no training needs assessment programme yet and in 
fact, the one that was planned is yet to take off due to administrative hurdles. This was a 
training needs assessment especially to understand the training needs of women and 
tribals. Lack of well targeted programmes and financial commitment to them is one of the 
major lacunae of the MWSIP in advancing gender rights. 
Information and knowledge  
The other major lacuna is the lack of useful information channels. The Domestic water 
sector has launched several IEC campaigns through which posters are put up and the 
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whole village is aware of a programme and how they could participate. Despite its 
limitations, it has created an ethos for participation and women have been able to come 
out in large numbers there. Women gave very interesting responses to this question. 
Some of them said that there should be rule of women’s participation and that women 
should have the information and knowledge about the various activities from the men and 
the officials. 
One of them said that if she gets the invitation and information she would like to 
participate. However, she added a caveat saying that this has to be accompanied by a 
proper environment for women to participate. 
As we have seen only one of the women on the WUA has attended a training programme 
organised by WALMI, the nodal agency for capacity building appointed by State 
Government. Most of the women were generally aware of why WUAs, but knew little 
about their functioning, rules and regulations or the financial matters. Unless women are 
encouraged to participate and are given information their effectiveness in the public 
sphere would not improve. 
Culture of the sector  
Our findings show that the single most important reason that we can identify for women’s 
lack of participation in the irrigation sector as compared to the domestic sector is related 
to the social norms that define which tasks women should perform and which remain in 
the male domain. These social and cultural norms define how men and women should 
interact in the public spaces. Public expectations of women’s role goes well with their 
participation in the domestic water sector and also working on the fields irrigating them, 
whereas participating in meetings related to water for production does not go too well 
with their public roles and expectations. They therefore are fit to participate in the 
domestic water sector, which is so closely connected to their present roles of household 
welfare. The irrigated land is a symbol of monetary gains, prosperity, markets and hence 
becomes the male domain.  
In fact, these expectations differ depending on the class and castes that women come 
from. In the dominant castes and the upper class we found that women rarely would go 
out in the field to irrigate it during canal rotations. Moreover, they hardly engage with the 
question of irrigation even in an informal way. Whereas women from the lower class and 
scheduled castes (if they do own land in the service area) do engage with the irrigation 
schedules, rotations and access in at least an informal way, through discussions with their 
men. In village Yeoti in Solpaur district of Maharashtra women were aware of most of 
the practices in WUA functioning, except perhaps the rates of water.  
Importantly the culture of meetings is what matters and WUA meetings are very male 
dominated and the issues discussed are also very male in nature as most often they are 
about resolving conflicts around allocation or about pricing and water charge collection. 
Women do not see it as their domain. In the final analysis, this would be compared with 
the drinking water scenario which is quite different and where a culture for women to 
participate is being created. Why certain sectors seek to attract women and certain others 
keep women away. The challenge here is to redefine roles and expectations within the 
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sector. Needless to add that these images and expectations of women are related to the 
larger structures of inequity and patriarchal exploitation. 
The village context: from the women’s point of view  
Women were asked a series of questions regarding their perceptions on the village 
context- whether they think their village is progressive in terms of women's issues or not. 
Ten of the 17 groups reported very high incidences of violence against women. Two of 
them said that they do not know because they do not step out of the house.  
These responses of women on how they perceive their village actually helps us build our 
village context, which shows how facilitating or constraining the village scenario is. The 
main argument in favour of decentralization working for women is that governance is 
brought to the village where women live.  
All of our villages had economic prosperity by virtue of being irrigated villages. 
Prosperity does bring in vices such as alcohol and these were really the main reasons 
cited by women for violence against them. In none of these villages did we see women in 
the public sphere and this context definitely provided a constraining environment for 
women’s participation.  
Participation in other public sphere activities  
But as there is violence there is also another side to the story and mushrooming of SHGs 
which have brought women into the public sphere though in a very limited way and we 
do see some positive impacts of these. 
A large number of SHgs have been formed in these villages and they have largely 
remained in the domain of savings and credit. Women have looked at these as providing 
positive spaces for them to come out of their homes.  
Mahila gramsabhas are not held in these villages because none of them are Jalswarjya 
villages where mahila gramsabhas are mandatory. However, none of these women attend 
gramsabhas either. This already builds a background of these women who are not for 
various reasons involved in larger village development activities.  
Among the committee members we have two women who have been active in the Gram 
Panchayat earlier. One of them is working in a school and is therefore familiar with 
public activities. The other has been working with the women’s front of the CPM, ie. All 
India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA). Although these cases are rare they do 
provide us insights into what works and does not work.  
Education and skills  
In the section on profiles we see that education is not an important variable qualifying 
women to membership of WUAs, although it does add value if women were to qualify 
for committee membership. But beyond the qualifying potential for committees we do 
not see any role that education has played in enhancing participation. Capabilities to 
participate need a different set of skills along with other facilitating factors that we 
discuss in this section. In the absence of that, education has very little role to play in 
enhancing participation.   
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Land ownership  
This is one of the most critical factors that qualify women to become members of WUAs. 
It is therefore one of the major constraints in bringing more numbers to the WUA. Unless 
these numbers increase, it is unlikely that women can bring about any change in the 
functioning and the culture of irrigation sector. Our larger database for 47 societies shows 
that of the 47 WUAs only one had membership of women that ranged from 30-35%. 
Most of them were in the range of 5-15% 
This is bound by a legislation, which needs to be amended in Maharashtra. One of our 
recommendations has been to dissociate landownership from access to water institutions 
and to water rights.  
Caste and economic factors  
Our findings clearly showed a caste bias in selection of dalits to the Managing 
committee. In one of the villages there was an active group of dalit women who would 
have liked to participate in the committee. This was a dalit group of women members and 
they were both widowed and were managing their own fields so had a clear stake in 
participating. Women from the other two groups were young and enthusiastic and were 
interested in participating in the meetings. An interesting response from two women from 
the dalit community was that if one of their women came on the committee of the WUA 
other women from their caste would be motivated to participate. We have discussed this 
at length in an earlier section 
Individual agency  
Despite the several constraining factors some women still go out and participate. One of 
the committee members from Kukana village is one such example. Her prior history and 
participation has been a major facilitating factor but her own enterprise and interest in 
being involved in the public sphere contributes a great deal to her active participation. 
Of the 17 groups, only two groups showed any interest in participating in the meetings. 
When we asked the reason for their participation if they do two of them said that they are 
interested in participating in the public sphere and hence would like to know more from 
what happens in these meetings. Thereby indicating an interest that needs to be nurtured 
through different incentives and inputs 
In our interviews women also said that unless women decide nothing can change thereby 
indicating at one level individual agency as well as collective agency.  
Support from the household  
Cutting across all the interviews was the need to address the family level resistance. 
In our interviews with ordinary members many of the women were quiet when we asked 
if there was support or opposition from the household. Many of them did not respond 
because this was an area, which they thought that they do not need to be involved in 
anyway. There silence in a way indicated that there was no encouragement from the 
family, but they also said that if they were to attend meetings there would be no overt 
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opposition but there is no encouragement either. Thereby indicating subtle ways of 
resistance. When women try to argue they said, “We are asked not to interfere in these 
matters”. 
As far as the committee members are concerned all the 8 members said that they did not 
face any opposition from their households in becoming members of the committee. They 
also added that they never attend any of the meetings and therefore are not so busy in the 
committee work, but were eager to say that their families do support them. 
The few women who do go for meetings said that when they are participating in the 
committee meetings then it is either their daughters in law or their daughters who help 
them. Only one of them said that her sons help her. Here we see that the cost of 
participation is largely transferred to other women of the household. 
In the domestic water sector we see that women’s participation is seen as respectable by 
the households as well. The ethos of participation is well created. 
Support from the community  
In some villages women reported that men do understand hence women can speak up, 
however in many of the villages women may not be heard at all. A few of them would be 
heard. But importantly women also need to be present for the meetings. They often are 
not even present for the meetings. 
Committee members reported that there were no other men from any castes who have 
opposed or resisted their participation. Again, this needs to be seen in the light of the 
caste from which these women come. All of them except one come from the Upper 
Maratha caste and hence are unlikely to be opposed. This also needs to be seen in the 
light of the nature of participation, which still is of a passive nature where they probably 
have not even attended meetings of the committee or of the general body. 
Since such kind of opposition is not faced by women they have not yet developed 
strategies to resist. 
Public expectations of women and costs of opportunity  
Women’s workloads at the domestic level as well as at the farm level, leave them with 
little time and energy to engage with other tasks. Sitting in meetings, applying ones 
minds and engaging with conversations, rule making processes etc needs a mental space, 
which women rarely have. Coming out of this cycle calls for a larger process of change, 
which challenges the patriarchal system and the roles and tasks that come along with it.  
In most cultures women are also expected not to speak in public or speak in softer voices 
or perhaps just echo what the dominant voice is saying. Women have tried to find ways 
out of these situations by couching their radical agendas in what is acceptable feminine 
behaviour. Public expectations of women participating in certain public spaces also 
constrains women’s participation. Often the WUA meetings are held in the small WUA 
offices or in the Gram Panchayat office or in some of the credit co-operative society 
offices. These spaces are inhibiting for women and women would rarely attend meetings 
in these spaces.  
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In this regard, women have indicated that a few changes could contribute to their 
participation. One of them is to have all women’s meetings either in the school or in the 
anganwadis or simply in some woman’s home. This gives an informal nature to the 
meeting and creates a more conducive and uninhibited environment for women to 
participate. It also makes it easier for women to decide on time that would most suit all of 
them.  
Costs of opportunity was a hypothetical question in the case of WUAs, as women were in 
fact dissuaded from participation. We asked women if they did decide to participate 
would their work loads increase and what they would do in that case. Women from one 
of the groups did say that if they were to participate, their workloads will definitely 
increase and this will affect their life at the household level. Their suggestion to resolve 
this problem was that as far as possible women above the age of 40 be allowed to become 
members of the WUA as they do gain some experience around that age and also because 
many of their household obligations are reduced by that age. 
Finally to conclude this section on Irrigation we say that although opportunities have 
come by way of quotas, it would take several necessary steps to realize quotas into 
meaningful participation. One of the major areas that needs to be addressed in this regard 
is to allow for a better performance of decentralization itself. The WUAs have proved to 
be better than centralized irrigation management as is evident from the responses of 
women as well as through our other data sets; however it cannot be denied that the sector 
is beset with numerous problems which are at multiple levels ranging from technical 
inefficiencies to institutional and socio-economic ones. It is often debated whether people 
really do have the power to decide in irrigation. Rules are laid and accountability 
structures which demand upward accountability rather than downward leaving very little 
space for people to intervene meaningfully. Addressing these would in a sense be the first 
necessary step to create a meaningful space for women and the other poor to participate.  
But we cannot conclude that addressing this would automatically lead to women’s 
participation as we have seen from our discussion of the various other constraining 
factors that women have to face. Altering the current form of decentralization will no 
doubt lead to a certain extent at least to changing its culture in favor of women, but very 
conscious efforts will have to be made in the policy and programmes, which provide 
incentives for women to come out and participate. Like Jalswarajya the sector has to 
change its image and make it respectable for women to participate. It is important that 
women’s organizations and other civil rights groups participate in this process. Unless 
there is a thrust from the grassroots there will be little incentive for the state to reorient 
the image of the women. 
The other important area to be addressed is at the family level. Democratic values have to 
first be instilled at the level of the family (Joy Deshmukh). If the idea of the normative 
women is not challenged at the level of the family there is very little hope that women 
would be allowed to participate in a meaningful way. Altering our mindsets and ideas of 
the normative woman therefore become central to our process of change. It is here that 
the role of civil society organizations and particularly women’s organizations becomes 
critical. The civil society that is being cocneptualised by the state to implement these 
programmes is not capable of instilling these values and making the change process 
progressive. They leave women at a stage of euphoria with public participation but do not 
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equip them with tools to challenge patriarchy. The tools lie in providing an understanding 




Table 1 Demographic features of the villages of location 
 












Shivdas Maharaj Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Yeoti 3003 14.2 2 75.4 916
Pragat Bagayatdar Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Kukana 6646 10.6 1.4 75.1 858




5326 17.9 9.8 76.7 812
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Pani Vapar Sanstha 
Dindori 15330 10.2 26.5 82 902
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha  
Varve 1651 8.6 0.5 76 1109
 
 
Table 2 Land use pattern (in hector)  
 
















Shivdas Maharaj Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Yeoti 
 1386.00 0.00 504.35 384.47  
55.00 442.18 
Pragat Bagayatdar Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Kukana 
566.00 0.00 410.00 86.00 
 
49.00 21.00 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha 
Wadala 
Bhairoba 872.00 0.00 562.00 220.00 
 
66.00 24.00 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
































Table 3 Season wise crops 
 
Name of WUA Village Kharif Rabi Summer Perennial 


















Pragat Bagayatdar Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 





















Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Pani Vapar Sanstha 







Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha  
Varve     
 
 
Table 4 Membership 
 


















236 24 9.13 10 1 
Pragat Bagayatdar Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Kukana 473 126 23.47 6 3 




227 59 27.20 9 3 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Pani Vapar Sanstha 
Dindori 1305 452 23.56 11 3 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha  






Table 5 Formation and transfer of management 
 
Name of WUA Village Year of 
formation 
Year of transfer 





Pragat Bagayatdar Pani Vapar 
Sanstha 
Kukana 1994 2000 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha 
Wadala Bhairoba 1998 1999 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Pani Vapar Sanstha 
Dindori 1997 1997 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha  
Varve 2002   
 
 
Table 6 About the area of WUA 
 
Name of WUA Village Total 
command 
area 
CCA ICA No of wells in 
command 
area 




281 281.58  Not available 
Pragat Bagayatdar Pani 
Vapar Sanstha 
Kukana 484 485.11  300 




204 248 204 Not available 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Pani Vapar Sanstha 
Dindori 1161 860 602 660 
Bhairavnath Pani Vapar 
Sanstha  










• Even after repeated correspondence with Irrigation Department they have not received any 
attention about the repair work which was supposed to be done according the agreement 
between ID and the society 
• Main gate of the Ujani LBC which branches into minor is not functioning and every time 
rotation starts society has to take responsibility with its own expense to lift the gate.  
• The entire stretch that branches from Ujani LBC up to where society’s minor starts is in a very 
bad shape with growth of grasses and bushes which obstruct the flow of the water. It causes 
increase in water level and water overflows and there is wastage.  
• At the point where area of the society starts there was SWF constructed. But it is not 
functioning anymore. And so the intention of volumetric supply is not achieved. 
• In the minor as a result of the black soil there have been several damages to the walls and floor 
of the canal. These are lined walls which have eroded the entire distribution system. The flows 
are affected and damage increases as a result of that.  
• There are no doors on the outlets from distributory. So every time the water is released, they 
have to use large sacks to block and release water flow.  
• Until 1987 the society used to get water from Ashti tank and not from Ujani dam. One of their 
major demand is that they have a right over the water of Ashti tank and as the distribution 
system of Ashti tank is far better the water should be distributed from there.  
• Some farmers are lifting water from Ashti tank and this is affecting the society as the demand 
for water decreases.  
Pragat 
Bagayatdar 
• At some places there are no gates at the channels. Where there are gates, many of them are not 
functioning. So they have to use sacks to control the water flow.  
• Measuring device is not functioning. 
• They have not yet received copy of joint inspection report. 
• There are tail ender problems. So farmers at tail end do not receive enough water. 




• Need of some repair work e.g. gates, field channels etc.  
• There is no participation of WUAs in planning meeting of advisory committee meeting.  
• There is no system in place to measure water. So water flow is stopped only after farmers have 
finished irrigating their fields. And the idea depends on the farmer. As farmers know that they 
are going to receive only 1/2 rotations, they tend to take more water. Further there is lot of 
water seepage from gates, so there is water available until it is there in main distributory. Many 




• Though the society has taken over the management and there was a contract between ID and 
the society, they have not received copy of the contract yet.  
• Main canal needs repairing. And it has to be done from expenses sanctioned by the 
government. It will reduce the water loss by percolation.  
• ID says that there is 68% water loss. But that is mainly due to the practice of lifting water with 
pipes. ID is not giving attention to this problem because some officials are involved into it 
along with the farmers.  
• People feel that though farmers from Dindori taluka have given their lands for the Waghad 
project, but they are not receiving benefits. Societies from Ozar region are benefiting from the 
water. 2 societies from Ozar take water from reserve quota for NA lands? 
• Office of the federation is at Mohadi. Women members of the WUA are demanding that the 
office should be shifted to Dindori instead. Because of the lack of transport facilities they are 
not able to attend meetings there.  
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Chapter 6  
Learning and Recommendations 
Our study has shown that the water sector reforms discourse is dominated by the 
management transfer view rather than one that proposes radical restructuring of the 
sector, i.e. delegation and deconcentration as opposed to devolution of power in both the 
states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Governed largely by multilateral agendas, water sector 
improvement moves towards water commodification brought out through the various 
economic and institutional reforms proposed in both the states70. Interestingly in both 
these states different stakeholders tend to agree on the need for improving water 
resources through such reforms and most would even agree that decentralisation is the 
best form to achieve this. For the hitherto excluded groups, decentralisation raises hope to 
redress their historical exclusion from accessing water and making decisions around it. 
Claims for representation in the decision making process therefore becomes critical for 
these groups. For local vested interests this often hold a promise for strengthening their 
political base71. For multilateral agencies (e.g. the World Bank in Maharashtra) and often 
the government as well, it holds meaning in terms of reducing state expenditure on both 
management as well as infrastructure and for private parties it opens up spaces for 
making economic profits in the event of clear entitlements getting institutionalized72.   
Given these diverse set of interests, which often appear like a win-win situation, it is not 
surprising that there is little struggle or debate over the new reforms in the sector. The 
state too has to straddle between supporting and advocating neo-liberal reform on the one 
hand, and bowing down to its own political constituents on the other. The impacts of 
these reforms unfold only gradually or if the state is pushed to the corner by private 
interests or multilateral agencies. What is important to understand is that decentralization 
cannot be wished away as a donor driven discourse as we see how historical inequities 
are used to occupy the spaces created by decentralization, thereby defeating the very 
purpose for which decentralization was introduced. 
For most stakeholders, particularly the socially excluded, therefore the question is not as 
simple as whether to oppose or engage with the state; rather, a combination of the two 
may be necessary if the restructuring view point has to gain currency over the transfer 
view point. 
We felt the need to outline some of these broader concerns at the outset or else our study 
findings may be seen only as an effort to identifying gaps in decentralization and their 
implication for women’s empowerment and not questioning of the model itself. Not 
surprisingly, then the recommendations would follow from these gap identification 
                                                 
70 Different legislative reforms in Maharashtra are already talking about private public partnerships, 
contract farming and tradability of water rights for example. For a detailed discussion on policies see Joy 
and Kulkarni, 2006) 
71 Shelawe Budruk in Jalgaon district of Maharashtra is a classic example of how the local leader climbed 
the political leader by bringing in the Jalswarajya scheme in an otherwise not water scarce village. 
72 The push towards going in for private connections over public standposts is clearly a move towards 
facilitating cash collections. Similarly, in irrigation we see that clauses for both creating individual 
entitlements as well as tradability of water rights have been introduced. 
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exercises and aim at interventions to close these gaps rather than question the paradigm 
itself.  
The tendency to comment on the divergence in implementation from the mandated policy 
goals has largely been avoided by us in this section. Along with a critique of the 
decentralization process we have tried to outline an alternative view on water that is 
located in a context specific understanding of water norms and power relations that 
constitute water rights scenario. Having said that we now look at some of the key 
learning from the two states, which broadly discuss the different aspects of 
decentralization and how they relate to women’s empowerment. We go back to some of 
our research questions in our discussion of learning and recommendations. 
The next section outlines some of our key findings on aspects of decentralization in the 
sector and its relation to participation and empowerment of women. We end by 
underlining the fact that although positive performance of decentralization would 
facilitate women’s meaningful participation it is not sufficient to ensure change in gender 
and social relations. This understanding leads us to address broader socio-economic 
inequities that set the stage for unequal terms of participation. It is argued, that these 
historically structured inequities are further aggravated by the neo-liberal reform agenda 
in the water sector. 
Aspects of decentralization  
Local/non local sources  
Decentralisation in the domestic water sector has typically meant the decentralization of 
responsibility for the distribution and management of water systems and services in 
villages whereas the source of the water is not always local, i.e. village based. In Gujarat, 
for example, although there was a commitment to find and develop local, in situ water 
sources, the prestigious Narmada-Mahi pipeline was often the main source for providing 
drinking water in the Ghogha project and today even extends to villages as far as Kutch 
under the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation project. However, in principle 
WASMO has now accepted the need for dual water supply systems and drawing on 
multiple sources as necessary. In Maharashtra, the Jalswarajya project has an explicit 
commitment to develop local sources where available. Most village communities prefer 
local sources as they are able to maintain them – ensure source sustainability – and have 
more control about water use decisions, rather than these being decided by the water 
bureaucracy.  
In surface irrigation the question of local versus non-local resource has a different 
meaning as the very nature of the source is a dam which conveys water to a very large 
expanse of land across different villages and depending on its size to different 
talukas/districts/states/nations as well. Here the need for nested institutions becomes very 
important, as use at one level will be affected by use at another level in the command 
area, a discussion that we shall do a little later. 
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Role of technology  
The use of appropriate technology and physical infrastructure that is well maintained 
becomes an important condition for participative planning to take place. Institutional 
restructuring can therefore not become a sufficient condition for the success of the 
programme in the absence of well functioning water infrastructure, which of course in 
turn, does depend on good management functions too.  
In the case of drinking water, for example a well laid out network of pipelines and valve 
systems that ensures distribution of water with sufficient pressure to all and timely 
availability of electricity to pump water73 were seen as important preconditions for people 
to take interest in sustaining the scheme. In both the states, people showed reluctance to 
pay the water tariff if schemes were not functioning well, if there was no power supply 
for pumping and if they were not getting adequate water.  
Inappropriate methods of testing the yields of wells was another technical issue about 
which the VWSC (Village Water and Sanitation Committee) members in Maharashtra 
were not comfortable. This would lead to source failure and ultimately to the failure of 
the scheme itself. 
In irrigation the case of technical failure was very glaring. In almost all the WUAs (Water 
User’s Association) that were studied there seemed to be a sense of urgency in handing 
over the management to the users at the minor canal level. This went against the 
agreements made between the WUAs and the ID (Irrigation Department) and the WUAs 
were left to manage canals, which were in a very bad shape, and economy that was in the 
doldrums. Farmers did not want to go in for volumetric supply and pricing, which in a 
way forms the basis for equity, mainly because canal seepages would not allow for 
equitable access. 
Equity  
We have already discussed the various meanings of equity in the water sector in our 
conceptual chapter and if we were to look at the programmes in the two states, from that 
lens, then they leave a lot to be achieved. Equity as a concept is very closely linked with 
sustainability - institutional, financial and ecological, so in that sense our understanding 
of equity transcends the discourse of equity as a matter of individual right (fair 
entitlement) and enters the arena of equity for the sustenance of the resource itself. 
On the face of it, we can say that in the domestic water sector no particular group has 
been excluded from accessing water or participating in its planning at the village level. 
But what we witnessed in both the states is that this is easier said than done largely 
because of the structural constraints of class, caste and patriarchy. These in a sense are 
‘non sectoral’ issues and therefore not necessarily a concern of the State, but they have a 
significant bearing on who participates in the planning processes and gains as a result of 
that participation. 
                                                 
73 Load shedding was cited as an important barrier in all the villages in Maharashtra for water distribution 
as well as towards collection of O&M charges. 
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An example of shifting to private connections over public connections in Maharashtra 
can be cited in this context. Not only does this divide women and men on caste and class 
lines, it actually opens up spaces for private players to enter the welfare arena of water 
service provision. In fact, the logic for this shift was to facilitate easy collection of O&M 
and it was stated in so many words. On the other hand, there was only one village, Dador 
in Kutch, where the pani samiti had decided not to give private connections because there 
was no way they could check on water use in the absence of metering.  
A consideration for equity was stated when it came to the collection of the capital 
contribution of 10 percent – in some cases villages waived this contribution for the very 
poor, but there was no way of understanding the underlying dynamics of how this would 
be ‘recovered’ from them later. In contrast, there was little thought given, by either 
women or men on water committees to the collection of water tariff based on differences 
in income levels. 
As far as access to water is concerned, we did not see exclusion, but the shift to private 
connections did signify that the poor may remain out of the ambit. Private connections 
are also a marker of eliminating any possibilities of inter-caste or inter-faith interactions 
or women’s interactions which often did/does take place at public standposts. Without 
overstating the virtues of public over private, we would like to say that it does foreclose 
all the past efforts in these two states to create conditions for communities to build 
solidarities across class, castes religion and gender74. 
The irrigation sector thrives on inequities of the kind mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Water access is tied to ownership of a commodity such as land and not to people. 
Needless to add that this rule eliminates all the landless people from being associated 
with the WUAs. A large number of women are landless and therefore not eligible for 
membership. Dalits in almost all the WUAs studied except one do not own land in the 
command areas. Within landowners too there is a divide of those within the command 
area of the project and those outside it. Needless to add that where membership itself is 
exclusive, representation in the decision making bodies is even more distant. Apart from 
these key areas of exclusion, we found that equity within the command too was not 
addressed and deprivation faced by tail-enders was more than evident.  
Equity in the manner that we conceive is not part of the framework of the 
decentralization project and therefore received no attention in any of the training 
programmes organised. Not surprising, since this would mean challenging the vested 
interests at all levels and in fact spells problems for the decentralization project in the 
manner that it has been conceived. 
Sustainability: Institutional, financial and ecological   
The question of sustainability needs to be seen in the light of institutions, resources and 
finances. We discuss here each of these areas: 
                                                 
74 Here we can look at the Ek gaon ek panavtha (one village one source) campaign launched in Maharashtra 
in the early 70’s basically to launch an anti caste struggle. For details see Adhav ) 
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Institutions  
Institutional sustainability is a vast area covering institutional structures that range from 
the state level down to the village level. For the domestic water sector, new institutional 
structures were set up at the state, district and the village level and we may not comment 
on all these structures in detail here. 
The newly instituted institutions at the district level were parallel bodies to the Zilla 
parishad i.e. the district level tier of PRI. These held the power to execute the scheme. 
These were also outside the usual government apparatus used for the drinking water 
schemes like the Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran or the zillha parishad in Maharashtra. 
This did create tensions between the newly created institutions and the old guard 
institutions as those mentioned above. A reflection of this is seen in the way the old guard 
seemed to favour the ambitious Bharat Nirman scheme of which drinking water is an 
important component and does not deploy new institutional set up for its implementation. 
Whether the structures deployed for the sector reform schemes, specifically in Jalswarjya, 
are justifiable or not and need to continue, we are not in a position to comment with 
limited data in hand. Our observations do seem to indicate however that Special Purpose 
Vehicles of the kind launched in the two states (WASMO and RSPMU) did manage to 
push the schemes in a time bound manner, if that can be considered a measure of success. 
Implications of time-boundness on other aspects of decentralization have of course been 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
 The VWSC or pani samiti is a sub-committee of the gram panchayat in both the states, 
although it has received prominence over the other sub-committees due to the launch of 
these programmes.  In a sense it has also gained prominence over the gram panchayat 
since this scheme alone brings in a large amount of money to the GP. In almost all the 
villages the process of selection of the VWSC was seen as problematic. Every gram 
panchayat is supposed to constitute a sub-committee for water and sanitation out of the 
elected members. Some of these members become part of the VWSC but invariably new 
members are selected through the gramsabha to make the process more participatory. To 
avoid political conflicts and to patronize different sections very large VWSCs are seen to 
be constituted. The VWSCs are also bound by the scheme to bring in 50% women in 
Maahrashtra and 33% only in Gujarat, and a proportional representation of dalits and 
other marginalized communities. It is likely that the VWSC will not exist in the form it 
does once the scheme is completed and handing over done to the GP The VWSC draws it 
power from the fact that it can establish a separate bank account, which has signatories, 
who are not necessarily elected representatives of the GP. Sarpanch does not necessarily 
have the powers to sign nor does he/she necessarily head the VWSC.This has led to 
conflicts in some of the villages. The gram sevak or the village level worker representing 
the Block development office was also kept out of the ambit of this scheme thereby 
creating some tensions between the PS and the VWSC. The other unstated aspect is the 
exit policy- who takes over the different roles of the committees once the scheme is 
completed and handed over to the GP. In the present context it is the  gram sevak who 
collects property and water tariffs (for the old schemes). There was a lot of voluntarism 
associated with the scheme while it was still in process, especially women’s time was 
seen as important for this, but after completion, whether people would be willing to give 
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time for the management is still to be ascertained. This ambiguity may lead to 
jeopardizing the institutional sustainability of the schemes. 
In case of irrigation, we see that institutional sustainability hinges on how well the 
process of federating at different levels succeeds and how well a link with the PRIs 
(Panchayat Raj Institutions) can be established on matters of water allocation. At present 
WUAs are legal bodies registered under the new MMISFA or the Cooperative societies 
act, with defined powers. There is no ambiguity with reference to their powers and 
functions. They are delinked from the PRIs with an alibi that these are users groups and 
can do without political interference. That this does not happen in the manner it is 
conceived is evident from ground experiences. Whether they should be linked and in 
what manner are issues that we discuss a little later on the section on interlinkage 
between NRM committees and PRIs. 
Finance   
Like institutions, financial sustainability too has many dimensions and levels to it, but 
here we restrict ourselves to the local scheme level financial sustainability in terms of the 
pricing and cost recovery issues and their meaning for the communities. In the 
Jalswarajya project our data showed that of the 10 per cent public contribution only the 
first installment of 5 per cent could be collected from the community, in fact only some 
sections of the community contributed. The next five percent it was assumed would come 
from the contractor implementing the scheme. 
In fact, collection of capital contribution could form an area of independent study as it 
had an interesting politics emerging around it. Some of the needy villages dropped out of 
the scheme because they could not collect the required amount. It is said that the 10 
percent collection is also a measure to assess the capacity of the village to collect water 
tariff for O&M. This actually eliminates villages and populations who perhaps may not 
be able to manage the required resources to bring in water into their villages and lays the 
basis for inequity. We already see here the interplay between the various aspects of 
decentralization, in this case equity and financial sustainability. As far as O&M is 
concerned, there is a lot of ambiguity in government policy. While there is an effort to 
work out differential tariffs through village level participation, the process has not been 
initiated so far although many villages are at a stage of scheme completion.  
In Gujarat, there were also delays in collection of the 10 percent contribution in the 
Ghohga project, which delayed the scheme. Where village water works have been 
completed and handed over, questions of O&M have begun to surface because of the 
poor functioning of schemes as discussed earlier, and villages are reluctant to pay O&M. 
This becomes a vicious circle – when people don’t pay, water services dependent on 
external sources (Narmada-Mahi pipeline) are cut.  
Irrigation is a much more complex sector as it falls in the productive sphere where 
financial returns are expected out of the water provided. Like the domestic water sector, 
in the irrigation sector too, sector reform process has brought in elements of cost recovery 
on improvement of irrigation infrastructure. This is to the tune of Rs 500/hectare. We 
found a lot of resistance to this clause across WUAs. They argued that they are already 
left with managing a poorly maintained system on which their annual expenditures are 
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substantial. This additional cost burden therefore cannot be levied on to the farmers. The 
ID however had a similar argument of instilling sense of ownership through financial 
contributions and this saw a strong resistance in the irrigation sector unlike the domestic 
water sector. The other contentious issue here is the pricing of well recharges due to 
canals. Although introduced in the law, this has yet to materialize and this has serious 
impacts on the sustainability of water. 
WUAs are statutory bodies and have been in existence for longer than pani samitis, their 
rules are fairly well laid out, but recovery of charges is a matter of concern for almost all 
the WUAs we studied. Many of them have not audited their accounts for two years and 
have internal defaulters as well. But by and large they have not defaulted the ID and that 
is the reason why WUAs are still functioning. 
Water resource  
Sustainability of water as a resource hinges on whether its use and management is 
planned in an integrated manner. In neither the domestic water sector nor in the irrigation 
sector do we see this dialogue happening. Implementation of the domestic water scheme 
moves at its own pace and so does the logic of surface irrigation. Neither looks at the 
strengthening of the local resource and the common pooling of water. Drinking water 
schemes are not taken up in irrigated areas and hence the interface between the two 
cannot really be assessed in our case. But domestic water schemes definitely do not 
combine with the watershed based programmes that exist in the villages selected.  
Source strengthening component through water resource management – was built into the 
drinking water programme in both the states, albeit later in Gujarat. In many of our study 
villages, we saw that some kind of an effort had been made towards this end. However, in 
the Maharashtra context we saw that source sustainability was not seriously discussed in 
the gramsabha meetings. It did not form an important component of the women’s 
empowerment programme either. Yield tests to assess the sustainability of the source 
were not done systematically, there was no awareness built around the 1993 Ground 
water regulation act for drinking water which prevented the sinking of borewells in the 
vicinity of 500 mts near a drinking water source. As a result gramsabhas and the men and 
women we spoke to were uncertain that the source would not dry up for the next 12 years 
and would be sufficient to meet the requirements of a growing population with increasing 
water needs. 
In the WUAs, our observations show that unsustainable agricultural and irrigation 
practices are in fact leading to irrational use of water. Lack of understanding around crop 
water requirements, poorly maintained canals and field channels and large numbers of 
wells in the command areas are all contributing to the unsustainable use of water. 
Transparency and accountability  
An important dimension of participation and democratisation is the issue of 
accountability of larger or supra local structures and agents to the local community and 
vice versa. Since water is at the same time a local and non local resource it calls for 
several nested institutional arrangements which range from the community level 
institutions such as the pani samitis or the WUAs to the larger institutions which 
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administer these local institutions. This calls for a two way accountability mechanism as 
well. 
In the case of the pani samitis, although the source is local in most cases (however where 
the situation demanded the source has been non local as well) its sustainability often 
depends on upstream and downstream uses which will have to be monitored through 
linking with other water resource bodies, a point made later in detail. What we need to 
state here is that accountability of use often has a bearing on issues of sustainability of 
source. 
The other meaning of accountability here relates to governance and in this case we found 
a complete lack of downward accountability. We did not see mechanisms of the 
bureaucracy being accountable on its expenditures etc. to the local communities, though 
local communities had to be accountable to the water bureaucracies.  
The second aspect is that of transparency in governance. Information related to funding 
sources, the quantum of money that is coming in and also the way the money is going to 
be spent at a macro level also needs to be shared with the communities. Keeping the 
account open for public scrutiny can ensure financial transparency and accountability. 
For the first time large sums of 30-40 lakhs were being handled at the gram panchayat 
level by the pani samiti. Despite that, our findings showed that incidence of corruption 
was modest due to the constant process of monitoring, and warnings of compliance to 
time frames which was tied to the process of reimbursement of funds in installments. 
This did vary across villages, but the general tendency was towards reduced financial 
corruption. 
As far as transparency is concerned, one could see a display of all processes on the 
village walls and certain sections of the village were often well informed about the 
different processes that were taking place around the scheme in Maharashtra and in 
Gujarat. 
In the irrigation sector however this was not really the case, as there seemed no incentive 
to bring in transparency. Most of the meetings were not held in public places, the audit 
reports were discussed in the Annual general meeting which was held once a year, but 
attendance in these meetings was indeed very poor and most members we spoke to did 
not have a clue of what was happening vis a vis the decision making processes in the 
WUAs. 
Linking political institutions to water committees  
For rural men and women, citizenship is exercised through livelihoods agenda. Questions 
of primary concern to them would be around allocations and use of natural resources. For 
the state however citizenship rights are largely in the arena of political and civil rights 
(Vasan 2007, Krishna 2007). So although vested with political rights to exercise their 
vote, this limited idea of citizenship is often not sufficient to constitute democratic 
citizenship or in fact remove the poor out of poverty or women out of patriarchal 
exploitation  An expanded notion of citizenship therefore calls for seeing linkages across 
state and non state institutions. 
 212
If we look at the various committees instituted in the water sector alone they are 
numerous. We have the watershed committees, water users associations, the pani samitis 
and none of them speak to each other (Manor). We also have committees around credit 
and forest management. A large number of institutions that range from resources to 
political participation exist at the village level. Each of these institutions plays a crucial 
role in the lives of rural poor. For integrated planning around water and natural resources 
towards meaningful livelihood agendas, it might be important for these institutions to be 
linked to each other.  
For example we see here a possibility of linking the PRI with the water users groups-
Increasingly we see that service provision is being separated from the allocative and 
distributive functions of the state. The private sector in Maharashtra is being invoked for 
service provision and the state retains the control over the allocative functions. There is 
often a lingering threat that allocations too start getting compromised in favour of the 
private players to make the service provision functions more profitable. Here we envisage 
a scenario that the allocative functions remain with the PRIs through the gramsabhas, but 
service provision and management can be done through users groups. For example 
deciding who gets access to how much water should remain in the arena of broader 
political decisions, but distribution of water and recovery of water charges can clearly be 
seen as a function of user groups. So although each serves a separate function they are 
still organically linked with each other. 
Training and capacity building  
In the domestic water sector, trainings and capacity building is seen in a limited 
framework of Information education and communication or IEC75. It also focuses on skill 
development in income generating activities through a special fund. However, capability 
building is more than information and skill building. It is knowledge building by igniting 
a critical thinking process. This definitely did not happen in these projects. Neither the 
bureaucracy was keen about it nor did the NGOs/SOs (Non Government Organizations/ 
Support Organizations) use this space effectively.  
However, despite the limited framework in which IEC functioned we found that women 
were fairly well informed about the scheme. Capacity building importantly needed to 
cover an important area of unpacking the different components of decentralized 
management and women’s empowerment. Issues of water rights, equity, sustainability 
and participation needed to be discussed and a perspective development around it was 
important from the point of view of informed participation. 
The irrigation sector has anyway missed out on gender and empowerment. All the 
training modules we assessed focused only on functioning of WUAs and did not go into 
preparing water schedules and planning for rational and sustainable water use. Gender is 
addressed only through organizing trainings for women, using the same training content 
mentioned above. 
                                                 
75 Refer to the study done by Prayas in Thane district of Maharashtra evaluating the IEC component of the 
Jalswarajya programme. It critiques the programme and attributes the failure to SO’s a stringent time frame 
and lack of resources. 
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Role of NGOs/civil society  
In both the sectors in Maharashtra there appears to be an overall disregard for the role of 
the outsider. Intermediaries between the State and the CBOs are not seen as welcome and 
come in to fulfill conditions outlined in the World Bank document. They are seen as 
implementers of the scheme rather than meaningful partners in the process of change. 
This was reflected very sharply in our interviews with the NGOs/SOs. None of them felt 
that had a decisive role to play in either the overall process or in the women’s 
empowerment. In fact we felt that in Maharashtra, the state through these structures has 
created its own captive civil society as against a critical one. While in Gujarat, in 
contrast, civil society has had a very strong role in the success of the WASMO-Ghogha 
and ERR projects, though this is more limited in the case of Swajaldhara schemes per se, 
which we did not look at.  
What does this mean for gender politics?  
At the outset, it may be important to state that decision making process especially in the 
domestic water sector does come closer to certain sections of the community and at least 
brings in a language of ownership among these sections. In fact, the idea of ownership 
has been instilled rather well and has become a symbol and a political imperative to 
advance the interests of this reform process. This has been internalized in both the states 
particularly in Maharashtra, however not always without resistance by the communities.  
While introduction of quotas have created a space for women we can see from the above 
discussion on performance of decentralization how difficult a terrain it is for them to 
participate effectively. Despite this overwhelming constraint, women in the domestic 
water sector still seem to be coming out and seeing a perceptible change in their own 
selves as significant stakeholders in village politics.   
Notion of representation and participation in public sphere has served women who did 
not otherwise possess a public voice and identity to demand that their points of view be 
heard. The right vested through public participation allows them a space to demand for 
change. PRIs are a good example of how despite the debates around male proxies women 
have come out and utilized that space to their advantage, overcoming structural 
constraints. The idea of them as a significant constituency when politicians or bureaucrats 
make plans does empower women. Such new ideas instituted through spaces of such a 
kind do contribute to changed perceptions about one self even in the wake of added 
responsibilities. This is evident through the discussions we had with over 200 women 
from both the states. It is a slow process and also highly differentiated across caste, tribe 
and class lines and change may come through gradually if the systems are strengthened in 
different ways. It assumes of course that the commitment to decentralization is not 
abandoned with the completion of the scheme. 
The process of empowerment of women gets a push wherever there is a strong initiative 
from either the civil society, local NGOs, or in some cases even an active and committed 
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bureaucracy. As mentioned earlier we see empowerment and participation as a process 
and to that extent the domestic water sector in both the states does hold some hope76. 
The irrigation sector has completely missed out on the agenda of women and this largely 
comes from its acceptance of the dominant narrative of the normative woman who can go 
far enough to participate in welfare/health and hygiene oriented sectors of sanitation and 
drinking water but no further. This image dominates and reflects in the lethargy of the ID 
to provide any active policy or programmatic incentives for women to participate. 
Caste, class, tribe and gender- the politics of exclusion  
Inclusion and participation in sector reforms process is critical from the point of view of 
ensuring that the hitherto excluded sections like women, dalits and the poor participate 
and benefit from water use planning. The influence that these sections can exert over 
decision making processes seems to be limited in our study areas. As we know that 
although the effort is to include, there are several non sectoral aspects of human life that 
have already created unequal terms of participation. 
In both the domestic water sector and in irrigation we found that caste was a major barrier 
in participation. Although proportionately represented in the pani samitis, they were the 
least vocal. Most of the ‘no responses’ category in our interviews largely had dalit and 
tribal women in it. A formal ability to participate across caste, class and gender in the 
domestic water sector, could not be realized due to their inability to negotiate and 
articulate on equal terms due to historical conditions of structured inequalities. So women 
did not speak up in these meetings or usually ratified what men said, or dalits and tribals 
did not speak or attend the meetings. The very goals of decentralization then need to be 
questioned if they fail to address some of these non- project terms of inequity. 
The state takes the position that once handed over to the community, it will not be 
involved in the micro-management of the scheme where decisions regarding which 
people or which women participate and why? These questions are best left at the mercy 
of local moralities and how the vested interests deal with it. We have already seen this 
reflected in our interviews with pani samiti functionaries and women members where 
there was a reification of the leaders’ ‘goodness’ to have a differential capital 
contribution regime. In Gujarat, in some villages, pani samiti members even questioned 
the participation of others – the broader community - in decision-making on water, 
arguing that they (the others, or non PS members) were not interested and therefore did 
not need to be involved, also implying the moral superiority of PS members.  
Gender relations and the family  
Addressing patriarchy through the water sector becomes an even more contentious issue 
and the State does not see a role for itself there. Most democratic institutions including 
the pani samitis and WUAs are of a public kind and do not really engage with, affect or 
attempt to influence domestic and familial life. However if gender relations are 
understood as part of a larger understanding of social relations of production, and water is 
                                                 
76 This is evident from our discussions with both the government officials as well as with the women 
themselves. 
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seen as a means of production and a source of life then the state cannot evade its 
responsibility of addressing inequities in the relations of reproduction. In the water sector 
it means not only including women, landless, tribals and dalits in improving access and 
participation in decision making, but also addressing the public private divide and 
women’s roles (gender division of work) that need to straddle across these two. 
Opportunity costs  
Women in the domestic water sector felt euphoric about participating in public decision 
making processes. They did not see attending meetings as additional burdens and in fact 
said that they had to complete their domestic work to ‘earn’ a space in the public sphere. 
These are opportunity costs but not seen as an additional burden by women themselves. 
Often these have been borne by other women of the household who are lower in the 
familial hierarchy – daughters and daughter in laws. 
Reconceptualising women and water: water for livelihoods 
approach  
Categorical thinking about domestic water and irrigation and men and women is common 
place now and affects among several things how policies and programmes are shaped. 
Spaces are divided on what is masculine and what is feminine- the home and the outside 
world. Men’s identities therefore are linked to the public sphere, money and power while 
women’s identities revolve around the home, nurture and subsistence. These identities 
transmit in exactly the same manner in the water sector and the sectoral divide is proof to 
this. It can be argued, that such categorical, dual thinking has worked to the advantage of 
women, in so far as it has given them space to participate in decision making around 
drinking water.  However, we cannot overlook the fact that these very advantages in fact 
can be counterproductive and distance women from entering other spheres of work, 
which in this case is the irrigation sector. Nor do they question women’s continuing role 
in water collection and maintaining household hygiene through careful water use at 
home. 
Alternatives lie in re-conceptualising women and men’s work on the one hand and also 
creating a new understanding of water. We then go back to our normative understanding 
around water and the need to visualize a water paradigm within those broader concerns, 
albeit informed by local contexts and concerns. The vision of water for livelihoods 
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